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ABSTRACT
In the search for nursing knowledge for practical, professional,
academic and personal purposes, criteria for its identification
need to be developed. The conceptualization of a nursing
perspective emerges as a primary and fundamental task in this
endeavour.
Current attempts to develop nursing knowledge are often
irrelevant, arbitrary, and inappropriate. The conviction
that empirical methods of investigation alone cannot produce
nursing knowledge has led to infrequent, generally fragmented
and often confused attempts to clarify the meaning of philosophical
enquiries in nursing.
Most claims to a 'philosophy of nursing1 misrepresent
ideological statements as philosophical concerns and obscure the
essential meaning of philosophical enquiries. 'Nursing ethics'
fail to engage in the criticism and analysis of moral arguments.
Theory construction and development indicate essential philosophical
concerns in nursing.
It seems necessary to examine philosophers' explanations
of the purposes of philosophy, the nature of philosophical problems,
the methods used in philosophical enquiries, the contents of the
discipline of philosophy, and its relationship with other disciplines.
The potential development of nursing knowledge by relevant
philosophical enquiries demands that four fundamental philosophical
tasks be accomplished, namely, limiting the search for knowledge,
thinking methodically and systematically about nursing, identifying
the philosophical demands of the research process, and constructing
and developing nursing theories.
The essential nature of philosophical enquiries demands that
all nurses need to participate at some level and to some extent
in accomplishing these four fundamental tasks, if nursing is to
be established as a practice discipline.
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FOREWARNINGS
In presenting my argument, I have adopted certain features
which ought to be explained at the beginning for the reader's
ease and comfort.
One of my principal aims in writing this thesis is to
demonstrate a particular kind of argument. It lies in the nature
of a philosophical enquiry, especially when it is conducted by
means of an internal dialogue, that the argument reaches points
where a question needs to be pursued that may appear to be somewhat
digressive. I could, of course, have tidied away any such
digressions (and if they were of a minor nature, I have done so).
But it appears to me to be an essential characteristic of this
kind of investigation, that questions emerge which must be dealt
with in the enquirer's mind before the main thread of the argument
can be developed further.
I have therefore deliberately exposed what might be called the
occasionally cluttered underground route of my thinking rather than
provide the reader with a guided tour through an uncluttered
overground route from which all obstacles and thickets of potential
confusion have been removed. Part of my concern of showing the
development of my thoughts and of the resulting argument is the
decision not to separate or split up trains of thought by
introducing subheadings.
Although the reader's task might have been made easier in
some ways by indicating with a subheading that a particular point
has been dealt with and another one is now being considered, I
fear that this advantage may be outweighed by greater disadvantages.
First of all I need to express a fundamental objection to the
impression that may be created by subheadings (rightly in other
enquiries, but wrongly here).
This is that they tend to convey the idea that all that needs
to be said about a topic, for example, about the purposes of
philosophical enquiries, is to be found under that subheading.
This is, and cannot be the case in my argument. More may be said
about a particular point in one place but a great deal must be
said about it elsewhere. What I wish to avoid is the impression
of finality that organising material under subheadings might create.
Secondly, using subheadings might lead to the expectation
that reading what follows a particular subheading should be
perfectly intelligible as it stands.
Although I have striven for intelligibility at all times,
the nature of this argument demands that one hears all of it
before one may accept or dismiss it wholly or in parts.
I would like to think that this thesis is read as a whole.
But having indicated distinct parts, I would expect each part
to be capable of a comparatively independent scrutiny.
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I have adopted a particular way of indicating words and
phrases which may not have an indisputable meaning, or which, in
my opinion, are used frequently in a somewhat narrowed, misleading
or distorted form, by putting single quotation marks around them.
For example, 'science' means that I am not certain whether
in the given context the word as it is usually employed, is
appropriate and unambiguous.
I quite like the idea of calling the words and phrases which
I have indicated in this way, 'fuzzies'.
Anything in double quotation marks indicates a "quote", be
it a word, a sentence, or a paragraph, and its acknowledgement
should be found close by.
Occasionally, arabic figures in the text refer to notes
at the end of each part of the thesis.
I adopted this convention to provide myself with an opportunity
to elaborate, question, or explain a point when such elaboration,
questioning, or explanation would have seriously interrupted the
flow of that part of the argument. Another important need that
is partly fulfilled by the notes was to find ways of indicating
the essential dialectic of my argument.
The essence of this kind of enquiry is the participation of
others who question, suggest answers, accept counter-questions
and examine profferlred answers; or to use another phrase, who
take issue with me.
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I have tried to take issue in this sense in three main
ways: by questioning and examining what other people have said
(in writing), by questioning myself, and by responding to
issues raised by those who came along on this journey of
discovery.
The first two ways of taking issue are whereever possible,
made explicit in the main text of the argument. The third way
may, on occasion, be found in the notes.
Finally, I have found it useful in thinking about some of
the issues which I am about to present, to use German words in
order to clarify quite essential distinctions. I trust that
their meaning becomes quite apparent in the context of the
discussion where I found them to be rather indispensable. As
I do use them repeatedly, however, without each time explaining
as much about them as when they were first introduced, I offer
a brief glossary as a guide, should one be needed.
vi












cancellation or nullification by two
opposing forces
meaning in a particular context;
also the importance a person attaches
to words, objects or actions
without meaning in a particular context;
without importance for a situation or
a person
literally, a picture; also a mental
picture or image; an impression
the process by which a person acquires,
forms and develops knowledge; a sound
comprehensive knowledge of the world
past and present; the development of
a conscious, articulate world view
form; configuration; a pattern with
its distinct features; an impression
of the totality of the features of an
object, a situation, a process
the ability to do something; to be
able to do something well in a particular
sphere
the ability to do something creatively
and elegantly, par excellence, in a
pleasing manner; complete mastery in
a particular sphere; the art of the
outstanding practitioner
the field of practice
the rightness of a claim; without
mistakes; accuracy
rational meaning of words and actions;
purpose and general validity
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sinnlos without rational meaning; for
no purpose; invalid
Wahrhe-it the truth of a claim; congruence
with the facts; agreement between
thoughts, words and actions
Weltanschauung a particular way of looking at the
world and the nature of man; an
acceptance of particular purposes and
goals in the development of the world
and man; a world outlook; an ideology
Weltbtld a person's comprehensive knowledge of
the world and man; a picture, mental
image, or impression of the world around
us and of our place in it
Wissen clear, precise and rational
knowledge
Wissenschaft systematic, methodical search for
knowledge and understanding in a
particular field with appropriate
methods of enquiry, and with known
criteria for the acceptability of
results; a discipline characterized
by research, and the ordering of
knowledge
The explanations in this glossary are based on
Duden : Bedeutungsworterbuch





Words often fail us when they are most needed. There are
no words in the English language to indicate briefly but
adequately what has led me to the writing of this work. The
lack of linguistic and conceptual equivalents to some German
words like 'Bildung' and 'Wissensehaft' will not only make
these introductory comments lengthier than they might have been,
but it may also reveal important epistemological questions in
nursing.
This thesis is essentially concerned with a particular
aspect of nurses' current quest for knowledge, namely with
philosophical enquiries in nursing. These are at present
somewhat arbitrary, certainly ill-defined, often misleadingly
superficial and generally, perhaps wisely, ignored by both nurse
theorists and practitioners. The urgency with which at least
some nurses are searching for valid and reliable knowledge
appears to be largely directed towards establishing a very narrow
and it seems to me, potentially dubious 'science' of nursing.
Both the unsatisfactory, confusing state of nursing philosophy
and the fragmented approach to a limiting nursing science may
be related to the inability of many English-speaking nurse
theorists and writers to conceive of different kinds of 'knowledge'
set in a wider context than that of a narrowly defined 'science'.1*
* arabic figures refer to notes which follow each part
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Knowledge in the sense in which much of the nursing literature
presents it, is concerned with facts, their relationships,
their causality and their effects. Nursing knowledge at
present is largely disconnected and disjointed, and I would fear
will remain so, because it lacks form and structure as a whole.
It is perhaps not just coincidence that the German word 'Bitching'
derives from the word 'Bild', meaning a picture. A picture has
a form partly imposed by its frame, partly by its subject matter.
The latter, along with the chosen technique of representation,
will influence its structure. Nursing lacks a consistent
framework, is uncertain of its subject matter and often uses
techniques of representation arbitrarily and randomly.^
'Bildung' denotes a process by which an individual acquires
coherent, comprehensive, integrated and conceptualized knowledge
about the world.
Here two other German words would be useful to draw an
important distinction. 'Bildung' should be the process which
leads to a 'Wettbild' but not necessarily to a 'Weltanschauung'.
Part of the process leading to a 'Weltbild' consists of the
acquisition of knowledge but being knowledgeable is not enough.
'Wissen' (i.e. knowledge) is not the same as 'Bildung'
(i.e. coherent, integrated and conceptualized knowledge).
The possession of 'Bildung' allows the individual to develop
a coherent and integrated view of his or her world leading to a
consistent 'Weltbild' (i.e. a picture or an image of the world).
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To construct a picture of one's world as it might be rather
than as it is, to invest in certain values by which one would
endeavour to change one's world in certain ways or by which one
would endeavour to preserve those features of it which are
consistent with one's values, would lead to an ideological
conception of the world or to a 'Weltanschauung1.
Following this line of reasoning one might argue that just
knowing some things in or about nursing is not the same as
nursing knowledge and that a conceptualization of nursing is not
identical with a nursing ideology.
Furthermore, some knowledge in the narrower sense of 'Wissen'
may well be 'right' within an accepted mode of enquiry rather than
that it expresses some relevant or valid truth about nursing.
This distinction between what may be 'right' rather than 'true'
might again be more readily appreciated if I could use the
language of a German philosopher of science, Haeckel, who contrasted
'Richti-gkeit' with 'Wahrheit' in the context of nineteenth
century natural science research. In a very simple way one
might illustrate the difference between 'Richtigkeit' and
'Wahrheit' by examining a statement which involves numerical
concepts and a simple arithmetical method. If I say, "There
are 10,000 nurses in a hospital all working a 60 hour week
therefore providing 600,000 hours of service per week", I have
made a statement which is right in the context of arithmetic but
which cannot be true in the context of nursing since there is no
hospital with that many nurses who all work such long hours.
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It might still be a useful statement for someone who is
learning arithmetic since the ' R'tcht^■gl<e'it, of its mathematical
content would be the primary concern of the person who made it.
It would obviously be of no use to a nurse manager in predicting
budgetary needs since its 'Wahrheit' in nursing is rather
doubtful. This distinction seems to be a useful one to remember
when nurses voice some disenchantment with the results of
certain kinds of nursing research.
"Within the nursing profession there has been undue
reliance upon theoretical constructs borrowed from other
disciplines and uncritical acceptance of them - both
with regard to their inherent validity and to their
usefulness in explaining and making reliable predictions
about the complex phenomena encountered in nursing
practice." (Schlotfeldt 1971)
This comment by a nurse appears to point to the distinction
which I consider important here: an investigation may well be
'right1 in the terms of the discipline in which it is carried out
without holding any 'truth' for nursing.3
It is necessary for knowledge to be placed in, and to be
illuminated by, a context which perhaps might best be described as
humanistic. One feature of the European humanistic tradition
expressed in the notion of 'Bildung' is more than a passing
acquaintance with the contributions of philosophy to the
understanding of our world.
One concern that has led me to writing this thesis is that
nurses by and large do not understand their world, i.e. nursing.
A second concern arises from the first. Many nurses wish to
create a picture of nursing by intensive 'scientific' investigations.
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It seems that the narrowness of 'knowledge' in nursing is
reflected in the often limited sense in which the English word
'science' is used.
Chalmers (1978) suggests that statements like
"Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge. Scientific
theories are derived in some rigorous way from the facts
of experience acquired by observation and experiment.
Science is based on what we can see and hear and touch,
etc. Personal opinion or preferences and speculative
imaginings have no place in science. Science is
objective. Scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge
because it is objectively proven knowledge." ,
sum up what is essentially a modern, naive inductivist account
of 'science' which is not only wrong but dangerously misleading.
Williams (1976) provides an account of how the English word
'science' came to be used specifically and exclusively to denote
"the successful methods of the natural sciences, primarily
physics, chemistry and biology. Other studies might
be theoretical and methodical, but this was not now the
main point; it was the hard objective character of the
material and the method ... which was taken as defining."
The problems created by this specific and exclusive use of
the word 'science' are mainly that the methods of physics,
chemistry and biology are seen to be the only methods of all the
sciences and that 'knowledge' comes to equal 'science' which
equals 'the scientific method', so that anything that can be
known at all can only be known by the methods of the empirical,
experimental sciences. (Putnam 1978)
In contrast to the now prevailing limited sense of the word
'science', the German word ' Wi-ssenschaft' which is commonly
translated as 'science', has a much less restricted meaning
since it denotes any body of organised knowledge that has been
acquired in a systematic manner by quite different methods of
enquiry. The harm that a very narrow concept of what constitutes
'science' inflicts is primarily that it casts doubt on the
legitimacy and respectability of any form of human enquiry which
does not fall within its definition.^ If nurses allow themselves
to be confined to the apparently more legitimate and more
respectable 'real sciences', they will fail to explore many
important aspects of nursing and they will limit rather than
extend the understanding of what nursing is or might be. Philosophy
presents such a body of organised knowledge outwith the narrowly
defined 'sciences' which it has acquired by methods quite
different from those employed by 'real scientists'.
Whether or not it is due to the generally narrower concept
of knowledge or the limited conception of science, nurse theorists
generally shy away from philosophical enquiries. Whether or not
the lack of wider concepts such as 'Bildung', 'Wissensehaft'
and 'Wahrheit' also excludes the possibility of becoming more
thoroughly familiar with current philosophical concerns and
approaches than many nurse writers appear to be, when 'philosophy'
does make an appearance in the nursing literature, it frequently
denotes subjects and activities which are not necessarily the
philosopher's domain, nor the only concern of philosophical
enquiry.
This thesis is an attempt to present an argument concerning
the meaning and relevance of philosophical enquiries in nursing.
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It must therefore largely ignore many aspects of philosophical
debate and must deliberately focus on what Winch (1958) calls
the "underlabourer conception" of philosophy in the service of
other enterprises.5
The main point of the argument is that nurses are engaged
in a search for knowledge, that philosophers have certain kinds
of knowledge and demonstrable ways of acquiring them and that
nurses on occasions attempt to utilize these for their own
purposes. But they very often do this badly. To utilize
philosophical enquiries more effectively, nurses must cease to
be arbitrary, subjectively selective and superficial in their
concerns with philosophical issues or their misuse of what
philosophy may have to offer will continue to produce largely
irrelevant, confusing and distorted results. The misuse of
philosophy in nursing can only be remedied if nurses can
conceptualize the potential development of nursing knowledge,
if they understand more clearly the nature of philosophical
enquiries and if they can develop a consistent approach to
philosophical issues in nursing.
This argument does not start by posing a question, nor even
a series of questions but by stating some possibly logically
related assumptions. It does not regard these assumptions as
irrefutable or inviolable, but rather as a starting point for
the enquiry.
In the pursuit of this argument, many questions will be
raised. Some may be amenable to further philosophical enquiry,
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others may be of a kind that should be subjected to 'scientific'
investigations. It may well be that the questions that are
already implied in the outlined argument are not the most
important ones to ask but that others emerge which turn out to
be far more crucial. I believe that one does not know
necessarily at the outset of a philosophical argument what is
crucial, and that this is an essential feature of this mode of
enquiry.
I have considered carefully the form of the presentation
of this argument. The style, form and structure of philosophical
treatises vary considerably with the topic in hand, with the
philosophical tradition that a writer prefers and feels most
comfortable with and reasonably competent in emulating, and with
the audience who is invited to share in the argument.
I would like to think that an old tradition in philosophical
discourse still demonstrates one of the fundamental methods of
philosophical enquiry: the conversational method of argument
involving question and answer which is described by the Greek
word 'dialectic' meaning 'to converse' or 'to dicourse'. It
appears to me appropriate in the context of this argument not
only because it avoids the complexities and pitfalls of more
formal presentations but also because it demonstrates directly
some important characteristics of a philosophical enterprise.
A philosophical argument of that nature is an individual
and personal statement, and although following certain rules
and conventions, it should never pretend to an objectivity or
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neutrality which is foreign to it. The work and the writer
are not external to the task as tools or observers. The writer
must question and take issues with the work as it proceeds, in
the same manner in which this would be done by a thoughtful
conversational partner.
Campion (1979) showed in an imaginative and compelling way
that the "manner of dealing with the materials around us displays
our efforts to continue thinking as we do." Although greatly
influenced by Campion's work, I shall in no specific way emulate
his approach, much as I admire it as a resolute realization of
the dialectic method. This may certainly be partly due to
my limitations, but partly is a consequence of what I consider
to be the individual and subjective nature of this form of
enquiry. I shall try to follow Campion's example "to listen
thoughtfully to what we have been, and are saying as we continue
writing." But I need to say it in my own way. I shall in the
absence of a conversational partner conduct what might best be
described as an 'inner dialogue'. Unlike Campion who could
transform himself into the 'we' of the opposing sides of the
argument, I shall relate my thoughts as 'I', since I feel
intellectually and emotionally incapable of representing
different personae. But direct and personal speech will be used
as the proper medium of a dialectic discourse.
Dialectic reasoning often emphasizes the importance of
questions over the possible finality of potential answers.
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"There can be nothing 'clinching' in philosophy: 'proofs'
and 'disproofs' hold only for those who adopt certain
premisses, who are willing to follow certain rules of
argument, and who use their terms in certain definite
ways. And every proof or disproof can be readily
evaded, if one questions the truth of its premisses, or
the validity of its type of inference, or if one finds
new senses in which its terms may be used." (Findlay 1949)
Vesey (1972) warns his readers that "Philosophy is not a
spectator sport". I wish to encourage the reader to participate
in the argument.
It is in many ways essential to the whole argument as well
as to the question of participation that it must draw the distinction
between the use of scientific knowledge in its narrower sense,
and the ways in which philosophy may be of use, in nursing.
One major difference is that nurses may well use the results
of scientific enquiry without participating in or repeating the
experiments or observations which have produced these outcomes.
In philosophical enquiries it is essential that nurses participate
in the enquiry.
One regrettable limitation to the chosen format of presentation
has already been mentioned, i.e. my inability to produce literally
a dialogue which would come nearest to the real essence of a
dialectical discourse. I would go further and argue that the
most effective and convincing philosophical activity lies in
a face-to-face verbal exchange. However, this limitation
offers one opportunity which neither a 'real conversation'
nor a reconstructed dialogue would easily permit. I shall
deliberately indicate sources of information and knowledge
probably beyond the usual expectations in a philosophical work.
10
The reason for this is threefold. Firstly, my argument is
largely based on what I claim that philosophers say they do.
It might be appropriate to substantiate my claims in this respect
to some extent. Secondly, nurses often (if mistakenly) feel
that philosophical discussions do not refer to or utilize
verifiable facts. It may be opportune to demonstrate that
this assumption is not true. Thirdly, although I agree with
Campion that "thoughts aren't worth having, if by having is
meant possessing as property; and private property at that",
I do not wish to claim as my thoughts what I have gained from
others. Thinking is worth doing both with my thoughts and
those of others who shared them with me as I am prepared to
share mine with others. If we did not do so, we "would be
allowing ourselves to be possessed by facts the true value or
virtue of which we had not inquired about", as Campion rightly
points out.
I shall only consider this argument to have been worthwhile,
if I can genuinely recognize and own up to the fact that I am
at a loss when either a question, a possible answer or an
anticipated progression elude me. But I fully agree with Campion
that "genuine inquiry ... does not settle for what it imagines
it already knows it can stand but ... chooses to extend itself."
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NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
The concept of 'knowledge' has raised numerous and complex
philosophical questions which usually are dealt with by
either epistemologists or by the philosophers of mind.
Epistemological questions rather than those concerning
the nature of the knowing person's mind underlie this
argument here. The search for knowledge as an objectively
ascertainable certainty and as an indivisible entity
whether in a Platonic or Hegelian form has had many critics.
Although the apparent objectivity of Plato's forms and the
rationality of Hegel's historical dialectic have been shown
to lead to an infinite regression of proof, the twin notions
that there is only one kind of 'real' knowledge with an
ascertainable degree of objectivity have by no means
disappeared. It is against this conception of knowledge
as something indivisible and as an homogenous whole that
I would wish to argue. Epistemological endeavours are
now mainly concerned with explanations of the many particular
kinds of knowledge and with their canons of proof and
acceptability. Hirst's proposition (1974) that there are
different forms of knowledge and awareness such as the
empirical, the mathematical, the philosophical, the moral,
the aesthetic, the religious and possibly the historical/
sociological with their own distinctive tests for truth
can be taken as a point of departure in my argument.
A searching analysis of Hirst's position which is beyond
the scope of this work is provided by Brent (1978).
A passing reminder by one of my supervisors that the German
word 'Gestalt' is not directly translatable into English
either made me aware of its potential likeness to what I
wished to convey by introducing the word 'Bit-d' into the
argument. A standard explanation of 'Gestalt' as offered by
Flew (1979) as an organised, coherent whole whose parts are
determined by laws intrinsic to the whole rather than being
randomly juxtaposed or associated, would certainly bring out
its opposition to the atomistic empirical tradition which I
see to be dominating a great deal of nursing research. I
would suggest, however, that 'Gestalt' implies a dynamism
in a visual, perceptual and interpretative process in which
'seeing' is essentially a phenomenological creation in so far
as what is 'seen' is what appears to the seer rather than what
may actually be there. Apart from the fact that 'Gestalt'
has become a central concept in a specific psychological
theory and using it in this context here may lead to
expectations with which I cannot deal in my argument, I
also feel that the word has a more pressing quality and a
less descriptive connotation than the word 'Bild'.
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The concepts of 'validity' and 'reliability' which are
central to any research endeavour come to mind here. They
do not, however, express precisely the point which I am
trying to make. Let us assume that a piece of social
science research is valid in the sense that the questions
asked or hypotheses posed are legitimate sociological concerns
and that the methods employed yield data which are relevant
and lead to answers or proofs which are acceptable to
sociologists. Let us further assume that the chosen methods
yield consistent, accurate and precise data. Such a piece
of research would be both valid and reliable. Nevertheless,
although being 'right' as a piece of sociological research,
its hypotheses, methods, data or proofs may not be either
valid or reliable in the context of nursing. It may not
pose questions or hypotheses which are derived from a
conceptualization of nursing (and indeed as a piece of
sociological research one would not expect that it does so),
its methods when applied to nursing questions may yield
inappropriate or irrelevant answers, and any replication of
the enquiry in nursing may produce unreliable results.
The fundamental issue here is, I believe, that 'validity'
and 'reliability' are intradisciplinary judgements to decide
whether an investigation is both right and true within the
terms of that discipline. The knowledge that is the result
of a valid and reliable investigation may well be of use
to other disciplines but this does not necessarily mean
that other disciplines would endeavour to identify and
create their own knowledge in exactly the same way.
The effects of scientism (i.e. the belief that 'real knowledge'
can only be acquired by the methods of the empirical sciences)
range from the strangely anthropomorphic notion of a
'mature' science (like physics) to the many areas of study
which are described and 'defended' as 'sciences' by their
supporters, presumably in an effort to regain the confidence
and respectability which appear to have been taken from them.
So it may come about that some historians now refer to their
subject as 'historical science'. Disciplines which developed
after the natural sciences were elevated to a kind of prototype
of all forms of legitimate human enquiry, tend to aspire to
the accolade of being considered 'scientific'. Political
science and social science are now commonplace. But it would
be misleading to think that this apparently extended use of the
word 'science' denoted a return to its original meaning
derived from the Latin word 'scientia' meaning simply 'knowledge'.
The claim of these disciplines to be 'sciences' is not based
on some inherent worthwhileness of their endeavours justifiable
in their own terms but on the degree to which they can emulate
the natural sciences in their methods. Chalmers (1978)
tells of the inscription on the facade of the Social Science
Research Building at the University of Chicago which reads,
"If you cannot measure, your knowledge is meagre and
unsatisfactory." It seems a small step from this mistaken
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assertion to the world of advertising where a product is
said to be superior to its rivals by having been subjected
to 'scientific tests' showing it to be whiter, brighter
or more potent.
Winch's critique of defining philosophy only in terms of
what it may contribute to the clarification and to the
solution of problems in other disciplines appears to me to
be justified. His main aim is to demonstrate that philosophy
oan be distinguished from other arts or sciences by its
subject matter and not only by its methods, that it has
problems of its own and that it does not only provide
"a technique for solving problems thrown up in the course of
non-philosophical investigations." But in doing so, he
does perhaps inevitably, ignore the essential contributions
of philosophical enquiries in the service of other disciplines.
Without denying that philosophy deals with its own germane
problems, but also without attempting to prove or disprove
the assertion that philosophy has a subject matter of its
own, the whole purpose of my argument is to examine in what
way, if any, philosophical enquiries may be relevant to and
meaningful in nursing. If the phrase 'philosophy of nursing'
had not been so terribly misused (by nurses) and had therefore
become rather suspect to me, I would be satisfied, if my
argument contributed to a genuine 'philosophy of nursing'
in the same way in which a philosopher-historian may contribute
to the philosophy of history or a philosopher-scientist to the
philosophy of science.
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PART ONE THE JOURNEY
The search for nursing knowledge, its
practical, professional and academic
purposes; criteria for different aspects
of nursing knowledge leading to the
relationship of the forms to the contents
of the new knowledge; conceptualizing
nursing in order to identify new nursing
knowledge; sources of knowledge for
nursing including irrelevant, arbitrary
and inappropriate selections; the arts
in nursing and the art of nursing
reconciled; questions of substance and
syntax leading to infrequent, fragmented
and confusing attempts at explaining the
nature of philosophical enquiries in
nursing.
THE JOURNEY
"... nursing is now an anxious profession", claims an
American professor of nursing. (Schlotfeldt 1975) I would
argue that nursing has always been a worrying profession. I
believe this to be true in two senses. Nurses have, since the
days of Florence Nightingale, always worried about the nature and
purpose of nursing, about their tasks and functions, about the
most effective way of preparing nurses, and about the relationship
of nursing to other caring groups, especially to medical doctors.
The establishment of nursing as a formal occupation in the
mid-nineteenth century in the United Kingdom was in itself the
outcome of another kind of worry about nursing. Those who
required nursing, or people who spoke and acted on their behalf,
demanded a better service of the kind that nurses were considered
best suited to provide for society.
Neither the worry of nurses about nursing nor that of others
about nurses and nursing has ever ceased and occupies the
profession to this day in almost every country in the world.
But the focus of nurses' concerns has changed in some ways which
are significant for this argument. While the public continues
by and large, to demand more nurses and better nursing services
in terms of numbers, distributions, enticements and rewards,
nurses themselves have introduced a new aspect to the debate
about nursing. The suggested solutions to the problems which
apparently beset the nursing profession in the first half of this
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century concentrated largely on the need for recruiting, training
and retaining more nurses. (Baly 1973) From the 1950's onward,
the demand for more nurses was frequently accompanied, if not
entirely replaced, by a strongly expressed desire for a new
knowledge in nuvsing. To have and to hold more nurses as such
appeared no longer, especially to nurses themselves, to be the
only solution. If more nurses were needed, they also needed
to be different.
Here, a question that may be answerable by a critical
historical enquiry comes to my mind in perusing the literature
from which I have formulated the above assertions about the two
kinds of worry about nursing.
It may well be that nurses themselves have always been more
concerned with rather more fundamental questions about the service
which they are expected to provide than the reports of the first
half of this century seem to indicate. It is only since 1941
when the Royal College of Nursing set up the Nursing Reconstruction
Committee which reported between 1942 and 1949 that nurses have
been represented in greater numbers on committees and working
groups which set out to examine nursing nationally, or that
enquiries of this nature have been set up by nurses themselves.
(Baly 1973) It may be instructive to compare briefly two reports
which were not too distant in time from each other.
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"A Reform of Nursing Education" (the Piatt Report) was
published in 1964. Over 62% of the committee members were
nurses. "The Staffing of Mental Deficiency Hospitals" (the
Batchelor Report) was published in 1970. In a membership of
ten, only one nurse qualified and experienced in the care of
mentally deficient people served on the committee. While the
Piatt Report could say that
"the nurse must ... asume the responsibilities of
leadership ... adopt a critical approach to her work and
... adjust to changing conditions...",
the Batchelor Report concluded that the extension of the nurse's
functions "towards education and training ... and ... towards a
greater degree of participation and even leadership ..." is not
desirable and that it had not been possible "to identify any
techniques of nursing which are peculiar to this field of work."
One may wonder what influence a reverse ratio of nurse representation
on these committees may have had on the conclusions which were
reached, if one assumes that nurse members may have been more
concerned with rather more fundamental questions about nursing
than non-nurse members.
In any case, in "A Reform of Nursing Education" the hope
that the study of nursing would become a suitable subject for
study at university level was expressed for the first time in a
published report.
The "Report of the Committee on Nursing" (1972) reaffirmed
on a broader basis this new look at nursing and demanded that
efforts should be directed towards making nursing a more research
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based profession. It was no longer felt to be sufficient for the
education of the professional nurse of the future to "remain at
the level of a training in procedures". Such skills as nurses
may acquire have "to be supported by a rationale, a scientific
basis for action". A theoretical basis for nursing action,
well-founded in scientific principles, many writers agree, is
essential to the provision of effective nursing care. Although
nurses are as yet in the early stages of theory construction and
are still engaged predominantly in the endeavour to describe what
actually happens in nursing, the search for a new knowledge in
nursing and the efforts to "see nursing in a new light"
(McFarlane 1976) have become declared aims of many nurse writers
and theorists.
Here, I feel that I must pause and consider what the foregoing
part of the argument has established. Apart from a speculative
diversion which does not appear to be fundamental to the general
trend of thought, I have stated a fact, that is, an observable
and even measurable phenomenon: nurses are saying that they need
a new knowledge. But a fact as such is worthless.1
I can also state the fact that the land area of Scotland
covers 29,798 square miles. What might make this factual
statement interesting, useful, amazing, or boring is the response
that it evokes in the listener who attaches a particular meaning
to it, and not necessarily the same meaning as other listeners
might do. It is also feasable that a listener shows no response
at all to this statement of fact.
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To be able to respond at all, the listener must be numerate
and must have some idea what sort of land area constitutes one
or ten or one hundred square miles. In other words, he must be
able to conceptualize to some extent what this verbal statement
means. How he responds to the meaning of this fact will depend
on the context in which he chooses to put this item of factual
information.2 A land surveyor who is about to set up a plan
of work might find the information useful in deciding how many
people he should engage and for how long. A sheep farmer might
want to know how much of this land is grazable before he considers
this fact to be of any interest to him. A traveller might simply
be amazed or disappointed to find that Scotland is so large or so
small, depending on her previous assumptions and on her experiences
of travel.
'Nurses need a new knowledge' is a statement that acquires
its meaning by the particular response which it evokes in the
listener. It is a complex statement and it could elicit any
number of responses. The response may initially depend on the
word which appears to stand out for an individual listener: nurses,
need, new, or knowledge.
My immediate response is to the word 'new'. This may
indicate that, as a nurse, I assume that nurses have already
some knowledge that is needed in some way or other, but that I
am puzzled by the demand for 'new' knowledge. Why do nurses
need a new knowledge?
20
Henderson (1966) in quoting a government report, offers as
a reason that a "body of knowledge (is) needed as a basis for
the improvement of nursing care". Scott Wright (1973a) sees
"a deep and broad enough range of knowledge" as a means for the
nurse to function effectively. McFarlane (1978) considers it
axiomatic "that the art of nursing consists of actions of a
nursing nature which are informed by knowledge or science".
Without knowledge, she asserts, the "quality of practice degenerates
into routine or sentiment and becomes unsafe". She goes further
by indicating a moral duty for the nurse to use "available and
relevant knowledge" and describes a nurse who fails to do so as
"guilty of negligence".
Not all writers emphasize primarily the need for knowledge
in the context of greater nurse effectiveness, that is, leading
to improved patient care.
"Much lip-service is paid to the idea that nursing is a
profession, yet all writers on professions and
professionalization insist that an essential hallmark is
the possession by the occupational group of a specific
body of knowledge ..."
writes Chapman (1972), and she continues, "Nursing may or may not
possess this body of knowledge". The status that knowledge
confers on a group of people who hold this knowledge in common
but do not share it to any great extent with others who do not
belong to this group, and who develop a distinct identity that
distinguishes them from other similar groups, is clearly referred
to by Rickelman (1971). She feels that
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"we are closer now than ever before to formulating and
synthesizing a body of knowledge which ... will serve to
conceptualize nursing's functions in a systematic structure
of knowledge differentiated from the functions and structure
of knowledge of other health disciplines."
In examining ideologies in nursing, Williams (1974)
expounds the idea that
"Then, as now, doctors have a monopoly of knowledge relating
to disease and its treatment, and nurses' work is regarded
as being in the service of this knowledge
However, there is again an implication that knowledge of a
particular kind is some kind of possession which identifies a
group of people and increases their status vis a vis those who
do not have a similar possession. Nurses' work serves the group
(or even groups) of people who claim knowledge that is distinct
from theirs, is not shared by them, and is organized in a
particular way. It may also be considered to be superior in
some way.
Another trend of thought is that the knowledge which nurses
need (or need to develop, or already have in some form), should
serve to establish nursing alongside other academic disciplines
which are "... seeking recognition as applied scientific disciplines
developing their own identifiable area of knowledge and expertise ..."
(Scott Wright 1973b). Zbilut (1977), concurring with this view, says,
"One of the major challenges still facing nursing as a
profession is the development of a body of (knowledge)
which would be recognized ... by the academic community ..."
Some nurses whose main work is the gathering of knowledge may
"even adopt values which supplant the service to society
value which underlies nursing ... A value of knowledge for
the sake of knowledge is one that is commonly expressed",
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comments Ellis (1970) who sees the nurse scientist as being
estranged from the nurse practitioner, and as being motivated for
different reasons to make the search for knowledge her career.
She suggests that the motivation underlying this choice may be
"The seeking of answers, of knowledge, of status or
prestige, of power or influence, of enjoyment, or of special
skills ... There are probably many more motives, such as
avoidance (of the practice of nursing)."
So what nurses are saying is that new knowledge is needed
for many different reasons, such as improving nursing practice,
raising the status of the profession, establishing nursing as an
academic discipline , and gaining knowledge as an end in itself.
Some people, however, feel that not all these reasons are
valid.
Not everyone agrees that nurses need a new knowledge in order
to provide more effective nursing care. Few nurses disagree
with the assumption that more or new knowledge could improve the
care that they give to patients, but occasionally a nurse
dissents from this view. Although
"... nurses may happen to have a private interest of their
own in biology, poetry, politics or whatever, ... it seems
to me quite unrealistic to wish on all nurses a smattering
... of general knowledge with the pretensions of a 'study
in depth'",
and
"Do we really ... have to formulate theories before we can
get down to work?"
asks Graham (1972).
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The search for knowledge in nursing is questioned more often
by members of other professions. A doctor speaks of "the wall
of incomprehension" which the determined advances in nursing
knowledge may encounter on the part of the medical profession.
(Jacobs 1970) He regards the "over-evaluation of intellectual
achievements as dangerous to ... society" and fears that
"professionalized intellectualism" may reign supreme. He is
clearly concerned that the intensive preoccupation of nurses
with knowledge is a "status symbolism of a 'white-collar level
of thinking' (which) may pose problems ..." for nurses, doctors
and patients. Nursing care might, in fact, become less effective,
if a "do-nurse" and a "think-nurse" are created in the process,
a concern which is shared by Graham who imagines the
"nightmare situation in which teams of graduates are deployed
in devising measurement tools and exercising their research
techniques in assessing quality of patient care given by
two teenage student nurses in a ward of 40 bed-ridden old
people."
Far from seeing the search for knowledge as a means to improve
nursing care, Jacobs regards
"the acquisition of more knowledge ... as a choice in favour
of the road of least resistance; as a defence mechanism
against the true problems and needs ... (and) the 'badge-
hunting' and rush for certificates of some nurses as a sign
of intellectualization, and as a defence against the
problems of true womanhood."
But there are also warnings from within the nursing profession
to consider carefully what is good for nursing as opposed to what
is good for the prestige of nurses as an emerging profession.
No amount of knowledge (gained in 'higher education') "which
blows up the prestige of the nurse, and sometimes does precious
little for the consumers of nursing will establish the status
of nurses as members of a profession." (Lamb 1970)
There are others who doubt that nursing can establish itself
as an academic discipline by developing academically creditable
knowledge.
"Academic study ... can only be discipline based - and
an academic discipline comprises a body of knowledge
informed by research and built up over time - whereas
nursing is a skill - a practical art - informed certainly
by a number of disciplines ... but incapable in its own
right ... of developing as a separate discipline." (Evans 1975)
And finally, knowledge for its own sake has its critics, too.
McFarlane (1978) feels that "knowledge which is amassed for
intellectual kicks and without relevance to practice adds little
to the art of nursing".
What has my response to the question 'Why do nurses need a
new knowledge?' produced? I have found evidence that nurses
claim knowledge for a variety of reasons and purposes which are
not all seen to be equally valid, or in a few instances, are not
considered to be valid at all. I must dismiss the latter
assumption from my argument. Not only because it would have
to be concluded rather prematurely, but also because I claim
the right to support the most frequently voiced reason for the
acquisition of knowledge, namely that more (or new) knowledge
might improve patient care.
I cannot see it as wholly problematic that some knowledge in
nursing may be searched for and perhaps found for different reasons.
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If such knowledge becomes available to nurses who consider it
relevant to nursing practice, there seems to be no reason that
they could not use it in their endeavours to provide more
effective nursing care.
If I had been given a great deal of money as gifts from
good friends who were engaged in making money for many reasons
of their own (to improve the lives of people, to gain respect and
power, to become a member of an exclusive club, or just to make
money), I could still spend this money for my own purpose. I
could improve my health, buy prestigious possessions, join
expensive gatherings of people, or put it into a bank.
I realize that my comparison should include the possibility
that my potential benefactors had amassed their fortunes in
foreign currencies which would not allow me to do any of these
things.
Similarly, knowledge that is primarily gained for purposes
other than its direct application to nursing care, may be of no
use to nurses. The disenchantment experienced by nurses in
this situation has already been commented upon.
But I shall still hold open the possibility that we cannot
really decide what kind of knowledge will turn out to be valid
or invalid in a nursing context until that context has been
defined.
There is, however, no indication in my evidence so far, why
nurses need new knowledge or what particular kind of knowledge the
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writers have in mind. In the previous pages it has been
described as
a body of knowledge (informed by research)
a range of knowledge
knowledge or science
available and relevant knowledge
specific knowledge
a systematic structure of knowledge
a monopoly of knowledge
an identifiable area of knowledge
general knowledge
more knowledge
These terms do not make explicit by what criteria this knowledge
might be identified.
A further reading of the literature reveals that this knowledge,
described in similar terms to those listed above, demands
"a grounding in the physical, biological and social sciences,
and the ability to use analytical processes ... (without
which) the student of nursing cannot acquire a systematic
knowledge of human behavior and development, of group
behavior, and of therapeutics ...". (Henderson 1966)
"... courses (must) provide students with a scientifically
based and conceptually whole body of knowledge" (Editorial 1974),
which is also described as "formidable". (Wilson 1964) This
"evolving body of knowledge essential to the practice of
nursing will constitute a synthesis of knowledge from other
disciplines, but hopefully this synthesis will be unique
to nursing,"
explains Rickelman (1971), and Scott Wright (1973b)expects that
nursing will develop knowledge "based on yet older academic
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disciplines including the liberal arts, physical, biological and
behavioural sciences". This "infinite need for knowledge
(especially) of the biological and social sciences" (Henderson 1966)
is reflected in "increased theoretical thinking" and
"There is much emphasis today on defining and discovering
the knowledge which is essential to research, teaching
and practice." (Rickelman 1971)
All this is perhaps aptly summed up by Gordon & Anello
(1974) who envisage that
"... the nurse must not only master the traditional professional
content (of the curriculum), she must acquire a more
intricate body of knowledge ...".
It appears to me that the terms which are used to describe
this knowledge that nurses should have, imply certain criteria
which refer to different aspects of it.
1. There are terms which refer primarily to the form, structure,
and organisation of this particular kind of knowledge:
a body, a range, a systematic structure, an identifiable area,
a conceptually whole
2. Other terms appear to define its nature-. infinite,
scientifically based, belonging to or taken from the physical,
biological and social sciences, and the liberal arts
3. Still other terms tell us something about the expectations
of the owners or users of this knowledge: available, relevant,
specific, a monopoly
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4. The phrase "informed by research" probably indicates
how it should be obtained.
5. There are also some indications of what its owner's or users
should do with it: define and discover, engage in
theoretical thinking, analyze and synthesize
6. There are words which refer to the relationship between this
new ccnd other knowledge that nurses already have: it is
different from the "traditional professional content",
it is "more" and more "general"





4. methods of enquiry
5. uses
6. relationships
It seems essential to distinguish clearly between these various
aspects to avoid some of the confusions which can only make a
complex issue less amenable to clarification.
To take an example: the word 'specific' occurs often in
the phrase 'a specific body of knowledge'. If a 'body of
knowledge' refers to the potential or actual forms of this
knowledge, as I think it does, then a degree of specifity is
inherent in the process of systematizing material of any kind.
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Forms are made specific by the components which shape them, or
a given form may take in or be filled with specific components
which happen to fit into it. In other words, either the
components to be structured will produce a specific form or
more likely, a number of specific forms, as might be illustrated
by making forms of various available shapes thus -
available shapes different forms
or an already given specific form will allow certain available
components to be fitted into it, while others remain excluded,
as might be illustrated by selecting those shapes which will fit
30




Which of these two possibilities of structuring nursing knowledge
should be used may be a very crucial question. But in either
case, the result will be that a body of knowledge must be specific
by definition, whether it derives its specifity from the components
of knowledge to be structured or from its predetermined form.
To use the adjective 'specific' in the sense that the forms which
nursing knowledge may take, must be 'specific', results in a
tautology.
It is more likely that the use of the word 'specific' in the
phrase 'a specific body of knowledge' refers not to its form
but to one of the other aspects of nursing knowledge. From the
context of the article from which this phrase was taken, it seems
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that 'specific' referred to an expectation, namely that this
formalized knowledge should belong specifically to nurses. It
could, however, in other contexts refer also to the contents,
the methods of enquiry, the uses, or the relationships of this
knowledge.
The phrase 'an infinite need for knowledge' provides another
example of the necessity to try and identify to which aspect of
nursing knowledge a word like 'infinite' might refer.
Forms, by definition, cannot be infinite.3 Forms of
knowledge are characterized by a particular range of knowledge
that either fits into or produces them. Forms, structures
and organisations imply boundaries. Therefore an 'infinite need
for knowledge' cannot refer to a need for infinite forms of
knowledge.
An infinite content might be feasable if one allows that
forms may have an infinite number of components (or sets an
infinite number of members).
Infinite expectations, however, contradict the expressed
desire that this knowledge should be specific to nursing. The
use of all known and still to be known methods of enquiry might
perhaps be described as infinite, but the uses of knowledge,
however it has been acquired, are probably limited, if that
knowledge is to serve specific purposes. The relationship of
this new knowledge to other forms of already existing nursing
knowledge is unlikely to be infinite.
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The alert listener may well point out that Henderson talks
about an "infinite need", not about infinite knowledge. I would
offer the suggestion that the whole endeavour to identify, define,
conceptualize, circumscribe and structure nursing knowledge
indicates processes which must direct and channel the need for
knowledge, however great, in specific ways and therefore would
make it less than infinite.
But to recall that nursing may or may not possess this kind
of formalized knowledge does not make the task of identifying it
any easier.
If I assume, as some writers do, that this knowledge does
not exist at present, I have to leave aside for the time being
the expectations, uses and relationships of nursing knowledge.
It appears that expectations of something, and its use, depend
on having or obtaining it in the first place. I would also
argue that one cannot demonstrate a relationship between something
that exists and something that does not exist.
I am therefore left with the forms, contents and methods of
enquiry of a kind of formalized nursing knowledge that needs to
be created.
In what way are these aspects related to each other? I
would like to go back to Rickelman's statement,
"we are closer now than ever before in formulating and
synthesizing a body of knowledge which ... will serve
to conceptualize nursing's functions in a systematic
structure of knowledge ..."
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and compare it with an explanation offered by Henderson (1966)
"... the analysis of the nurse's clinical experience ... is
the way to develop nursing (knowledge)".
If I understand Rickelman's statement rightly, she is saying,
1. we are producing the forms of knowledge
2. these will lead to a conceptualization of nursing within
these forms
While Henderson says really the opposite,
1. we should conceptualize nursing 'through an analysis of the
nurse's clinical experience
2. this will lead to the forms of knowledge.
These statements are trying to relate the forms to the contents
of nursing knowledge. This, as I had already anticipated, is
one of the most crucial relationships to be examined in the endeavour
to identify the nature of that knowledge for which nurses are
searching.
The process that is advocated by Rickelman resembles the first
model or representation of the construction of forms which I
offered earlier on.
Components or parts of knowledge will be structured in a
particular way to produce a specific form of knowledge. But the
point which I tried to make was that this process is likely to
result in a number of specific forms, and not only in one. If,
as Rickelman argues, nursing will be conceptualized within these
forms (and it is significant that she uses the plural in this
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context), then not one, but a number of conceptions of nursing
must emerge. There may be good reasons to argue that not all
nurses are engaged in the same kind of care, and that, for
example, general nursing differs conceptually from psychiatric
nursing. But if this were the case, that is, a fundamental
difference in the nature of the caring activities engaged in by
general and psychiatric nurses could or should be demonstrated,
then I believe that the same word to describe these fundamentally
different activities, namely 'nursing', should not be used in both
instances.
Although Toulmin (1972) holds that a concept is something
that everybody uses but nobody explains and still less defines,
he does suggest that it has something to do with how we structure
our experiences and with how we categorize entities with which
we have to deal.
Wilson (1963) expresses a fairly general notion when he
maintains that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the
concept of anything. But he also admits that
"when we talk of 'the' concept of a thing, we are often
referring in an abbreviated way to all the different
concepts of that thing which individual people have,
and to the extent to which these concepts coincide ."
(the italics are mine)
Without wishing to enter here the unresolved philosophical
debate of how 'meaning' and 'concept' are related and whether
one is subsumed in some way under the other, in the context of
this argument, it seems necessary to point to the meaning
attributed to a word by most people. Unless questioned rather
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closely, people generally expect that the same word, although
used with different attributes from time to time, indicates some
commonality.
One would normally expect that all items of furniture
referred to as a 'chair', be they armchairs, soft chairs, high
chairs, metal chairs, wicker basket chairs, rocking chairs
or deckchairs, allow one to sit in or on them. If a 'chair'
turns out to be entirely unsuitable for its commonly assumed
primary purpose, one would feel somehow deceived. In other words,
there is at least one aspect in which all possible 'conceptions'
of what a chair might be, what it might look like, or how or from
what material it might be constructed, coincide, and that is
that one may use it as a seat.
I would maintain that whatever people may expect from a
nurse, if they are subjected to the experience of being nursed,
whether by a general, psychiatric, district or theatre nurse,
they are likely to expect that there is an element in her
activities which coincides to some extent with elements in all
other activities called 'nursing'. That nurses themselves
expect a commonality between all things called 'nursing' is
evidenced in many ways, however much nurses may argue about their
various differences.
For example, the disappointment voiced by psychiatric nurses
about the apparent unsuitability of most forms of nursing care
planning for their particular field of nursing (Harris 1970,
Palisin 1971, Aidroos 1976, Scnrock 1980) indicates not only that
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psychiatric nursing is seen by them to be different in some way,
but also that they expect something that refers to 'nursing' to
be applicable and useful in the psychiatric field to some extent.
If this were not so, the feeling of disappointment could not
arise.
The disenchantment with certain of the endeavours and results
of nursing research also points to the fact that nurses expect
a degree of relevance and applicability from investigations that
are defined as 'nursing' research. I have found no indication
that this disappointment where it was articulated, was in any way
modified by considerations of differing conceptions of nursing.
(Silva 1977)
It seems to me that the process of creating a concept of
nursing (or more likely, many concepts of nursing) from an as yet
to be established body of knowledge (or various forms of knowledge)
that is inherent in Rickelman's explanation of the relationship
between the forms and the contents of nursing knowledge, is not
going to lead to the desired results. It may indeed be one of
the causes for some of the perplexities of nurses, two of which
I have just described.
The form that nursing knowledge should take, that is, the
entity referred to as a body of knowledge, a range of knowledge
or a conceptually whole knowledge, cannot be created by apparently
random excursions into all possible areas of investigation in the
hope that somehow these initially completely unrelated searches
will produce components of knowledge that can be fitted together
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into a meaningful whole. It seems that this approach is more
likely to perpetuate what has in fact been the traditional method
of defining the expected extent of nurses' knowledge. Without
reference to how nurses saw their functions and tasks, the content
of what they were taught and expected to know was based on
developments in other disciplines, mainly in the biological and
medical sciences. The contents of knowledge were then produced
by natural scientists and medical researchers, while now some of
these contents may be produced by nurse scientists and researchers.
No articulate conceptualization of the nurse's functions emerged
from the contributions of components of knowledge which were
produced by natural scientists and medical researchers. I
do not expect a meaningful contribution to the conceptualization
of nursing to emerge from the components of knowledge which are
now produced by nurse scientists and researchers without an
initial reference to current concepts of nursing practice.
I have already said that some of the knowledge produced by
nurse researchers is considered by other nurses to be irrelevant
to nursing practice.
An overview of 175 nursing research projects conducted over
13 years in the United States of America clearly illustrates the
also fragmented nature of nurses' search for knowledge. (Abdellah
1970) It appears as if the phenomena which nurses chose to
investigate were selected rather arbitrarily and randomly. How
nurse researchers choose their areas of work, what influences this
choice, and how it could be directed to become more profitable
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than it often appears to be are questions which need to be answered
by empirical methods of investigation. There must be facts
attending these issues which can be established by asking first-
order questions. These, however, are not the province of my
argument.
For the purpose of my question, of which I have not lost
sight - namely by what criteria we could recognize the new or
particular kind of knowledge for which nurses are searching - the
above mentioned survey provides some evidence that the relationship
between the forms and contents of this new knowledge is by no
means established.
I do not wish to deny that there is value in knowing some
things, even if these items of knowledge appear to be unrelated;
but the point is that if this new knowledge is to be characterized
by the endeavour to identify, define, conceptualize, circumscribe
and structure it in such a way that it resembles an organised
whole of some kind, then there is little evidence that this is
being achieved by random enquiries, and there is even less
evidence that a "conceptualization of nursing within these forms",
as postulated by Rickelman , is at all feasable.
For example, Abdellah points out that in the surveyed projects
clinical research efforts were focused primarily upon problems
dealing with the child. Five such studies were conducted, and
reported between 1962 and 1968. Researchers studied the dependent
behaviour of children to assess the effects of nurses' nurturance
or its denial, discovered play interview techniques to be useful
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in assessing preschool children's reactions to hospitalization,
described the nature of crying as a physiological state of the
newborn infant, set up an experimental study to determine the
nursing care of premature infants by their mothers at home, and
compared the effects of needle and jet spray injections of
medications in preschool and school children.
No matter how one would attempt to organize and structure
these items of knowledge, it does seem very unlikely that any
kind of conceptualization of (paediatric) nursing would emerge
from such an attempt.
That this is not a state of affairs peculiar to paediatric
nursing, which I simply chose as a handy example here, is shown
by the many who echo Fuller's conclusion (1978);
"A review of research in nursing reveals a fragmented
array of studies defying the identification of unity
and order in their results as well as in their
conceptualizations."
In an unpublished and undated discussion paper, Cahoon set
out a tentative typology of and for nursing research because
"The existing body of knowledge of nursing is an unwieldy meld of
knowledge ... (and) is particularly fragmented ...".
It appears to me that she expresses a common contradiction
here. If, as she says and I have tried to show, nursing
knowledge is fragmented, then by my understanding of what
'a body of knowledge' might be, this entity must be non-existent
in nursing. If it exists in some form, then it should not be
fragmented.
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The search for nursing knowledge independent of any explicit
conceptualization of nursing produces another, distorting
effect.
The most frequently mentioned "goal of nursing is improvement
of practice through the development of a body of science in
nursing and the application of this science in practice."
(Editorial 1970)
Abdellah (1970) confirms this clearly when she considers
the "major gaps" in nurses' search for knowledge:
"Clinical research of problems related to nursing
is considered by most nursing leaders to have high
priority."
This priority, however, is not reflected in the knowledge that
is actually produced by nurse researchers.
Of the 175 research projects in Abdellah's overview, only
twelve are categorized as "clinical research of problems related
to nursing practice", and even if one adds six studies which are
concerned with "model and theory development" related to nursing
practice, the total of eighteen practice orientated projects does
not reflect adequately and proportionally the most frequently
voiced reason for the acquisition of more (or new) knowledge.
This distortion between what nurses say that they most
urgently need to know and what those who search for nursing
knowledge actually go out to find, is not only characteristic of
American nursing research. It has its parallels in British
nursing research. (Clark & Hockey 1979)
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In looking back over my examination of the first of the
two statements which I had hoped would illuminate the relationship
between the forms and contents of this new nursing knowledge,
I find that the process postulated by Rickelman -
1. would not remedy the prevailing random search for nursing
knowledge
2. would not necessarily produce more deliberate, fitting and
balanced nursing knowledge
3. would not facilitate the structuring and systematizing of
parts of nursing knowledge into a meaningful entity
4. would not produce the forms of nursing knowledge
5. would not identify commonalities in nursing
6. would not serve to conceptualize nursing
7. would not produce the contents of nursing knowledge.
It therefore appears untenable in its postulates.
My first model of the construction of forms, if it represents
Rickelman's approach, would therefore not be a suitable one to
apply to the acquisition of nursing knowledge and its structuring.
As I cannot logically conceive of any other alternative process
of structuring nursing knowledge than that represented in my
second model of the construction of forms, I must turn my attention
to the examination of Henderson's statement which I believe
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indicates a process that resembles this alternative. Henderson's
starting point for the development of nursing knowledge is an
analysis of the practice of nursing. To her,
"It is self-evident that an occupation, and especially a
profession, whose services affect human life must define
its function."
She also acknowledges that "this is still an unfinished
business". (Henderson 1966) But if nursing knowledge is to be
developed from an analysis of the practice of nursing, then some
picture must exist in the mind of the analyst which is a
conceptualization of nursing. It will have been created by the
personal knowledge and out of the experience of nursing which the
analyst possesses, and it will be informed, and probably will have
gained its general features from what the analyst knows about other
nurses' knowledge and experience. It is a picture of nursing
generally as she sees it. Although she may never have thought
much about it, or articulated it in any way, the picture of the
world of nursing that she possesses provides the foundation for
her contribution to the development of nursing knowledge. I
maintain that no nurse functions without some, however dimly
perceived WeZtbild of nursing. It may be rather diffuse,
much like a photograph that is out of focus, and therefore the
person holding such an image may find it difficult to identify
and describe its pertinent and most salient features.
I am reminded of a simile used by Stevens (1979) in trying to
explain the nature of a theory.
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"A theory is like a map of a territory as opposed to an
aerial photograph. The map does not give the full
terrain (i.e. the full picture); instead, it picks out
those parts that are important for its given purpose.
If its purpose is travel, the map is likely to highlight
roads; if its purpose is to describe the physical
characteristics of the earth, it shows mountains, plains
and rivers. But no map (or theory) reflects all that
is contained within the phenomenon."
I feel that the picture of nursing - the way a nurse sees
her world as a nurse - resembles the aerial photograph. It may
contain so many complex features, and even strange, disturbing
and unidentifiable ones, that at any one time the holder of this
picture can only consciously perceive and deal with selected
features of this world of nursing. But whether it is a reasonably
sharp, well developed picture or rather a fuzzy one taken from
a great height, the nurse needs, and develops in the course of
her experience of the practice of nursing, a 'Weltbild'. This
mental image of nursing will greatly determine her function as a
nurse, and must serve her in order to make decisions and choices.
Without some choices and decisions, there is no practice of nursing
as, indeed, without them there would be no recognizable human
activity of any kind. It is said often that many practising
nurses would not be able to answer the question what nursing is,
that is, they would not be able to define it or to articulate
their personal view of it. I mentioned a particular instance
of this apparent inability to present an articulate view of the
nature of nursing earlier in this argument. But this cannot
logically be construed as evidence that either nurses practice
without a general concept of nursing or that there is a danger,
if they were to articulate their views, that nursing as we know it
44
would mysteriously vanish. Neither can one deduce from the fact
that nurses generally are unable or unwilling to offer an articulate
view of nursing, that such a view is not needed. (Storlie 1970)
I still find Stevens' simile useful in pursuing my argument,
and I will therefore return to it.
Let us assume that I wanted to construct a map for the
particular purpose of travelling by car in an hitherto unmapped area
of the world.
If I followed Rickelman's postulates, I would send off as
many travellers as I could find, asking them to bring back any
information about unknown roads that can be used by cars. Since
I have given them no indication of the area in which I wish to
travel, they would most likely go off into many different parts of
the world and return with information about the roads which they
discovered. But this would not help me to construct even a
rough map of the particular area in which I had intended to travel,
since the probably correct, but unrelated bits of information from
any of the travellers who by chance had reached the area, would
not fit together to produce a usable map. It might also turn out
that by chance, no one had actually travelled in that part of the
world.
I could, of course, tell them the approximate location of the
area to ensure that they all travelled somewhere in or at least
near it. But if they knew no more than its likely location, a
great deal of time would be needed to eliminate obviously unsuitable
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terrain for my intended travels. The whole area may not even
be thoroughly explored, if all my assistants were to move about at
random. It is likely that quite a few of them will explore the
same part of the area, because it is nearest to where they
started, or because it has a track which appears promising.
Their view of what the whole area might look like might be obscured
by a mountain range. They may never discover that a very passable
road had been built on the other side of the mountains. Again,
my map would be very incomplete and very likely it would be
misleading, if I accepted my assistants' assurance that the
obstacle to any further travel consisted of a large mountain range
covering the rest of the area.
But if I could obtain an aerial photograph, or better still,
a series of such photographs taken from different angles and at
different times, we could decide before setting out on our search
for passable roads, where in the area they are most likely to be
found. We might be able to identify those features which would
make it more or less likely that roads existed in their vicinity.
We might expect that the part of the area which is covered by a
great expanse of water would offer little chance of transversing it
by car. We might be able to identify the precise location of
high mountains, and notice in doing so, that right in their centre
there appear to be some large man-made buildings. There should be,
or should have been once, a road leading to this spot. I would
expect that a systematic search concentrating on the most likely
parts of the area would produce more valid information to help me
with the construction of a reasonably useful map. It is of course
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possible that in actually exploring a particular part of the
area, it turns out that the feature which in the aerial photograph
appeared to be a fairly flat stretch of land, is a rather swampy
moor. I would then have to amend my general picture of the whole
area accordingly. But in any case, the possession of the aerial
photograph in the first place will have saved a great deal of
unnecessary and fruitless travelling and will have helped me to
utilize my assistants to the greatest possible effect. And
I am certain that I could not have obtained the equivalent to an
aerial photograph by any other means than by taking it.
All similes have their limits and inherent simplifications.
But the way in which nurses search for nursing knowledge does
seem to resemble more often than not the less productive ways
illustrated by my example.
If nursing knowledge is to serve a purpose, and I have allied
myself with those who assume that it should serve the practice of
nursing, then a general concept of what this practice is all about
and how it is viewed by those who engage in it, is a necessary
prerequisite for the search for knowledge.
I think that Crawford et ail (1979) in analyzing theory
development in nursing are making the same point in saying
"... we suggest that the thinking surrounding theory
development in nursing and directed towards the building
of nursing knowledge has evolved to a point exemplified
by the following statements. 1) All knowledge utilized
by the profession of nursing is not nursing knowledge;
only those theories and knowledge which have been derived
from nursing's perspective comprise nursing knowledge.
47
2) Nursing knowledge will be developed from nursing's
unique perspective by asking questions and viewing
phenomena unlike other discipline, (sic) 3) The knowledge
base of nursing will be developed from basic, applied, and
prescriptive research in nursing. The urgent task for
nursing is to continue to clarify and make more explicit
the unique perspective and focus of nursing."
(the italics are mine)
I have tried to argue that a narrowly defined 'scientific'
search for the form, structure and organisation of this particular
kind of knowledge which is variously referred to as a body, a
range, a systematic structure, an identifiable area, or a
conceptually whole knowledge is not possible.
I have also tried to show that the contents of this knowledge
must be secondary to its forms.
I have accepted Henderson's postulates in preference to
Rickelman's, since they appear to offer the only logical process
by which this new nursing knowledge can be developed, and I
have therefore dismissed my first model representing the structuring
of forms as unsuitable for nursing. I have adopted the assumption
that a given specific form (of knowledge) will allow certain
available components (items of knowledge) to be fitted into it
while others will remain excluded.
In what way has my argument so far answered the questions
which I raised in response to the fact that nurses are saying
that they need a new knowledge? Why do nurses need a new knowledge
and by what criteria might this new knowledge be identified?
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Having accepted at least one of the offered reasons why
nursing might benefit from a search for knowledge, namely the
potential improvement of patient care, I tried to show that the
terms which are used to describe this knowledge imply certain
criteria which refer to different aspects of it.
Before one can examine the expectations, uses and relationships
of this knowledge, I argued that one needs to discover the
relationship of its forms, contents and methods of enquiry.
I have tried to show that the contents of nursing knowledge must
be secondary to its forms, since the latter cannot be established
or created from fragmented items of knowledge which have been
acquired without any reference to a clearly articulated concept
of nursing.
The criteria which might identify this new knowledge must
therefore include first and foremost a clearly defined concept of
nursing or, as some writers have put it, an explicit perspective
of and focus on nursing. It is only with reference to a
conceptualization of nursing that nursing questions may be asked
which may lead to items or components of nursing knowledge.
And it is only possible to structure, organize and unify these
items of knowledge into a recognizable entity by their reference
to a fundamental conception of nursing which led to relevant nursing
questions being asked in the first palce. It is the demand that
the new kind of nursing knowledge be formed, structured and
organized in a particular way which constitutes an important
criterion by which it might be recognized.
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I would therefore conclude that the new knowledge for which
nurses are searching is identifiable by
1. its explicit nursing perspective
2. its structure and organisation based on a clearly
articulated concept of nursing
3. its demonstrable potential to improve patient care through
nursing action.
I would like to forestall a particular criticism of these
criteria. 'An explicit nursing perspective' and 'a clearly
articulated concept of nursing' are two phrases which refer to
what I have earlier called the nurse's 'WettbiZd1. I think
that I have been careful in avoiding the impression that there
should or could be 'the' nursing perspective or conception, or
one picture of nursing which informs all nurse researchers and
nurse scientists. But I still hold it to be essential to attempt
an analysis of the extent to which various concepts of nursing
coincide.
Unless some commonalities can be demonstrated, there would
be no further point to this argument. If there is such a thing
as nursing knowledge, it must be identifiable
"by a unique perspective, a distinct way of viewing all
phenomena, which ultimately defines the limits and nature
of its inquiry." (Donaldson & Crowley 1978)
I do not advocate an interminable quest for the definition of the
nature of nursing (apart from the fact that formulating definitions
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is not quite the same as clarifying a concept), but I do agree
with Donaldson and Crowley that
"it might behoove us ... to seek relationships and
commonalities in the ideas of writers whose work has
influenced (and continues to influence) tacit knowledge
of the scope of the field."
I will defer the problem of how nurses might set about creating
and articulating a nursing perspective of the kind advocated by
Donaldson and Crowley, because I have so far omitted to consider
the third element which I thought it necessary to relate to the
forms and contents of nursing knowledge, namely the methods of
enquiry by which such knowledge may be acquired.
"In the 1960's and early 1970's differences of opinion
could be identified in the literature concerning how to
develop knowledge in nursing. With a focus on scientific
research methodology as the means to development of
knowledge, Simon argues for an inductive approach and Putnam
argued for a rational-deductive approach." (Crawford et al
1979)
Induction versus deduction, however, is only part of a generally
rather confused argument about the appropriateness of various
methods of investigation which are aimed at the development of
nursing knowledge.
McKay (1977) suggests that we do not at present have any
recognized methods and that we do not know what criteria might
make researchers' findings acceptable in nursing. This view is
somewhat contradicted by the assertion that it is precisely the
acceptance of certain research methods, to the exclusion of
possibly others, which constitutes a major obstacle to the development
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of nursing knowledge. (Stevens 1977)
Others criticize the borrowing of research methods from
other disciplines, and consider a rigorous adherence to such
borrowed methods to be a cause of retardation and of trivialization
of nursing knowledge. (Dickhoff, James & Semradek 1975)
"Where a researcher approaches a discipline with tools
(methods) already in hand, the tendency is to search for
a subject matter that fits those tools ... Here, then, is
a situation where trivial answers will be found because
trivial questions are asked." (Stevens 1979)
The 'accepted' research methods which seem to find nowadays
more critics than friends tend to be those of the oldest or
'hardest' sciences, that is, the empirical sciences. Social
science research, where it most tries to approximate natural
science investigations, draws the same kind of criticism of
methodological bias toward the classic experimental design which
frequently is considered unsuitable for and inappropriate to nursing
research. To Stevens (1979) it appears
"evident that nursing with its complexity of subject matter,
must develop unique methods of inquiry, if it is to acquire
meaningful knowledge."
Earlier writers on the subject appeared more confident that
nursing knowledge may be developed with well-known and well-tried
methods of investigation.
Not only was it accepted that "The very roots of nursing
practice stem from the biological and physical as well as the
social sciences" (Abdellah & Levine 1965), it was also assumed
that the nurse researcher "must learn to use the tools of research
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peculiar to the (physical and/or social) science (Dorigo 1968)
As doctors have based their investigations into medical
practices "on the older disciplines of the physical, biological
and behavioural sciences", so nurses were expected to evolve
nursing knowledge in a similar way "as an applied scientific
discipline". (Scott Wright 1973c)
The preparation and training of nurse researchers who were
"to develop techniques for measuring the quality of nursing care"
included an introductory course which dealt with research methods
in the clinical and social sciences, and with the study of the
statistical method. (McFarlane 1970)
There appeared to be some hesitation in identifying clearly
the 'sciences' which should serve as either a model for nurses'
investigations, or from which material contributions could be
expected. They were usually denoted by such collective
designations as 'the biological, physical and behavioural sciences',
which creates the unwarranted impression that these categories
contain a generally accepted and discrete number of disciplines,
and that all of these might yield similarly beneficial results
for nursing. Neither were all the writers on the subject
unanimous about which of these broad categories they considered
to be fundamental sources of either knowledge applicable to nursing,
or of the methods of investigation to be mastered and emulated.
Dorigo (1968) leaves out the biological sciences, or perhaps
includes them in the category of the natural sciences. This
confirms that the content of these categories is not generally agreed.
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Neither is it clear whether the 'clinical sciences' mentioned by
McFarlane (1970) consist of the natural and biological sciences,
since the social sciences retain their separate identity in her
exposition, or whether the clinical sciences are distinguished
from the social sciences by their methods, or by some other
criterion such as their contribution to the traditional content
of medical knowledge.
How far the term 'scientific' may be narrowed even in
comparison to the writers who include 'natural, biological and
behavioural sciences' in their discussion when advocating a
'scientific approach' to nursing is shown by Wilson (1964) who
sees "many facets to nursing ... one of these facets is scientific
knowledge She explains that she will deal "mainly with the
scientific aspects of nursing" but that this knowledge cannot
exist alone and must be complemented by other kinds of nursing
knowledge which are equally important, such as "the understanding
of the patient as a person". This seems to suggest that
'scientific' here is reserved for the study of the natural sciences
(implying, I think, that the behavioural sciences are not 'scientific').
Nonetheless, here is one writer who indicates the content of the
category 'science' as perceived by her.
"The science subjects which are referred to here are
anatomy, physiology, pharmacology, bacteriology, chemistry
and physics as they apply to nursing."
In spite of very general categories on one hand and the
narrowing of the concept of 'science' on the other, there appeared
to have existed a certainty among the earlier writers that the
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'scientific method' is not only acceptable in the search for
nursing knowledge, but also that it provides the only possible
approach in nursing enquiries.
This certainty that the methods of investigation which have
been fruitful in the natural and social sciences would also,
if appropriately applied to nursing, lead to the desired knowledge
in nursing, has in the short span of a decade given way to doubt
and uncertainty. How this uncertainty is expressed by nurse
researchers without, however, causing them to change their fundamental
assumptions about 'the method' appropriate to nursing research,
may become apparent in a closer examination of Cahoon's position.
In setting out a tentative typology of and for clinical
nursing research, the writer claims that
"There is no single scientific method, there are a number
of methods that are collectively referred to as the
scientific approach
Nursing research ... is guided by the scientific
approach."
This statement is part of a series of explanations and definitions
offered by Cahoon which suggest to me the following line of
reasoning.
A body of cumulative 'scientific' knowledge drawn from the
physical, biological and behavioural sciences becomes, by a process
of synthetization, unique nursing knowledge. This nursing knowledge
is synonymous with nursing science.
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Nursing research leads to nursing knowledge, hence to nursing
science.
Nursing research uses the 'scientific approach' to produce
this knowledge/science.
There are a number of unspecified methods which constitute
the 'scientific approach' but since nursing knowledge/science is
a mix of the biological, physical and behavioural sciences, it
must utilize the methods of investigation that characterize these
sciences, that is, the methods of the empirical sciences.
Nursing research method therefore is synonymous with
empirical science method.
It seems that the declaration quoted above was somewhat
superfluous. There may be 'a number of methods that are
collectively referred to as the scientific approach', but clearly
by this reasoning, only one of them is relevant in the search
for nursing knowledge.
What makes it impossible to come to any other conclusion
is the starting point of the argument which resembles Rickelman's
approach to the identification of the forms and content of nursing
knowledge.
In trying to relate the method of enquiry to the forms and
contents of nursing knowledge, Cahoon is representative of the
earlier writers on the subject by starting with various undefined
and largely unstructured components (that is, the physical,
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biological and behavioural sciences). Both Rickelman and Cahoon
suggest that a process of synthetization converts knowledge from
other disciplines into unique nursing knowledge. There is no
indication, however, by what criteria items of knowledge from
other disciplines may be selected in order to be synthesized
into a new form of knowledge. That some selection must take
place is likely, since it would not appear feasable or necessary to
reconstruct alt that is known in the natural, biological and
social sciences into some hyperconstruction for the benefit of
nursing. Since one must also assume that no nurse researcher is
conversant with all the knowledge that may potentially contribute
to this synthesis, whatever may be selected is likely to be
determined by the individual researcher's grasp and knowledge of
another discipline. As the reference to nursing follows and not
precedes this selection in both Rickelman's and Cahoon's argument,
what is unique about the possible outcome of this process is not
'a synthesis unique to nursing', but a synthesis unique to each
individual nurse researcher. This is not to say that such
individual constructions of knowledge are valueless or useless,
only that they cannot and do not provide "a systematic structure
of knowledge differentiated from the functions and structure
of other health disciplines." (Rickelman 1971)
The communication model, for example, created by Rickelman
which combines aspects of communication and linguistic theory,
and which is conceptualized by her as "bio-psycho-social
linguistics" is a conceptual exercise which could be applied to
all other health care endeavours besides nursing. Simply using
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this model in nursing does not make it uniquely part of nursing
knowledge.
An abbreviated but in no way distorted version of the model
should illustrate this point quite clearly.

















There is no problem in substituting any other identity
for 'patient' and 'nurse'. For example, a substitution of
'client' for 'patient' and of 'social worker' for 'nurse' is
entirely feasable.
Rickelman's bio-psycho-social linguistics model applied to
social work
Individual client Individual social worker
in his particular with professional
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The model retains its validity to whichiver practice it
may be applied as long as that practice is a social process
which involves interaction between people. I would also argue
that no synthesis is involved in the presentation of this model.
It remains, and quite properly so, a theoretical conception of
a particular aspect of a social science discipline.
The attempt to construe a model of the "components of
professional nursing" derived from the aspects of communication
and linguistic theory contained in the "bio-psychc-social
linguistic nurse-patient interaction" model can only lead to a
construct which again is equally applicable to other professional
endeavours, and is in no way unique to nursing. Substitution
does not invalidate this derived model either, as the following
illustrations will show.
Rickelman's model of the components of professional nursing
The nurse interacting with
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Rickelman's model of the components of professional nursing
applied to social work















. , , bio-psycho-social linguistics , .social work \ i ^ ultimate
process social worker-client interaction' social work goal
Some important conclusions appear to be justified from the foregoing
argument.
Scientific knowledge drawn from the physical, biological and
behavioural sciences does not become nursing knowledge simply
by its application in nursing. It remains quite clearly what
it is, that is, physical, biological and behavioural science
knowledge. This is not to say that knowledge drawn from other
disciplines may not be applicable to nursing, in the same way
in which it may also be applicable to social work or medicine.
But this knowledge is not synonymous with nursing knowledge/
science since it not particularly identifiable by
1. its explicit nursing perspective
2. its structure and organisation based on a clearly articulated
concept of nursing
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3. its demonstrable potential to improve patient care through
nursing action.
Even if a process of synthesis could be identified which I
failed to do in the offered example, it would not lead to
something that is uniquely nursing, but it would quite properly
enrich or complement the knowledge in the disciplines from which
the re-formed items were taken in the first place.
The fact that a particular method of investigation would
verify or falsify conceptual or theoretical constructs in a
particular discipline, cannot lead to the conclusion arrived at
by both Rickelman and Cahoon, that the same method must be
appropriate in nursing investigations.
The offering of conceptualizations derived from other
disciplines, however useful they are in their original contexts,
must lead to "a fragmented array of ... conceptualizations"
(Fuller 1978) which defy any attempt at ordering them into a
unified and intelligible form or structure that is 'unique to
nursing', for the simple reason that they do not belong to nursing
but to a multitude of other disciplines.
Nursing knowledge/science is not simply a mix of the biological,
physical and social sciences, and need not utilize necessarily
or exclusively the methods of investigation which are characteristic
of these sciences.
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In recent years, some writers have expressed the conviction
that "Nursing has both scientific aspects and aspects akin to the
arts." (Donaldson & Crowley 1978)
While some of these give examples of disciplines or branches
of knowledge which are usually described as belonging to the
'arts' rather than to the 'sciences', such as history, politics,
economics, education and "even cybernetics and theology" (Zbilut
1977), others have included the "liberal arts" as a more general
category along with the 'physical, biological and behavioural
sciences'. (Scott Wright 1973b)
But apart from the fact that there is hardly a subject
which has not been thought to be useful and even necessary to
nursing, there emerges a difference in the way in which the concept
of 'art' is utilized in relation to nursing.
There are those who argue that "knowledge from political
science, history, philosophy, and other disciplines is very
important". (Donaldson £ Crowley 1978) They clearly see the
'arts' as another source of relevant knowledge in the same way
in which the sciences are thought to possess knowledge that
nurses should utilize for their own purposes and should, as
argued by some writers, integrate or synthesize within a specific
nursing perspective.
There are others who see the 'art' in the execution of
nursing skills. As McFarlane explains, "the art of nursing
lies in skilled performance ...". (1976) She considers it to
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be axiomatic "that the art of nursing consists of actions of a
nursing nature which are informed by knowledge or science." (1978)
If one argues, as McFarlane does, that "the science (of
nursing) rests upon the art (of nursing)" and then equates
(nursing) knowledge with (nursing) science, the implications appear
to be different to those who see in the 'arts' a different source
of knowledge for nursing that should be utilized as well as
knowledge derived from the sciences.
But these two positions are not irreconcileable. It seems
to me that the apparent confusion is caused by the limitations
of a language which does not provide one word that unequivocally
embraces all sources of methodically acquired knowledge with their
appropriate and accepted canons of proof or justification {'W-issenschaft') ,
and reserves a distinct expression ('Kunst') for a skilled performance
which goes beyond technical competence by its "perfection of
execution" and by being a "process of creating something beautiful."
(McFarlane 1976)^
There is good reason to believe that nursing as an art and as
a science can be informed by both the arts and the sciences, and
that such knowledge as may be derived from either of these may be
utilized, conceptualized, synthesized, or handled within a 'nursing
perspective', and may inform nursing practice.
The following model which is meant to show that the two
positions derived from different interpretations of 'arts' and 'art',
are not irreconcileable, may also illustrate what I take to be
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McFarlane's argument. In addition, it may assist in placing some
of the German words which, I feel, distinguish more readily






































It is important to the whole of my argument to see the
relationship between nursing practice and a relevant nursing
perspective as a dynamic process. All models are artefacts
and tend to convey rather mechanistic conceptions. I do not,
at this point, wish to rehearse all the parts of my argument
so far which might support this representation, since this would
take me too far away from the methods of investigation under
discussion at the moment. But I must acknowledge my inability
to find a precise and succinct English term for the central
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component of my model (that is, Bildung), which denotes the
process by which a nurse might acquire and develop a nursing
persp ective.
However, the central question under discussion at this
point in my argument is whether nursing needs to utilize
necessarily or exclusively the methods of investigation which
characterize the biological, physical and social sciences.
Donaldson and Crowley (1978) developed a distinction which
might be useful in clarifying the problems involved in deciding
in what ways nursing knowledge should or might be developed.
They define two dimensions of what might be called the discipline
of nursing. (The word 'discipline' indicates in their argument
"true distinctions between bodies of knowledge" and a particular
"realm of learning".) The "substantive structure" consisting
of the conceptualizations that fit the discipline's perspective,
is developed, so they and others argue, by expositions of practice
models and theories in order to build a "focused and cohesive
conceptual system" in nursing. (Johnson 1974)
The "syntactical structure' is composed of the research
methodologies and criteria which are used to distinguish acceptable
from unacceptable findings.
In their paper, Donaldson and Crowley are careful "not to
equate the discipline of nursing with the science of nursing",
because "only part of nursing employs scientific method (sic)."
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They clearly see the scientific method (in its usually
accepted sense of denoting inquiries conducted on the patterns
of natural science research) as only one way of contributing to
the syntactical structure of the discipline of nursing.
Although they focus the discussion on the substantive
structure, they seem to imply that inductive and deductive
methods are only some of the ways of developing nursing knowledge
and that other methods are also necessary. In creating the
substantive structure of the discipline, they say,
"philosophical, historical, and similar types of enquiry
within the discipline of nursing is (sic) crucial not
only in terms of providing the knowledge base for
professional preparation but also for the development of
the discipline."
Another writer supports this view by pointing out that
"Nursing faculties rarely have among their members scholars
who are concerned with establishing the history of nursing
science and with identifying the philosophies or
conceptualizations of nursing that have influenced the
structure of that knowledge at various times in nursing's
history." (Schlotfeldt 1977)
Leaving aside for a moment the explicit but dubious equation of
"philosophies" with "conceptualizations", Schlotfeldt's point of
view is taken up by other writers in a similar form.
McKay (1977) suggests that not all nursing knowledge is
'scientific' in nature and that the use of 'non-scientific
methods' such as of historical and philosophical enquiries is
essential. Frequently, similar statements can be found in
articles and books which are almost entirely devoted to the
explanation of, and to comments on, more narrowly defined
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scientific research methodologies, almost as if it had become
obligatory to acknowledge this sentiment, but not necessary to
follow it with any more detailed examination of what these
'non-scientific' methods entail and in what particular ways, in
fact, they may differ from what constitutes the greater substance
of the article or book. (Clark & Hockey 1979; Stevens 1979)
This tendency of pointing to the 'essential' contribution
that philosophical enquiries are expected to make to nursing,
but then to leave it as an intriguing but superficial remark,
or to select rather arbitrarily, as is illustrated by the quotation
from Schlotfeldt, one aspect of a philosophical endeavour and
equate it with the whole, is one of the main reasons for my putting
forward the arguments in this thesis.
It would not be true to say that no writer has attempted to
define or explain more clearly what the nature of such 'non-
scientific' enquiries might be.
As early as 1956, Hillway endeavoured to explain how nursing
knowledge may be acquired and he concluded that it will come about
"through one or more processes that may be arranged in the
following progression:
1. Intuition (a glimpse of 'truth', unconscious)
2. Authority, tradition, custom
3. Chance (accidental personal experience)
4. Trial and error (deliberate personal experience)
5. Generalization from experience
6. Logic, deduction, syllogistic reasoning, or a formal
argument with a major and a minor premise and a
conclusion
67
7. Inductive reasoning - a conclusion arrived at by
related particulars, especially numerous observations
8. Research, scientific inquiry, or a structured,
systematic investigation to answer a question,
throw light on a theory, or solve a problem."
This suggested progression in the search for nursing knowledge
has been almost completely neglected by subsequent writers on
the subject, and especially by those evincing an interest in the
'non-scientific' methods of enquiry. It certainly contains
aspects that should be examined from a philosophical point of view
in order to judge their validity in this context.
Henderson (1966) rather disarmingly admits that she finds it
difficult to present an argument for nursing research, as she is
unable to see any argument against it. As nursing research at
that time almost exclusively relied on and utilized 'scientific'
approaches, Henderson certainly was exceptional in holding a wider
view, and was perhaps not unjustified in being tolerant rather than
unreservedly enthusiastic about the beginnings of scientific
enquiries in nursing.
By referring to Hillway's explanation and by concluding that
"it seems obvious that all these processes are useful, even necessary",
and that
"Perhaps the most civilized man is the one who recognizes
all of them and chooses in each case what he believes to
be the appropriate basis for his acts",
Henderson was expressing a view of a process by which an individual
develops a picture of the world in its widest sense, and acquires
'Bzldung' rather than, or as well as 'Wisser.' .
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It is pertinent to note that it took some years before a
few researchers returned to Henderson's position, that the -basis
for the development of nursing knowledge must be the conceptualization
of nursing through an analysis of the nurse's clinical experience,
and at the same time, began to question the methods of investigation
which were current at that time. This confirms to me that there
is a close relationship between the forms of knowledge and the
methods of enquiry which are employed to discover their appropriate
contents, or between Donaldson and Crowley's substantive and
syntactical structures which define the dimensions of the
discipline of nursing.
Two writers who have made fairly explicit in what ways,
in their view, a philosophical approach might differ from a more
narrowly scientific one, are Dickhoff and James. Their explanation
of philosophy as an approach is, I think, most clearly demonstrated
in a paper which was basically concerned with the examination of
beliefs and values in nursing. (1970)
It is worth devoting some thoughts to their argument, not
only because it is probably the most detailed one in this context,
but also because their departure point for seeking knowledge lies
in nursing practice. Although both writers are philosophers,
and not nurses, they were certainly seminal in reorientating nursing
research to nursing practice, and influential in stimulating nurse
theorists to develop a 'practice theory' in nursing.
Where science based nursing attempts to create certainty
by the quantification and by the ordering of facts, the philosophical
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approach encourages what these two writers call "systematic
ambiguity". Dickhoff and James see the philosopher's contribution
not in forcing choices in order to resolve any uncertainties, but
in maintaining a sense of ambiguity to allow for the greatest
possible exploration of the issue at hand before, as it were, the
case is closed. They point out that
"Philosophers tend to emphasize differences even if they
irritate or offend a little rather than ... to smooth
over or avoid delicate points."
In contrast to the scientist who is preoccupied with the
detail and the "enumeration of detail", the philosopher's tendency
is to be global and overarching, and to seek completeness and
thoroughness by emphasis on structure. Simplicity that is
achieved by selection or elimination would be anathema to the
philosopher even at the risk of being accused of "philosophic
obfuscation".
Dickhoff and James further argue that the familiar tends to
be hard to "see really"; therefore what they call "deliberate
disorientation" should be a tool of analysis, before people build
on things which they feel they know without really knowing them.
They continue,
"We consider philosophy a discipline with no beforehand
restrictions on method or subject matter and a discipline
that uses thought as a critical tool ... in genuine
philosophy thought is conceived as functional in action,
is based on or not ignorant of the real, and, moreover, is
committed to shaping the real through action guided by
this very thought."
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The "philosophic characteristics" which in these writers'
opinion would profit nursing are:
1. a habitually large surveying focus, as opposed to concentration
on isolated, specific detail; and the capacity to do
without the gratification of achieving immediate and concrete
results from present activities
2. the related habit of seeing the general tendency of a
situation rather than its immediate detail and, hence, the
custom of seeking what is right or what is possible in
situations rather than the tendency to see what is wrong
or impossible, and
3. the capacity for frontal attack as well as for compromise.
Dickhoff and James suggest
"that nurses cultivate as values certain practices or habits
of philosophers:
1. Capacity to entertain systematic ambiguities, without
losing capacity to make an appropriate resolution of
ambiguity where practice of nursing or teaching demands
it.
2. Cultivation of a healthy disrespect for the merely
venerable, without losing respect for history and
experience as a source of enlightenment.
3. Boldness to suggest and work with new terms or new
structures when the old and familiar is deemed inadequate,
but without losing sight that both for institutions
and for effective change new concepts alone are not
enough.
4. Confidence to render overt and explicit and to exploit
constructively errors, difficulties, frustrations, and
embarrassments, without resorting to mere confessions
of guilt or termination in gossip.
5. Patience and scope to seek simplicity through integration
rather than through mere selection or enumeration, but
maintaining the executive skill for seeing through detail
and being able to be decisive in action even when conceptual
tentativeness cannot be resolved in time for action.
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6. Using examples and anecdotes as mere heuristics and not
as a substitute for theory or generality, but without
using generality as an excuse for losing the link to
action or the key to communication.
7. Courage to seek purposeful disorientation as a step
toward a richer reorientation, without getting hooked
on puzzlement as a perpetual state of mind."
Dickhoff and James' position needs further examination,
and inspite of their disclaimer that "not all philosophers are ...
real philosophers", it must be compared with what other
philosophers declare the methods of philosophy to be. But
there is little doubt that the "sense of indignation" about their
"cynicism" experienced, for example by Wiedenbach (1970), demonstrates
the effectiveness of their argument in stimulating a debate about
the methods of enquiry current at that time.
I would date the slowly increasing criticisms of the kind of
knowledge that nurse researchers produced, and which had hitherto
been accepted with a degree of self-congratulation by the profession,
though it was (and still is) rarely utilized in informing or in
changing practice, from the publication of Dickhoff and James'
work at the end of the 1960's.
But just as the methodological progression in the search for
nursing knowledge suggested by Hillway and taken up by Henderson
was not subjected to further examination and was not utilized for
the development of the 'non-scientific methods of enquiry' in
nursing, so Dickhoff and James' perhaps more provocative exposition
remained largely unexamined.
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Instead, a methodological analysis by Stevens in 1971 concerns
itself with the 'logistic, dialectical, operational and problematic
method', which again has a distinct 'non-scientific' flavour.
The assumption that here is another attempt to define more
specifically some aspects of the 'philosophical method' of enquiry
is partly confirmed by the writer's declaration that
"The purpose of this investigation was to clarify philosophic
concepts underlying ... common curriculum structures . . ." .
This examination, of what are essentially methods of reasoning,
was later extended by Stevens (1979) to identify how nurse
theorists utilize 'different thought patterns' in the construction
of their various theoretical perspectives. Based on a now
unobtainable paper by McKeon, in which these methods were described
as not only having a long tradition but also as still being operative
in contemporary philosophy, they are explained by Stevens in a
way which differs to some extent from the more usual explanations
of the meaning of the first two terms as they are commonly employed
in philosophical discourse.
Where the term 'dialectic' no longer retains its original
(Socratic) meaning of referring to the conversational method of
argument involving question and answer, it either becomes largely
synonymous with 'logic' as it did for the Stoics and the Middle
Ages, and to some extent to Kantian philosophy as a means of
exposing fallacious reasoning, or it expresses the reconciliation
of opposites as in the Hegelian progression from thesis and anti¬
thesis to synthesis. Plato often used the word 'dialectic' for
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philosophical method in general and "came to apply it to whatever
method of enquiry he favoured at the time." (Lacey 1976)
Stevens' notion in explaining the dialectic method, namely
that the whole "governs the relationships and provides coherence
to the parts of that whole" appears to be derived from Hegel's
version of the coherence theory of truth, but I am not at all
certain that a consistent Hegelian viewpoint is expressed in her
claim that the "dialectic method works by taking as its perspective
a whole that it organizes." (the italics are mine) Nor do I think
that Hegel's progression to a higher level by way of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis allows "contradictions to be seen as
compatible components in a larger unity." (the italics are mine)
Although I could not claim to grasp Hegel's notoriously obscure
writings, from what I can gather, he maintains that contradictions
need to be reconciled and that falsity needs to be removed by
'Aufhebung' between thesis and antithesis. That is, contradictions
are seen as irrational self-cancellations which are removed before
the whole process is repeated at a higher level. The whole point
seems to be that the whole as Hegel sees it, does not contain any
contradictions, so there cannot be any "compatible contradictions"
in a larger unity as Stevens claims.
Similarly, the impression created by the phrase "taking as its
perspective a whole" sounds rather more like Plato than Hegel.
Hegel's whole is, as I understand it, the result of his particular
method of arriving at the truth which is the whole. The whole
of which he speaks is a developing whole and it develops through
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the medium of contradiction. His dialectic is generally
regarded as a process of argument that proceeds to the whole
starting with an initial proposition.(Flew 1979)
Stevens' explanation, however, sounds to me as if the whole
were the organising principle from the start. Her comment that
the nurse theorist who is "a good example of a dialectic
thinker" is "little understood by most readers of theory" and
"may be the recipient of esteem from those nurses who
mistakenly assume that any theory must have merit if they
cannot understand it",
may be less than charitable, but it is also indicative of the
dubious value of emulating one of the most obscure philosophers.
I find less difficulty with her explanations of the logistic
method with its emphasis on the construction of relationships,
although I had considered it to be more truly characterized by its
analyses of scientific theories into formalized statements
of symbolic logic or of mathematics.
The important point here is, however, that whichever way
defined, 'dialectic' and 'logicism' are recognizably part of certain
philosophical enterprises.
The 'problematical' and 'operational' methods which she
includes, are not so easily located in the general context of
philosophical methodology. Saying that the problematical method
is designed to recognize and define unique problems with their
attendant factors which in turn must harbour the solution to the
problem, does not really identify the philosophical source of
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this particular approach, and the statement that "In a sense
the agent is the (operational) method" makes me think more of
behaviourist or interactional methods than of philosophy.
I have chosen to include Stevens' account although I am not
at all sure what exactly my difficulties are, particularly in
respect of finding the philosophical sources for the last two
'methods'. What I am certain about is the clear intention of the
writer to detail some aspects of what McKeon calls "the semantic
schemes that have been used in philosophy."
I seem to have reached a similar state of bewilderment as I
experienced when I tried earlier on to identify the forms and
contents of the knowledge that nurses say they need. In defining
and delineating philosophical methods of enquiry in nursing, each
writer seems to pursue a different kind of explanation.
Where one attempts to show a progression through different
methods of enquiry, of which one or two appear to have philosophical
aspects, the other seems to consider the states of mind that
unspecified philosophical methods might bring about such as
ambiguity, disrespect, and disorientation. McKeon's 'semantic
schemes' are interpreted by Stevens as ways of reasoning, as
different thought patterns and as different ways in which "meaningful
terms" are put together. "The method of thought" is being described
as dialectical, logistic, operational and problematic. But are all
"methods of thought" philosophical in nature? This seems a large
claim to make which I feel cannot be settled without a further and
much wider examination of how philosophers describe their ways of
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working as being distinctly different from those of others in
search of knowledge.
Zbilut (1977) does not help to reconcile these rather
disparate attempts of defining or delineating the input of
'non-scientific methods' into nursing knowledge by presenting
"four broadly defined methodological levels of thought" which he
terms the empiriological-existential, empirical-metaphenomenal,
philosophical-metaphenomenal, and philosophical-transcendental.
Except that it represents a progression to different levels of
enquiry similar to Hillway's and Henderson's notion of a
methodological progression in the search for nursing knowledge,
it shares little else with their explanations. If I understand
Zbilut rightly, he sees a progression from empirical descriptive
research to the formulation of hypothesis, theories and laws,
which in turn are taken and applied to the "two basic conditions
of human existence, i.e. space and time", and which are finally
incorporated into a wide view of man giving a "unique formality
to human existence".
What we have here is not so much an emphasis on method (as
in Hillway's and Henderson's progression) but different levels of
thought about the human condition.^
By examining "the four main branches of philosophy - logic,
epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics", Silva (1977) claims that
all scientific nursing research "is derived from or leads to
philosophy". She explains that
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"through logic, researchers are able to establish the validity
of various thoughts and the correctness of their reasoning."
Epistemology, she says, establishes the 'truth condition', the
'belief condition' and the 'evidence condition' of the research.
To metaphysics belongs the concept of causality which is central
to scientific research, and finally, "the study of ethics comes
to grips with moral principles and values." Apart from selecting
various aspects of what one might call the subject matter of
philosophy as being useful in relation to nursing research, Silva
also comments on the legitimacy of philosophical introspection and
intuition as "methods of scientific enquiry".
Griffin (1980) sees the "distinctive contribution" that
philosophy can make "for the development of nursing theory,
research and education" in its
"particular methods to help us think with persistence,
intensity and generality about what we are doing."
The particular interest of the philosopher in value questions,
including those of a social and political nature, should help
nurses to accomplish ethical analyses which appear to be needed
in many areas of nursing.
A few more explanations of the kind which I have briefly
described and commented upon, can be found in the literature, but
not only are the attempts to explain what might constitute relevant
'philosophical knowledge' in or for nursing rather infrequent, they
also appear to evidence the same deficiency as the more frequent
attempts to define nursing knowledge per se. They are fragmented,
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and it seems impossible to me to create from them a coherent picture
of what the contributions of 'non-scientific methods of enquiry'
which some authors consider to be necessary in the development of
nursing knowledge, might be.
I believe that nurses have set out on a search for knowledge
or on a journey of discovery for a variety of reasons which may
well be related to each other in some ways but which tend to
follow somewhat different paths. Although there is an implied
concensus that this 'new' nursing knowledge should improve patient
care, there is little concensus about its form(s), contents or the
methods by which it might be obtained. Inspite of this apparent
uncertainty, the methods of enquiry which are predominantly utilized
by nurses are based largely on a fairly narrow interpretation of
the 'scientific method' of enquiry. This almost exclusive claim of
the 'scientific method' being the appropriate method in pursuing
nursing knowledge may have been necessary in gaining 'academic
respectability' with its attendant access to the necessary
resources for study and research. But 'academically respectable'
knowledge seems to have fallen short of being useful in improving
patient care. The challengers who indicate the necessity for
'non-scientific methods of enquiry' do so largely in responding
to what they see as the inadequacies of the 'scientific' method.
It seems, however, that they - just as their 'scientific' colleagues
have done before them - start with very different viewpoints from
which they attempt to produce the contents of this 'non-scientific'
knowledge, and to identify the methods by which it might be obtained,
without examining first the form or forms that it should take.
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I would also argue that a somewhat narrow knowledge of another
discipline, q* a preferred aspect of it, might lead to a subjective
selection and application which will have a distorting rather than
a unifying result.
I would not claim that anyone will ever have a complete grasp
of a particular discipline, but I would assert that a philosopher
should have a reasonably general idea of the current parameters of
philosophy, in the same way in which a nurse theorist should have
a reasonably coherent picture of the current parameters of nursing.
In other words, we need to know more about the body and range
of knowledge, its systematic structure, its identifiable area and
its conceptual wholeness, that is, we need to know its form or
forms before we can judge the appropriateness of any of its contents
or methods in relation to other forms of knowledge.
We need to know more about philosophy and more about nursing
in a general sense, before we can decide which specific contents
and methods may be of use in the search for nursing knowledge.
I have argued that nursing knowledge must be developed from
analyses of the practice of nursing based on a general conceptualization
of nursing.
I shall argue that the identification of philosophical
'knowledge' and 'methods' which may be useful to nursing must be
based on the practice of philosophers within a general conceptualization
of philosophy.
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NOTES TO PART ONE
I had originally said, "a fact as such is meaningless". I
am still not convinced that this is not exactly what I meant to
say, although I perceived the difficulty which one of my
supervisors experienced in accepting this statement. A
philosopher's enquiries into 'meaning' as part of the philosophy
of language, explore various aspects of our understanding of
words and sentences. One aspect of the notion of 'meaning'
is its connection with other psychological conditions, such
as wanting or intending, and with human conventions and rules.
Many writers have analyzed the meaning of a sentence in terms
of it being "normally used by those intending to bring about a
certain result in an audience." (Flew 1979) Without such an
intention and without an appropriate response by a listener
(on the assumption that language serves the purpose of communication),
an utterance of whatever kind remains 'meaningless'. Once
again, two German words denote much more clearly the difference
which I am trying to elucidate. 'Sinn' and 'Bedeutung' would
both be translated as 'meaning', or possibly as 'sense' and
'meaning', but they are by no means synonymous. A word or
sentence may have a 'Sinn', but no 'Bedeutung' for any listener.
The factual assertion by a chemist that iron oxidises in the
presence of oxygen has a meaning {'Sinn'), but may be meaningless
{'bedeutungslos') to a listener who has no knowledge of chemical
processes. What I am trying to say here has a meaning, but
it may still be meaningless to a non-German speaker or to a
person with no appropriate 'psychological condition', such as
wanting to understand the 'meaning' {'Bedeutung') of my utterances.
One can even go further and claim that a 'meaningless'
('sinnlose') utterance like 'boo-pa, boo-da' has a 'meaning'
{'Bedeutung') in a speech therapy session where it may serve a
particular purpose in learning to articulate certain sounds.
"Word and meaning are not the same. A word is simply a sound
or a written symbol for something meaningless {bedeutungstos!).
... The meaning {Bedeutung) which we attribute to a word, may
change without the word being changed. ... The utterance as
such does not 'possess' meaning {Bedeutung), only the 'understanding
subject' {das verstehende Geschtfpf) can attribute meaning
{Bedeutung) to an utterance." (my translation from Apel 1953)
The following observation by Fodor and Katz (1971) illustrates
the importance of the context in which an utterance is made, or
in which it is put by the listener: "The same utterance will be
associated with a given speech act under certain environmental
conditions but not under others. For example, if I utter
'A travelling salesman was looking for a place to spend the
night', then, depending upon the environmental condition, I may
be making an assertion, starting a joke, referring to a joke,
giving an example, providing an explanation, quoting, informing,
talking to myself, damaging my reputation, and so forth. But
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the environmental conditions which determine which, if any,
of these acts I am performing can clearly not be discovered
by merely examining the utterance."
A given form or set may be repeated an infinite number of times
or may have an infinite number of components or members, as,
for example, is indicated by the mathematical symbol of x1}
But this does not make x itself infinite. The notion of
infinity as it occurs in philosophical arguments from
classical times onwards, is vague and loosely taken as
"that which has no beginning or end" or "that which has no
boundary, internal or external". (Flew 1979) It appears
paradoxical to talk of forms as structures, whether of a
symbolic, conceptual or material kind, which all serve to organise,
define, permit inclusion or exclusion of certain members,
components or characteristics, and then to consider them to be
infinite in themselves.
In a talk given to the members of the Scottish National Nursing
and Midwifery Consultative Committee, Altschul (1977) offered
a range of criteria by which the performance of nursing actions
might be evaluated as an art. These included their
aesthetically pleasing nature, the elements of creativity
and inspiration, the apparent ease in the performance of a
difficult task according to rules geared to a certain standard,
and the sense of accomplishment, success and pleasure which
may be invoked in the performer or in the onlooker. In the
effort to demonstrate the scientific foundations of nursing,
says Altschul, and possibly as a result of an increasing awareness
of cost-effectiveness, "We seem to have downgraded the acquisition
of skills in favour of knowledge and comprehension, so that
nurses' actions are sometimes no longer performed in an
aesthetically satisfactory way." It is indeed pertinent to ask,
as Altschul does, whether we should not try to determine whether
an aesthetically pleasing nursing performance has any therapeutic
effects.
It has been suggested to me that Zbilut's and possibly Stevens'
attempts at explaining the nature of philosophical enquiries
need not be taken very seriously. Whether this suggestion
was based on the judgement that these writers are not very
good philosophers (which they probably are not) or on some
other criterion, I do not know. But I would maintain that it
is important to examine such attempts at explaining non-
empirical methods of enquiry in nursing with care and concern.
Apart from the fact that nurses have to learn (as I am doing)
to handle this kind of explanation in the same way in which
they had to learn empirical methods of investigation, these are
the only kinds of explanations which we have at present.
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PART TWO THE MARKET PLACE
The claim of nurse writers to a philosophy
of nursing; ideology misrepresented as
philosophy; misunderstood ethics; the
rights of patients as a moral proposition;
the scarcity of social and political
analyses; nursing as an applied science
in need of conceptualizations; toward
a theory of nursing?
THE MARKET PLACE
Explanations which are aimed at defining and delineating
philosophical methods of enquiry in nursing are not only diverse
and usually fairly brief, they are also offered very infrequently.
But since I have chosen to develop my argument from the
demonstrable fact that nurses are engaged in a search for knowledge
of a particular kind, and that this search, fragmented as it may
still be, includes occasional attempts to explain what might
constitute relevant 'philosophical knowledge' in or for nursing,
I cannot proceed without examining some rather more frequently
found examples of the use of 'philosophy' in the nursing
literature.
I am going to make a deliberate distinction between the
attempted explanations of philosophy in or for nursing as provided
by Hillway, Henderson, Dickhoff and James and by others previously
mentioned, and those uses of 'philosophy' which I am about to examine.
I consider the difference between these two groups of writers
to be so important that I avoided discussing them together in the
same part of the thesis.
Much more frequent than the kind of explanations offered by
Dickhoff and James, or Stevens is the use of the word 'philosophy'
as denoting "an integrated viewpoint toward certain beliefs and
practices." (Gardener 1973) The custom to talk about 'a philosophy'
or about 'the philosophy' of an individual, of a group of people,
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of the profession, or of an institution in the context of established
beliefs and values which may be prevalent in nursing, appears to
have originated in the North American nursing literature.
Chapman (1978) comments that
"The use of the word philosophy is perhaps a dangerous one
as British nurses frequently laugh at their American
colleagues because of their preoccupation with the 'philosophy
of nursing'."
I am not sure that this use is dangerous because it can be ridiculed,
but I think that it may be dangerously misleading for other reasons.
In some of the papers by American nurse theorists, the origin
of the use of philosophy as synonymous with values and beliefs is
attributed to educational theory. (Walker 1971, Ogundeyin 1976)
Walker bases her conclusion that the "discourse of nursology"
(that is, talking about the study of nursing) is accomplished by
three modes of inquiry, on an analysis of educational theory by
Maccia (1968). According to this analysis, the scientific mode
of inquiry provides a description and explanation of nursing
phenomena as they occur, the praxiological mode describes and
explains what constitutes effective nursing practice while
"In the philosophic mode a description and explanation
is provided of what constitutes worthy means and ends for
a given practical endeavour."
In other words, the philosophical method of enquiry is here clearly
defined and delineated by the question 'What is worthwhile
nursing?'.
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It goes far beyond this argument to examine the nature of
educational theory, or to deal fully with Ogundeyin's claim that
"A philosophy of education is a statement of values regarding what
should be taught in the educational institution." (1976)
Contemporary British texts in the philosophy of education
would suggest that this view is not accepted (Archambault 1972,
Lloyd 1976, Schofield 1972) and that the approaches taken by British
philosophers of education are not only concerned with very different
issues, but also very specifically declare the prescription of
practical actions based on certain value systems to be an illegitimate
aim for the philosopher. One quote shall stand for many which
express the position of British philosophers of education in this
respect:
"Philosophers are no longer to be regarded as the guide
of humanity, in education or anything else. Moreover,
if someone were to argue that the philosopher as a human
being may have some desire to do at least what he can to
leave the world a little better than he finds it, a common
contemporary philosopher's reply would be that there is
not the slightest reason to suppose that his philosophical
reflections - say upon some aspects of the problem of
values - would render him in any way more competent to
pronounce or advise on practical affairs." (Reid 1972)
But "to pronounce and advise on practical affairs" is precisely
what these "statements of philosophy", whether they are made in
the context of nursing education or practice, are meant to do.
"The course philosophy" as a statement of what should be done,
or of what should be achieved in a given educational endeavour has
become a standard pronouncement of nurse teachers. (Newell 1978)
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"The statement of philosophy contains the broad goals of the
educational program and how these goals are to be attained", declare
Gordon and Anello (1974) in an explanation of a systematic curriculum
revision. The use of the word philosophy to indicate what ideally
should be done is even more clearly narrowed down to a list of
prescribed actions when it is used in the context of nursing practice
and of instructions for the preparation of nursing students for
this practice.
"The Philosophy of 'Briggs'" (Collins 1977) may be an extreme
example of a selection of verbatim recommendations for action taken
from the Report of the Committee on Nursing 1972, and published
under the above title with the, in this context irrelevant,
explanation of philosophy as "The pursuit of wisdom, or of the
knowledge of things and their causes - the study of ultimate
realities and general principles." (the italics are mine)
Some writers indicate that the system of beliefs and values
denoted by the word philosophy is, or may be, an outcome of
philosophical reflection which is indeed concerned with a
systematic and searching analysis of
"a system of thought - political, religious, ethical,
educational, (and which is) concerned with reality, origins,
the nature of man, the purpose and the meaning of existence,
the nature and sources of knowledge, the science of exact
thought, and the nature and realm of values." (Wagner 1969)
I think that this implies the development of a 'Weltanschauung'
based on a 'Weltbild' .
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I have argued earlier that the acquisition of knowledge
(Wissen) may make a person knowledgeable but that being knowledgeable
is not enough by itself. Knowledge of facts, their relationships,
their causality and their effects can remain disconnected and
disjointed. To arrive at a coherent picture of the world (Weltbild),
a person needs to conceptualize and to synthesize this empirical
knowledge into a meaningful whole. It is in the process of
creating a 'Weltbild' that philosophical methods of enquiry may
prove to be useful, if - as various writers insist - philosophy
is fundamentally concerned with the study of ultimate realities
and general principles.
I would therefore agree that "Philosophy helps a person
to develop a coherent world view, one which makes sense of
every-day experience." (Lanara 1976)
I do not agree that the system of beliefs and values which
a person may hold and on which he or she may act, is either
necessarily or even potentially a function of philosophical
thought. A 'Weltanschauung' may well be influenced by the
ideas which have been formed in the process of philosophizing
(Treece 1974), but their adoption as articles of belief which
may eventually form a personal or professional 'ideology' are
a function of social life.
An ideology (or a Weltanschauung) expresses the interests
of particular groups of people in particular circumstances, and
will be used to justify such actions as are compatible with the
interests of the group in question. (Larrain 1979, Williams 1976)
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That this is precisely the function of the so-called 'philosophy'
of nursing is clearly expressed by Gordon and Anello (1974) :
"... after the faculty have discussed and clarified their
beliefs, a committee can then draw up a rough set of
philosophical statements emanating from the discussion."
But this statement of the group's 'philosophy' must be
"coherent and consistent with the overall purpose of the
institution. ... Faculty must therefore examine and
clarify the institutional goals before formalizing a
philosophy of nursing education." (the italics are mine)
It is certain that ideological structures serve to increase
loyalty to the group, and that they are fundamentally necessary in
"the selection of modes, means and ends of action." (Godfrey 1971)
But in serving these purposes, ideologies are expressions of a
commitment which accepts at least for the time being certain
'truths' while
"... the essence of philosophy is not the possession of the
truth but the search for truth ... It is a disinterested
pursuit, to which questions of utility ... have no
relevance." (Jaspers 1951)
Whatever the Concise Oxford Dictionary may say, "the rules
for the conduct of life" are not drawn up by philosophers nor do
they constitute 'a philosophy'.
My particular concern that the use of philosophy as synonymous
with ideology should be exposed as being dangerously misleading
is that it confuses questions with answers3 uncertainty with
certainty3 scepticism with conviction, examination with result3
and personal doubt with group concensus.
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An acceptance of 'philosophy' in the form of recommendations,
however valuable and proper they may be, spells the end of
philosophy as a valid method of enquiry, and incidentally of course,
the premature end of my argument. I am conscious of the possible
problems of defining the expressions of fundamental sets of shared
beliefs and values as 'ideology', since this term does not have
an undisputed and generally accepted meaning either. However,
in the absence of a more exact translation of 'Weltanschauung'
which has the advantage of not being used in the pejorative
sense of 'ideology' as being an "abstract, impractical or fanatical
theory" (Williams 1976) , I cannot offer a less controversial
choice.
Feibleman (1958), as will be seen later, talks about 'official
philosophies' as compared with philosophy proper. I do not
think that this is a clear enough distinction between two
conceptual endeavours which aim at completely opposing states
of mind.
Dickhoff and James (1970) in criticizing the use of the word
philosophy in a similar way, although less fully than I have done,
suggest that "What nurses tend to call 'philosophy of nursing'
we as philosophers would tend to call a 'religion of nursing'."
Not only do I fear that the substitution of 'religion'
for 'philosophy' might cause even greater troubles than offering
'ideology' for 'philosophy' where the latter is used inappropriately;
I also think that it is further misleading.
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Dickhoff and James emphasize that the integrated and consistent
personal attitude towards life and reality which underlies a
nurse's shared and central purposes is "fixed" and held "either
dogmatically ... or (is) at least not open to systematic scrutiny
and possible change." They also maintain that
"these beliefs and values are held by an individual as a
person rather than as a nurse or as a professional, and
held in common, if at all, only by happy chance."
Undoubtedly, there are such beliefs and values but those
which I found presented in the nursing literature and with which
I took issue were not necessarily of this kind. Gordon and
Anello, for example, make it quite clear that a reexamination of
the "philosophy" is an essential task that has to be accomplished
from time to time and they emphasize that 'the philosophy' must
be flexible enough to accommodate changes. Chapman's paper
constitutes a reappraisal of current beliefs and values in nursing,
and Lanara traces the development of the current 'philosophy of
nursing' from classical Greece to the pronouncements of the
International Council of Nurses and of the World Health Organisation.
I would argue further that any such ideological revision
necessitates the use of philosophical methods of enquiry; the very
reason that they should be clearly distinguished from the matter
to which they may be applied.
Another example of such an examination of the ideological
basis of nursing is provided by Gamer (1979) who claims rightly,
I think, that there is a
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"growing divergence between the ideological aspirations
of the official spokesmen and of the practical interests
of the working nurse ...".
This is not a question, as Dickhoff and James suggest, of beliefs
and values held by individuals as people rather than as nurses,
but of the ideology of professionalism
"which served to unite nurses in the attainment of
licensure and higher educational standards (but which)
can no longer hold together a group which is stratified
by education, achievement, personal goals, and perceptions
of the nursing role."
Furthermore, not only are the so-called 'philosophies' of
nursing part of the wider ideologies of the institutions in which
they find their realization (for example, the hospital, the college)
but as Wagner (1969) says distinctly, they include "the concepts
that a civilized society looks upon as being right, reasonable and
reachable."
The obvious problem here is of course that contemporary
industrial society does not present a homogenous structure of
beliefs and values but "consists of differentiated groups or
subcultures each having the propensity to develop patterns of
values in its members." (Godfrey 1971)
So far from being "fixed", ideological structures in nursing
are under frequent and conflicting pressures. To what an extent
and in what way nursing ideology responds to these pressures must
depend on the ability of nurses to handle confidently the tools
of conceptual analysis and ideological revision.
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Where this ability and confidence are lacking, it is likely
that nurses will be reluctant to occupy themselves with the confusion
and entanglements that seem to threaten their professionallit/es.
They may console themselves with the thought that these discords
are merely transient and that fundamentally everything is alright.
It may well be that here Dickhoff and James's 'dogmatically held
sets of beliefs and values' do become apparent. Nursing ideology
may turn at this point into myths which rest on "numerous cliche's,
platitudes and strange contradictions which point ... directly
to a set of unsubstantiated beliefs ...". (Reinkemeyer 1969)
Whether we may call these myths the "religion of nursing", I
dare not say, but they have lost the power of what I would call
an ideology, namely to justify such actions as are in the interest
of those who subscribe to it.
However, whether we are dealing with reasonably coherent
ideologies as perhaps expressed by the articulate spokesmen and
-women of the profession, or with the cliches and platitudes which
may serve others as a less coherent and less articulate rationale
for their actions, the real
"function of philosphy lies in its criticism of what is
prevalent ... The chief aim of such criticism is to
prevent mankind from losing itself in those ideas and
activities which the existing organisation of society
instills into its members. ...
(Philosophy) means the lack of faith in the prevailing
popular thought. ...
By (its) criticism, we mean that intellectual, and eventually
practical effort which is not satisfied to accept the
prevailing ideas, actions, and social conditions unthinkingly
and from mere habit; effort which aims to coordinate the
individual sides of social life with each other and with the
general ideas and aims of the epoch, to deduce them
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genetically, to distinguish the appearance from the essence,
to examine the foundations of things, in short, really
to know them." (Horkheimer 1972 - the italics are mine)
If I have come full circle in this argument which started
with the observation that philosophy might contribute relevant
knowledge to nursing, then I have returned to the central question
which I have set out to examine.
The claims to a 'philosophy of nursing', which are based
on a misleading confusion caused by ideological statements being
dressed up as 'philosophy', lead to a dead end as far as any
philosophical enquiry is concerned. This is succinctly expressed
by Feibleman (1958) who observes
"For institutions often adopt official philosophies, and
official philosophy can be the death of philosophy. To
adopt a philosophy officially means to have discovered
the final truth; and it ends inquiry into the nature of
truth by claiming the possession of it ..."
Such false claims to a 'philosophy of nursing' must be clearly
distinguished from the attempts to explain philosophical enquiries
in or for nursing even though these explanations are so far not
altogether satisfactory. But what is on offer as 'a philosophy
of nursing' is simply not worth buying. The idea that "Sensible
people ... have a philosophy (while) silly people rely on ideology"
(Williams 1976) is really both naive and offensive.
Furthermore, the use of the word philosophy is dangerous
inspite of the spreading transatlantic custom to talk in this
way about nursing ideologies or even nursing myths. Philosophical
issues in nursing are not exemplified by a collection of assumptions
and beliefs. This does not do justice to the contribution which
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philosophical methods of investigation can make to the study of
nursing. It not only appears to confine philosophy to a very
narrow function, it also attributes to it a purpose which it
does not have.
It behoves us to look further for the meaning of philosophical
enquiries in nursing.
When surveying books and articles concerned with 'ethics'
in nursing, applied to nursing or for nurses, one may hope to
find at least here some indications of the appropriateness and
usefulness of philosophical enquiries. Unfortunately, it seems
to me that again nurses have adopted a terminology (possibly
following a medical tradition in referring to certain professional
issues as 'ethical' or 'ethics') which promises much, but generally
does less than justice to that branch of philosophy known as
ethics or moral philosophy.
It is true that moral philosophers differ in the interpretation
of their task. Nowell-Smith (1954) rightly points out that
traditionally moral philosophy has been regarded as a practical
endeavour in providing knowledge for moral action, that is for
doing what is right.
But even classical philosophers1 do not undertake to give
detailed practical advice on how people should behave in certain
situations. However,
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"they all agreed that the goal of moral philosophy is
practical knowledge, not that we should know what goodness
is but that we should become good."
But if philosophical treatises from Plato and Aristotle
to Hobbes and Spinoza contain injunctions to do something rather
than another, to adopt this or that course of action, or to
subscribe to this or that moral code, these injunctions are
usually implicit in the nature of their discourse.
Firstly, classical moral philosophers examined a rather
general and fundamental question: what is the good life for man
and what is happiness? They saw their task in describing the
good life in principle or in general outlines, and in showing
how it could be achieved. Secondly, they held the view that
people would naturally act in such a way as to try and achieve
the good life, if they knew what it was. In other words, by
offering knowledge about good and bad, right and wrong, by
means of a rational discourse, this knowledge had to be practical,
since all rational men, who could follow the argument, would
inevitably act in such a way as to lead a good life.
In order to find answers to these very general questions
about the kind of life that people might lead in striving for
individual happiness and collective security, the classical moral
philosopher had to range over a wide field of human concerns.
Since men must live with one another, life in society and politics
had to be discussed. Indeed, ethics and politics were, for these
philosophers, one subject. They saw their function in elucidating
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principles which might eventually affect individual conduct.
Some later philosophers called this endeavour which aimed at
"systematising the different ends of human action and
the different sets of rules for practice, or ideals of
what ought to be",
practical philosophy and distinguished it from other philosophical
concerns referred to as theoretical philosophy. (Sidgwick 1902)
The latter, by contrast, would be concerned with all those
endeavours which might lead to an understanding of the world in
its widest sense but for its own sake, without either implicitly
or explicitly relating this understanding to any consequent
actions.
This distinction between practical and theoretical philosophy
in relation to ethics was, and occasionally still is, made in
comparing the contributions of, say, Plato with those of Broad
and Ross. (Nowell-Smith 1954) Where Plato tried to provide an
understanding of the good life with the implicit assumption that
people would act on this understanding (that is, practical
philosophy), Broad and Ross are predominantly concerned with the
study and analysis of moral terms, moral judgement and the nature
of moral discourse generally (that is, theoretical philosophy).
At first sight, this appears to be a useful distinction to
make. Sidgwick (1902) suggests, for example, that "such professions
as Medicine" are in need of practical philosophy. Nurses too
have acknowledged that they need to
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"justify one form of behaviour over another, to determine
the right-making characteristics of action, for purposes of
carrying out duties and obligations." (Davis & Aroskar 1978)
What is now on occasion called normative or applied ethics
can be seen, for the purpose of my argument, as being synonymous
with practical philosophy.
What has been called theoretical philosophy is termed by
some nurse writers on the subject 'meta-ethics1, which, however,
is then quite narrowly defined as that aspect of ethics which
"delineates the extent to which moral judgements are reasonable
or otherwise justifiable." But even this aspect of moral
discourse does not appear to be of importance to nurses.
"Health professionals are primarily concerned with ... normative
ethics", claim Davis and Aroskar (1978) .
The almost inevitable conclusion to which this distinction
between the rather narrowly conceived tasks of theoretical and
practical philosophy leads, is to assume that practical philosophy
in the form of normative or applied ethics only is of importance
to nurses. The outcome of this now already limited conception
of ethics is often what is called 'ethics' in nursing. It
consists of generalized prescriptions for professional conduct
which tend to resemble ideological statements rather than that
they constitute an examination of values which may justify these
statements, and an analysis of how moral judgements based on
these values are made.
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Heading these pronouncements on 'ethics' in nursing is the
"Code for Nurses" (1973) of the International Council of Nurses.
It is meant to be "a guide for action based on values and needs
of society." (ICN 1977) An accompanying text presents "ethical
considerations in nursing practice" by providing fifty examples
of the kind of nursing situations which contain the seeds of a
moral dilemma. (Tate 1977) There is, however, no exposition
of tenable moral theories or principles which could form a basis
for a critical analysis of the presented situations. The questions
put to the reader which centre around the issue of what to do,
are not informed by any kind of practical or theoretical philosophy
in the original sense of these terms. What has got lost, quite
possibly due to the distinction made by philosophers between
practical and theoretical philosophy which I do not think to be
as valid as it might at first appear,2 is the endeavour
"to give a true account of what it is to make a moral
judgement, to decide, deliberate and choose, as well
as to answer moral questions in a more direct way."
(Nowell-Smith 1954)
All moral philosophers, including the classical writers,
have always been theoreticians. That is, they have argued the
reasons, their underlying assumptions and theories, for their
description of the good life and how it may be achieved.
it seems to me that arguing the underlying assumptions is
the proper function of professional ethics.
There is, as far as I could ascertain, only one British author
(not a nurse) who makes this point clearly and consistently when
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dealing with moral dilemmas in medicine and nursing. Campbell
(1975) explains the concern of ethics as being directed towards
the "understanding of the nature of moral judgments". In this
endeavour, ethics attempt to "provide a rational framework for
understanding the complexities of moral judgments" and to clarify
the meaning of moral terms like good and bad, right and wrong.
As an "abstract, analytical, uncommitted approach" ethics,
Campbell claims, are 'characterized by the spirit of radical
enquiry". The moral philosopher does not attempt to 'solve'
moral dilemmas or
"to provide any form of specific moral guidance such as
rules for right behaviour ... His function is not one of
moral guidance but one of objective analysis."
It seems to me that nurses tend to narrow down philosophical
enterprises to the point of distortion and falsification in a
surprisingly consistent way. When one compares Campbell's
explanations of the nature of ethical enquiries in relation to
moral dilemmas in health care with the explanations offered earlier
of how philosophical enquiries might assist a person in the
acquisition of a consistent and coherent view of the world, and
if one then examines what nurses actually do and offer as
'philosophy' or 'ethics', one reaches very similar conclusions.
In each case, what nurses offer should more accurately be described
as ideological statements or statements of belief.
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More serious than a possible confusion of terminology is
again the confusion between questions and answers, between uncertainty
and certainty, between scepticism and conviction, between
examination and result, and between personal doubt and collective
commitment. As statements of belief are offered as 'a philosophy',
so prescriptions for professional conduct are offered as 'ethics'.
But the apparent certainty, conviction and commitment implicit
in such statements must hinder to some extent a genuine philosophical
enquiry in nursing.
Although some transatlantic nurse writers have begun to
move away from nurses' traditional misrepresentation of 'ethics'
in the form of codes of conduct or even just as points of etiquette
(Davis & Aroskar 1978, Steele & Harmon 1979), these are very
recent attempts which have not yet been emulated in this country,
with one exception. In a paper concerned with the question of
honesty in nursing practice (Schrock 1980), I attempted an
examination of some of the principles which appear to, or perhaps
ought to, govern nurses' decisions to lie or tell the truth. The
fundamental expectation of truthfulness in social and professional
interactions makes it necessary to examine the nature of excuses
and justification put forward to defend a deliberate deception
in a professional relationship. This paper is reproduced in
Appendix I.
But this and the above mentioned American attempts are still
overshadowed by recent publications by professional bodies3 which
perpetuate this misrepresentation, and which are much more likely
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to be in the hands of nurses than the few texts devoted to a more
valid examination of the meaning and relevance of nursing ethics
in relation to nursing practice.
One debate which engages a number of nurses (and other health
care workers) is concerned with 'the rights of patients'.
The conception of human rights in a context which must imply
a particular view of man and society, is embedded in the rise of
individualism, and in the development of social contract theories
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which held as their
most fundamental and common tenet the principle "that the basis
and end of government (is) the security, the happiness, the
rights of the individual." (Kamenka & Tay 1978)
The ensuing declarations^ which expressed some human rights
as ideals or demands served obvious political purposes and must
be considered as political documents. But while these various
conceptions of human rights were now purposefully applied to
political issues, they had originated in religious conceptions,
conflicts and martyrdoms.5 The eighteenth century with its
doctrines of the rights of man invited a new argument which for
the first time based its reasoning on philosophical analysis
rather than on religious convictions. Closely linked to the
notion of natural rights which belongs to the realm of moral
discourse, the whole idea of human rights is essentially a moral
proposal.
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"The doctrine of human rights is a proposal concerning
the morally appropriate way of treating men and organizing
society. Like all such proposals that gain force and
command respect, it is a complex proposal, attempting to
present a systematic view of man and society, taking up
associated empirical material, relating and ordering moral
preferences." (Kamenka & Tay 1978)
I will therefore argue that a discussion of patients'
rights should be part of professional ethics in its proper sence,
that is, prescriptions relating to patients' rights should be
examined in such a way that the nature of the moral judgment
required by the nurse in deciding on the 'right' nursing action
becomes clear and explicit.
Davis and Aroskar (1978) offer a general discussion of the
development and of the nature of human rights, examine the more
specific right to health, and illustrate the conceptual and moral
issues attending the notion of patient rights by examples of various
declarations, such as the American Hospital Association Statement
on a Patient's Bill of Rights, Your Rights as a Patient at Beth
Israel Hospital Boston, and The Pregnant Patient's Bill of Rights.
It is pertinent to note that such declarations from various
sources abound and can readily be found in the North American
nursing literature. A perhaps particularly topical example in
this, the United Nations' Year of Disabled People is the
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons (1976). But no
such declaration has been fully reproduced and discussed in the
British nursing literature.
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Steele and Harmon (1979) treat the topic of individual rights
in a somewhat narrower sense by concentrating mainly on the
patient's right to refuse medical treatment or specific medical
therapies, and on the right to confidentiality. As an analysis,
their treatment is superficial, but in a descriptive way it draws
attention to a variety of writings which provide such analyses
in relation to the enumerated topics and situations.
In developing a moral argument in support of a theory of
respect for persons, Campbell (1975) examines issues relevant
to the idea of patients' rights, and discusses the rights of the
individual in the context of an examination of utilitarianism.
With the emergence of patients' rights into the consciousness
of nurses and other health care workers (and of patients themselves),
it has become obvious that the moral proposals which are articulated
in the declarations of such rights are not necessarily realized
in action.
The original idea of human rights which defined certain areas
of human conduct and affairs to be immune from government
interference, also embodied the notion that the people could use
justified force against the government, if their rights were not
protected by governmental action. (Popkin et> at 1955)
One important feature of both legal and moral rights, it seems,
is their connection with coercive power.
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"Early declarations of rights were regarded as justifications
for revolution and other acts of political violence."
(Kamenka & Tay 1978)
John Stuart Mill (1962) declared it an injustice to take or
withhold from any person "that to which he has a moral right."
He believed that
"When we think that a person is bound in justice to do a
thing, it is an ordinary form of language to say, that
he ought to be compelled to do it. We should be
gratified to see the obligation enforced, by anybody who
had the power. ... When we call anything a person's
right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to
protect him in the possession of it, either by the force
of law, or by that of education and opinion." (the
italics are mine)
But not all human rights enjoy protection by legal enforcement,
or by the force of public opinion. The declarations of the
patients' rights have remained clearly attempts to "put the desires
and needs of patients on firmer ground and to bring them to the
provider's attention". (Jenny 1979)
Writers on the subject agree generally that the adoption
of a proclamation of patients' rights is the first important
step, but that this by itself is not sufficient to guarantee these
rights. Eventually, so Annas (1975) believes, following a
period of education,
"doctors and nurses will begin to afford patients their
rights as a matter of course. Until this goal is attained,
however, it will be necessary to set up some mechanism
that can help ensure that patient's rights are protected.
The mechanism I favor is the patients' right advocate."
Annas envisages a new kind of hospital worker who would
represent the patient's interests and being only accountable to
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the patient, would also have the power to enforce the realization
of his rights.
Although Annas as well as Abrams (1978) and Kosik (1972)
identified various advocacy models such as patient representative,
counsellor, lay therapist, information provider, health care
humanist (sic) , watchdog, educator, spokesman, catalyst, and
ombudsman, the proposals remained quite vague and nebulous.6
Not so, however, the nurses' reactions!
The whole idea of patient advocacy received widespread
endorsement in the North American nursing literature (Kosik 1972,
Christy 1973, Pankratz & Pankratz 1974, Donahue 1978, Fay 1978),
and quickly led to official statements by nurses' organisations
(Registered Nurses Association of Ontario 1977).
In arguing for their right to adopt or to maintain the
commitment to see patients' rights realized in the context of
nursing care, nurses put forward coherent and searching arguments
which demonstrated to me the ability of nurse writers to examine
the values on which statements of patients' rights are based, and
to analyse the nature of the moral judgments required by nurses
in the realization of these rights. In other words, here unlike
in almost any other context, nurses engaged in a valid
philosophical argument.
I cannot offer any explanation for this phenomenon. Its
very occurrence, however, makes other, often confused, irrelevant
or arbitrary efforts to engage in philosophical enquiries so much
more inexplicable.
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Although modern moral philosophers tend to leave the
discussion of what a good society should be like and by what
criteria it might be recognized to some of their colleagues who
are more directly concerned with the apparently distinct problems
of political philosophy, it seems to me that these cannot be
divorced entirely from the concerns of the moral philosopher.
Neither do I think it very important for the purpose of my
argument here to distinguish between political and social
philosophy. (Flew 1979)
But it seems pertinent to ask whether nurses indicate in
some way that notions like freedom or liberty, authority, power,
obligation, consent, and justice have any relevance to their
activities.
Campbell (1978) offers an examination of the concepts of
freedom, equality and fraternity in a variety of political
theories (such as social contract theories, utilitarianism,
Kant's transcendental idealism and Marxism) in order to elucidate
the problem of justice in the delivery of health care.
A multidisciplinary working group which included two nurses
among its fourteen members and which also had the services of
a nursing adviser, conducted a moral enquiry into the ethics of
resource allocation in health care by group study over a period
of two years. (Boyd 1979)
The group operated under the aegis of the Edinburgh Medical
Group as part of a research project in medical ethics and education.
The working group's purpose was to examine the moral criteria
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which, either implicitly or explicitly govern or should govern,
political and managerial decision making in the allocation of
scarce resources in the health services of this country.
Griffin (1980) who, like Campbell, is not a nurse,
emphasizes "the central importance ... in the area of moral
concern" that a consideration of care priorities should be given.
But nurses do not seem to have contributed greatly to this, in
any case still rather limited debate.
I am deliberately omitting a close scrutiny of American
papers related to these issues, since very few have been written
by nurses, and those that seem to incorporate a nursing
perspective tend to be descriptive or prescriptive rather than
analytical. For example, Mullane (1975) deals with a popular
subject when she describes how nurses can influence policy decisions,
whether in governmental or local health care settings.
My own contributions (Schrock 1974, 1977a, 1977b) are rightly
categorised as illustrating a suitable approach to the "proper
content for general political education in a democracy" (Griffin 1980)
rather than as analyses of political concepts and theories. The
few passages in my papers which contain the seeds for an analysis
of some notions like individual versus state responsibility (1974)
and political consciousness (1977a), and which suggest a more
critical examination of politics and professionalism (1977b)
have not, to my knowledge, been taken up and developed more fully
by other nurse writers in this country.
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As I search for evidence of nurses' concern with moral issues
in nursing, and of attempts on their part to analyse some central
moral concepts and theories, I wonder whether such activities are
essentially part of discovering the new kind of nursing knowledge
which nurses say they need.
Might it not be sufficient for nurses to refer to the writings
of others who examine moral problems in the context of health
care, and who analyse and define ethical criteria of social and
political relevance? Must nurses repeat the efforts of members
of other disciplines in their search for knowledge? Perhaps
they can use for their own purposes what others have found to be
true, or apply the arguments of others to their own moral
problems. It may be reasonable to suggest that the scarcity of
writings about ethics by nurses indicates that these are simply
not needed.
This possibility raises a fundamental question which has
hovered constantly in the background of my argument and to which
I have only intermittently addressed myself. It now seems
necessary to be more explicit.
To what extent is nursing a composite applied science which
draws on other disciplines for purposes of its own?
I have said that nurses may well use the results of scientific
enquiry without participating in or repeating the experiments or
observations which have produced these outcomes.
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I also claimed that nurses need to participate in philosophical
enquiries but I do not think that I have clearly shown why this
should be so.
In questioning the 'truth for nursing' of some enquiries in
other disciplines, I have maintained that the knowledge which
results from a valid and reliable investigation may well be of use
to nursing, but that nursing would not necessarily endeavour to
identify and create its own knowledge in exactly the same way.
I suggested that the contents of nursing knowledge can only
be defined after nursing has been conceptualized (that is, the
contents of this knowledge must be secondary to its forms).
If some, or all, of these contents were to come from other
disciplines, I wondered by what criteria items of knowledge may be
selected in order to be applied in, or to be synthesized for
nursing.
I tried to show that knowledge from the physical, biological
and behavioural sciences does not become nursing knowledge simply
by its application to nursing.
I have suggested that nursing knowledge might be identifiable
by an explicit nursing perspective, by being structured and organised
around a clearly articulated concept of nursing, and by its
demonstrable potential to improve patient care through nursing
action.
I do not imply by offering these criteria for identifying
nursing knowledge that, for example, physiological knowledge about
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the maintenance of body temperature that is applied by nurses
might not improve the patient's well-being through nursing
action. Neither is the question which was put to me, whether
it is any worse for the patient, if this knowledge remains clearly
biological science knowledge, relevant to the issue.
It may not matter at all to the patient whether there is
such a thing as identifiable nursing knowledge provided that such
knowledge as is used by nurses contributes to an improvement in
his or her well-being. Moreover, it should certainly matter
to patients, if there were potential or actual knowledge that
could contribute to an improvement in their well-being but which
is not being used by nurses.
However, it clearly matters to nurses whether there is any
identifiable nursing knowledge, for the very reason that its
systematic application in nursing care might improve the patient's
well-being. Until it can be shown that there is no such thing,
or if there is, that its use makes no difference to the outcome
of nursing actions, it appears provident to continue the search
for it. And it is this which is under discussion in my argument.
The observation that conceptualizations derived from other
disciplines do not as such belong to nursing and can therefore not
be readily ordered into a unified form or structure that is
unique to nursing, is not made regretfully, as has been suggested
to me.
If nursing can operate effectively without any conceptualizations
of its own, and without ordering its knowledge base in some way
that is meaningful to nurses, then the assertion that nursing
knowledge is not simply a mix of other sciences is obviously
irrelevant.
If nurses cannot operate as effectively as they might wish
without conceptualizing their activities and without identifying
nursing knowledge, then the observation that they need to go
beyond the conceptualizations derived from other disciplines may
cause quite another regret, namely that it needed a lengthy
argument to arrive at such a fairly obvious conclusion.
A common observation about the nature of nursing is that
like other professional activities (for example, medicine and
education), it applies scientific knowledge to its own purposes
and actions. Its knowledge base is therefore often described
as a 'mix of other sciences'.
Illustrations of this conception of a mix of sciences usually
involve representations of the sciences relevant to the centrally
placed activity under discussion, as one example here may show:7
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Leaving aside a number of problems apparent in this
presentation (for example, it may not show all the disciplines
which make up the profession's knowledge base, it does not
indicate the proportions of each discipline's contribution,
it assumes certain relationships between disciplines, and it
includes dissimilar elements), the crucial question is: how does
nursing apply these disparate items of knowledge, and is there
anything which will make the final mix distinctive from other
such amalgamations? Or to put it another way, what happens
at the interface of these various disciplines with nursing?8
McFarlane (1976a), like many other authors concerned with
this question suggests that, for example, the same item of
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physiological knowledge would be applied differently by a doctor
and by a nurse. This would also happen with other items of
knowledge and would therefore lead to a different applied science
for each profession. But what leads to this difference in
application, and does the difference lie only in using the same
kind of knowledge in a different way?
Professions which apply knowledge derived from other
disciplines have in common that their activities serve a quite
specific purpose. (Wiedenbach 1964, McFarlane 1976b) Without
having to argue the point at length, one may expect that doctors,
teachers, nurses, ministers, and lawyers pursue different
purposes with their activities, although they all conduct these
activities in personal interactions with a person or a group
of people.
In pursuing their different purposes, each profession will
select such knowledge from other disciplines as may be relevant
to the specific problems that need to be solved in order to accomplish
the set purpose. The mix of sciences which is utilized by a
doctor is therefore quite different to that utilized by a nurse.
Each must be unique to the purposes and problems of either
medicine or nursing.
But in order to produce this unique mix of knowledge, the
doctor must be able to conceptualize her purposes as a doctor,
and she must be able to identify what constitutes a medical
problem. She must do both these things in the context of the
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practice of medicine which alone provides the basis for a
conceptualization of its purposes, and allows an identification
of the problem in medical terms.
That this also applies to nursing, and how its purposes
and problems may differ from those of medicine may be made clearer
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Even if one assumed (probably quite unjustifiably) that
both doctor and nurse will apply similar knowledge of the physiology
of respiration to the solving of their different problems, the
doctor, in addition, might draw extensively on her knowledge of
pathology, biochemical action of drugs, microbiology, and radiology
(physics), while the nurse may need more immediately knowledge
about psychological and social aspects of eating, nutrition,
anatomy and physiology of digestion, and the effects of movement,
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gravity and air currents (physics). The nurse may even have to
consider to what extent he is entitled to persuade or force the
patient to do something which the patient clearly does not wish
to do (ethics).
It seems clear that nursing is a composite applied science
which draws extensively on other disciplines for purposes of
its own.
Furthermore, the selection of knowledge from other
disciplines must not occur randomly, if its application is to
be of benefit to the patient.
Knowledge derived from other disciplines is only relevant
to and applicable in nursing when it can serve the purposes of
nursing.
Knowledge becomes nursing knowledge when it is selected and
integrated for the purposes of nursing actions, and when it aids
the solution of nursing problems.
The thought processes which are indicated by words like
'select' and 'integrate' demand a conceptualization of nursing
purposes and actions.
Such conceptualizations, unlike the results of the empirical
sciences, cannot be provided by other disciplines.
Therefore nursing is an applied science only to the extent
to which nurses can use the results of the empirical sciences
122
within a conceptual framework of nursing.
Philosophical enquiries which might assist in such a task
in nursing must be conducted by nurses since conceptualizations
of nursing by non-nurses may be at best approximations and at
worst distortions. This does not exclude that nurses might wish
(and perhaps ought to) consider the perceptions other people
have of nursing (especially patients).
Nurses may well learn from philosophers how to set about
such endeavours, but philosophers unlike chemists or physiologists
cannot provide the results (answers) for them to use.
Therefore it is necessary that nurses participate in
philosophical enquiries, even if they need not participate in the
actual research activities related to empirical enquiries in other
disciplines.
The question which started this examination of how nurses
may use the results of other disciplines can now be answered.
If moral discourse is concerned with the examination of
values, the justification of moral statements, and an analysis
of how moral judgments based on these values and statements are
made, then nurses must engage in moral arguments. Only nurses
can identify with any certainty the values which are pertinent
in nursing. They must examine their own moral statements and
justify the moral decisions which they make. The lack of such
writings by nurses is not adequately filled by other people's
legitimate concern with nursing ethics.
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The foregoing discussion of nursing as an applied science
is particularly pertinent to the kind of philosophical enquiries
which I shall present as a final example of the use of philosophy
in the nursing literature.
A vast transatlantic literature has emerged which one might
globally describe as contributing to 'nursing theory'. Since
I have not set out in this argument to analyze, compare and create
nursing theory in particular or in any specific form, and since
almost all of this literature is not directly and readily
accessible to the majority of British nurses and nurse teachers,
I shall select examples only to illustrate the kind of work that
is being done.
To order this attempt in some way, I shall follow a pattern
which might reflect to some extent the process by which the theory
of a discipline is created and becomes established. In using
words like concept, model, conceptual framework, and theory,
I shall endeavour to explain my understanding of them for the
purpose of this discussion. I shall not attempt, nor would I
intend, to offer precise, invariant, operational definitions.
Not only could I not accomplish such a task, it would be inimical
to the purpose of any philosophical argument or enquiry.
"The view that language is, or should be, or could be
exact is one of the naif assumptions imported into nursing
by nurses dealing with equally naif social or natural
scientists or even philosophers. ... language is a much
more living tool than is suggested by the outlook on language
that links a given word to just one clear and exact
meaning and sees any variation only as inexactness or
misuse." (Dickhoff & James 1971)
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I agree basically with Dickhoff and James in this respect,
and I also share their fears that nurse researchers might engage
in rather sterile undertakings as a consequence of elevating the
measurability of a phenomenon to an end in itself rather than
seeing it as a means to find answers to human concerns. This,
however, does not exclude the necessity of judging when terms
need to be defined more precisely and when they can be accepted
in more global forms.
Although researchers who use empirical forms of enquiry
need working definitions (or operational terms), they often fail
to acknowledge that "many important terms lose something in being
operationalized." (Stevens 1979)
The insistence on a definition of terms acceptable to all
participants would in any case be counterproductive in a
philosophical enquiry which sets out to question rather than to
answer with finality. It needs tolerance for a certain degree
of ambiguity to explore the potential of a given thought, action,
or concern.
Having participated in two major enquiries which aimed at
establishing a conceptual basis for nursing and for health visiting
(Scottish National Nursing and Midwifery Advisory Committee 1976,
1981; Council for the Education and Training of Health Visitors
1977, 1980), I would suggest the following steps as a feasable
progression in theory construction in nursing:
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- the identification and clarification of pertinent concepts
elucidated from current nursing practice which may include
attempts at definitions of nursing or health visiting
the attempt to relate key concepts by experimenting with
various models and applying them to nursing or health
visiting practice in order to test their explanatory value
and power for practice
the construction of a conceptual framework
the formulation of principles (in the form of hypothetical
generalizations or theories).
The formulation of a principle opens the way to empirical
investigations of the conditions under which a particular
principle does or does not hold.
"As evidence of the validity and reliability of a principle
accumulates, its value as an empirical tool is enhanced.
Commonalities between events come into view. The
significance of a principle may take on new dimensions
of meaning beyond those envisaged by the formulator of
the principle. Principles are symbolic. They are
representations of the real world and must be tested
against actuality to verify their correctness." (Rogers 1970)
It is from within a conceptual framework for nursing that
testable hypotheses which have relevance to nursing are derived.
Empirically established facts, and ideas expressed within such
a framework, are synthesized to present a coherent pattern
consistent with known nursing practice. Or to put it another
way, the frame of reference provided by a conceptual system which
utilizes the key concepts thought to be central to the practice
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of nursing, and which relates them to one another in a dynamic
model of nursing practice, allows empirical observations to be
organized into a meaningful whole, that is, into a body of
knowledge.
"The science of nursing9 is a body of abstract knowledge
arrived at by (empirical) scientific research and logical
analysis. It is this body of knowledge that encompasses
nursing's descriptive, explanatory, and predictive principles
indispensable to professional practice in nursing."
(Rogers 1970 - the italics are mine)
However, if the impression were created that only those
facts which 'fit' into a preconceived conceptual framework were
admitted as being valid, then it is vital to emphasize the
interrelationship between these two (but by no means distinct)
parts of a theory.
What I chose to call a conceptual basis for the development
of nursing knowledge is only one, but an essential part of what
might become a theory of nursing. Empirical investigations
(which establish facts by a variety of methods) must be grounded
in the conceptual basis but will in turn modify, elaborate, and
extend, that is, change it.
Once this interrelationship is clearly established, one might
be able to distinguish between the initial act of theory building
(construction) and the refinement of theory following empirical
investigations (development), as Stevens (1979) suggests.
Some attempts have been made to examine the process of theory
construction. All but two of these contributions belong to the
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transatlantic nursing literature.
These contributions tend to pursue slightly different ends.
There are those which advocate theory construction as a worthy
and useful undertaking for nursing (Foley 1971, Chapman 1972,
Johnson 1974), those which examine how to set about the task
(Hardy 1974, Jacox 1974, Dickhoff & James 1975, Schrock 1977) 10,
and those which try to illuminate the content and premisses of
nursing theory construction and development (Phillips 1977) .
All these approaches are important.
While articles which are entirely devoted to the advocacy
of theory construction by offering reasoned and detailed arguments
for such a stance, were more numerous in the 1950's and 1960's
in the North American nursing literature than they are now,
Stevens (1979) claims that the need for them remains since
"many of our nurse leaders still claim that theorizing is not
appropriate for nursing."
As she rightly points out, "there is little choice about
whether or not to theorize." One does so of necessity, the
only difference being whether or not one may recognize the theoretical
base from which one acts and reasons.
The absence, by and large, of any such consistent and
coherent advocacy of theory construction in the British nursing
literature is surprising and difficult to explain, since research
papers of all kinds have proliferated in nursing over the last
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two decades. Although almost all nurse researchers endeavour
to present a clear account of the theoretical base of any other
discipline which underlies or contributes to their work, few
researchers seem to recognize the need for an articulated conceptual
basis which is derived from a nursing perspective.
I can only hazard a guess that the tendency to underplay the
value of nursing theory springs from a fear that the still early
development of nursing as an academic discipline will be rejected
outright by the nurse practitioner, who, it is assumed, simply wants
practical answers to practical questions, and does not see the need
for 'theorizing' about nursing.
There may be some justification for this assumption when
one considers the traditional values which find expression in
stereotyped 'feminine' behaviour in what was, and still is,
largely a women's profession; that anti-intellectualism was, and
still is, characteristic of the 'sisterhood of nursing', and may
still be reinforced by the equally stereotyped expectations of
a 'brotherhood of medicine', has been observed and documented by
many writers (for example, Reinkemeyer 1969, Dickhoff & James 1970,
Partridge 1978).
I think, however, that also other factors influence this
apparent unwillingness of the practitioner to accept the idea
that a conceptualization of nursing is a prerequisite for effective
nursing practice as well as for valid and relevant nursing research.
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Ellis (1970) observes that
"The orientation of the nurse scientist to nursing, and to
the practice and practitioner in nursing, is essential,
if one wants to use the word "nurse" to modify "scientist",
or to use the word "nursing" to modify the word "research"
Pressures for some discontinuity with nursing can occur
in the process of a nurse becoming a scientist." (the italics
are mine)
It seems possible that nurse researchers experience a certain
loss of identity as nurses in "the process of acquiring identity
with and from an academic discipline." This might also contribute
to their inattention to theory construction in nursing.
Another point made by Gamer (1979) is also worth considering
in this context. It may well be that practitioners and nurse
researchers no longer share a common nursing perspective, that is,
they each have a very different 1 Weltbitd' of nursing.
I have argued elsewhere that any conceptual revision in
a practice discipline must be shared with the practitioner-, and that
answers which are offered by the researcher, may not be acceptable
to the practitioner for a variety of reasons (Schrock 1977c, 1981)
But none of this really solves the two major problems, as I see
them, that appear to hinder the work of theory construction in
nursing.
Firstly, practitioners do and must 'theorize'whether they are
aware of it or not. The questions, inherent in this problem of
non-recognition of 'theory' are, how practitioners can be helped
to articulate their thoughts, and how the 'superiority' of one kind
of theory over another might be argued.
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Secondly, the results of nursing research will not be widely
applied until the problem of a conceptual framework for nursing is
solved to some extent, and any emerging framework is shared by
both researchers and practitioners at least in its most fundamental
conceptualizations.
The contributors who examine how to set about the task of
theory construction appear to be unanimous in the view that this
is a process which proceeds through various levels or stages These
level are identified differently by various writers but they generally
include as a first stage the identification, examination and classification
of concepts which appear most pertinent to the activity under
discussion (or, as Jacox, 1974, suggests, which are used in
describing the phenomena in the field).
The probably best known account of the development of a
personal concept of nursing is that by Henderson (1966). The
resulting definition of nursing, that is
"The unique function of the nurse is to assist the
individual, sick or well, in the performance of those
activities contributing to health or its recovery
(or to peaceful death) that he would perform unaided if he
had the necessary strength, will or knowledge. And to do
this in such a way as to help him gain independence as
rapidly as possible." ,
has become almost as famous as the World Health Organisation's
definition of health which describes health as a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being, rather that solely as
an absence of disease. Henderson's definition of nursing
is quite often, but not so often applied with any consistency in
either argument or practice. This may be due to its apparent
simplicity (which is usually a sign of a clearly thought out statement,
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and should be taken as a credit). Henderson herself acknowledges
that
"This concept of the nurse as a substitute for what the patient
lacks to make him "complete", "whole", or "independent" by
the lack of physical strength, will, or knowledge, may seem
limited to some."
But on closer examination of Henderson's reasoning leading to her
definition of nursing, the apparent simplicity soon gives way to
a whole array of concepts which are now claimed by many nurses to
be fundamental to professional nursing practice (for example,
patient-centred care, patient needs, activities of daily living,
independence, nursing problem, help, patient participation, and
many more).11
Henderson does not claim to have invented these concepts and
pays tribute to a great many sources of inspiration. But she
does present her conceptualizations as a result of what Stevens
(1979) would call singlehanded development of nursing theory.
I do not know of any writers who identify and examine
concepts derived from observed or experienced nursing practice
without attempting to order them in some kind of model which
can be tested in its application to nursing. It seems that the
first two stages of the task of theory construction are so
closely linked that one cannot really be performed without the
other.
But it is pertinent to note that, frequently, those writers
who present more elaborate models are far less explicit about their
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conceptual components than is Henderson who utilizes only a simple
need-and-response model to illustrate the relationships between
the concepts which emerge in a lengthy argument.
Although Rogers (1970), for example, devotes a great deal
of time to the explanations of evolutionary, cultural, scientific
and philosophical conceptions of nature, man, and the world,
her exploration of those concepts most pertinent to nursing is very
brief. I do not think it enough to say that a conceptual
framework for nursing must take all the foregoing into account.
Even if nursing science must build on basic assumptions about the
nature of man, such as his 'wholeness', his interchanges with his
environment, and his inevitable progression from birth to death,
it cannot operate with all the details offered by Rogers without
transforming them into manageable concepts that can be utilized
within a nursing perspective.
Schlotfeld (1971) confirms my reservations about Rogers'
global approach. She says,
"Even though attempts to develop grand theories of the
life process of man are ongoing there is as yet no verified
science that leads to the understanding of all behaviour
of human beings."
She implies, I think, that it is hardly up to nurses to
produce this global understanding of man and his world but that
intelligent nursing action might result if practice were guided
"by theoretical constructs about man's health - seeking and
coping behaviour"
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and, one should add, if such theoretical constructs included a
conceptualization of nursing interventions
"that have predictable chances of augmenting the health-
seeking behaviour of individuals and groups."
Before further examining contributions to the use of models
in nursing, it would help me to think about their meaning generally
and about their use in the construction of nursing theory in
particular.
Some people do not like models, or feel that they are misused
in some way, but they fail to say why or in what way this may be
so. (Crow 1981)
Models like conceptual frameworks, theories or other kinds
of analogies, are representations of something that exists, happens,
or in some way manifests itself in the real world which we
experience. They are organising devices by which we can orientate
ourselves in thinking about complex phenomena. In that aspect
all these representations are alike.
In distinguishing between, for example, models and conceptual
frameworks for nursing, as I have done and as many authors on
the subject do, one introduces a property of such representations
which may vary in degree, and this is the commitment one has
towards them as intended factually true representations, or the
degree to which one believes them to incorporate the most salient
aspects of the phenomena which they purport to represent.12
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I see models as constructions (verbal, figurative, or
symbolic) which relate key concepts in nursing in a variety of
ways. They serve as means of experimentation, of trying out
one, then another relationship between concepts and testing them
against the practice from which the concepts emerged. They may
provide the necessary means for rearranging certain key concepts for
specific purposes within a given conceptual framework.
In other words, the commitment to a particular model is,
and probably should be, somewhat ephemeral, if one considers
it to be a means of conceptual or paradigmatic experimentation
in which one tries out, accepts and discards various elements
of a usable model which must be tested for its inherent
consistency and for its explanatory value and power in relation
to the practice under examination. But there is a danger that
conceptual experimentation can be prolonged to such an extent
that the original relationship which a model was meant to
illuminate, has got lost altogether.
There is no perfect model!
The search for it is an illusion based on a misunderstanding
of the function that a model can serve. It may well be that the
best model is the one which holds together long enough to allow
for a better one to be developed. (Schrock 1981) The use of
models as experimental devices is very clearly illustrated by
Chapman (1975) in examining how the pattern of nurse education
could be reconsidered in the light of some of the recommendations
of the Committee on Nursing.
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However, the next step in theory construction as I have
envisaged the process, would be a far more committed action which
leads to an acceptance, for the purpose of generating hypotheses
or principles, of a more permanent and also more elaborate
conceptual framework which contains elements tried out in a
variety of models and found to be valid at least at that stage.
An example of a conceptual framework for nursing which builds
on Henderson's work with reasonable consistency, is provided by
the Scottish National Nursing and Midwifery Consultative Committee
(1976), and its extension (1981) shows how the working group
concerned with a "further exploration and with ... validating
(the Committee's) own concept of nursing and translating it into
practice" utilized the work that had already been done by its
predecessors in the Committee. It is useful to recall Chapman's
contribution here, as she makes an observation which illustrates
the relationship between models and conceptual frameworks in
nursing. Models, she argues, may act as tools within a conceptual
framework such as the nursing process which is a central component
in the representation offered by the SNNMCC's working group.
One could argue with some justification that any kind of conceptual
framework tends to take on a less dynamic character than that
inherent in the conceptual experimentation which the use of various
models facilitates. It is not yet for me to say how the various
models suggested by Chapman (for example, the medical, an open
systems, a need-response, and a social exchange model)13 might
provide a dynamic dimension to a conceptual framework of nursing
such as the nursing process presents. But since the nursing process
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is a linear (or possibly circular) model itself, one may
appreciate that it might need various other directional extensions
to give it some purposeful impetus.
Although some writers like Henderson do not extend very far
into the third stage of theory construction (that is, the
construction of an explicit conceptual framework), this stage
does seem to be very closely related to the first and second
levels of theory construction, so that most authors concern
themselves with all three of them. Sometimes it is therefore
difficult to decide which stage has actually been reached, especially
if the author does not employ a figurative or symbolic representation
of modelling or framework construction.
No such difficulty exists in identifying when theory construction
has reached the stage of the formulation of principles since this
seems to be seen as a quite distinct activity.
Some authors propose principles which could well lead to the
formulation of testable hypotheses without deliberating on a
clearly identifiable conceptual framework to any great extent.
Wiedenbach (1964), for example, bases her "principles of
helping" (that is, the principles of inconsistency-consistency,
of purposeful perseverance, and of self-extension) on an
ideological exposition which incorporates some moral concepts
(such as respect for life, for the dignity, wcurth, autonomy and
individuality of man, and moral commitment and courage) and some
general assumptions about the nature of man. She uses a need-
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response model similar to Henderson's, but it is not really clear
in what way the proposed principles relate to all these, still
disparate elements.
Having already criticized Rogers' limited exploration of
concepts which may be especially pertinent to nursing, I can
however appreciate how principles such as reciprocy, synchrony,
helicy, and resonancy can be derived from the wide-ranging
discussion of the nature of man and the world, but I am not very
sure how or if they can be derived from a conceptual framework of
nursing. lt+
In the British literature, principles have only emerged from
the investigation carried out by the working group of the Council
for the Education and Training of Health Visitors (1977). Defining
the practice of health visiting and clarifying fundamental concepts
utilized in describing that practice preceded a stage of conceptual
experimentation with a great variety of models relating to various
aspects of the process of health visiting. The value of health
appeared to be the concept that informed, guided and linked almost
all representations. Its detailed analysis was therefore
considered to be of prime importance. The principles that were
formulated, were derived from the agreed definition of health
visiting practice and from the belief in the value of health.
So emerged four principles which might best be described as the
principles of searching for health needs, stimulating awareness
of health needs, influencing policies affecting health, and
facilitating health-enhancing activities.
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There is one major difference which becomes apparent in
comparing the far greater literature devoted to nursing theory
in North America with the very small British contribution.
Almost all theory construction presented in the transatlantic
literature is carried out by individual nurse theorists.
McFarlane (1980) provides a very useful analysis and comparison
of four prominent individual contributors: Imogene M. King,
Dorothea E. Orem, Martha E. Rogers, and Sister Callista Roy.
King (1968, 1971, 1975) and Roy (1970, 1971, 1973, 1974) in
particular are representative of those nurse theorists who have
developed their own theory constructions over a number of years.
Stevens (1979) dismisses frequent attempts to construct
theory by a group process as unproductive^ as "there is no major
nursing theory that is the result of 'group think1."
She notes the constraints which appear to hinder successful
group work in this field. At conferences, symposiums and other
such short lived groupings, people to not have time to explore
each others' views, to argue constructively about differences,
to develop a feeling for the enterprise in hand, to learn from
one another, and to tolerate the unstructured, uncertain nature
of the experience since inevitably there are 'programmes' to be
followed and 'results' to be produced. The only outcome is
likely to be what Stevens calls a "theory by negotiation", and
she concludes that "theory construction as a political act is
unlikely to result in a consistent, coherent product."
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On the other hand, Stevens acknowledges the difficulties
of theory development since
"An active exchange of ideas through critique of theory
work is the exception, not the rule. The nursing ethos
of noncritical acceptance for the work of others acts
to the detriment of the discipline. Few theorists
receive any serious criticism from their peers. Thus,
few get assistance in developing their ideas. ... In
addition, there appears to be a nursing ethos that a
theory, once evolved, remains the 'property' of its
originator."
It is not difficult to see that there are two major problems
associated with the singlehanded development of nursing theory.
One is that such a diverse and disparate range of approaches
makes it impossible to see any unifying or complementary
characteristics which would help the teacher, researcher, and
not least of all, the practitioner to use the proposed theories
in their work and thereby provide the essential empirical dimension
which is needed to create a body of knowledge by testing the
hypothetical propositions expressed in these theories. If,
nonetheless, researchers provide empirical verification or
falsification in relation to these many diverse approaches, then
the fundamental task of integrating and structuring the knowledge
so derived can still not be accomplished, if one assumes that a
theory should allow empirical observations to be organised into a
meaningful whole, that is, into a body of knowledge.
Empirically established facts, and ideas expressed in such
a diversity of conceptual frameworks, cannot possibly be
synthesized into a coherent pattern consistent with known nursing
practice.
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This is not to dispute Stevens' claim that the great drive
for a universal, unitary nursing theory is an obstacle which has
serious detrimental effects. But although one would not wish,
as she says, like to see psychological theory represented only by
Freudian conceptualizations, one can nevertheless discern a fairly
common, generally valid conceptual framework in which all
psychologists operate and to which they refer. For example, a
Freudian analyst and a Skinnerian behaviourist can communicate
with comparative ease about a psychological phenomenon, such as
trust or maturity, which is set in a developmental context,
since they both accept that the investigation of developmental
processes is part of the essential business of psychologists.
They share a conceptual framework within which they can propound
different theories in the form of different propositions,
assumptions and hypotheses. There is no need to develop a
"grand theory", but there must be some shared understanding of how
various theoretical approaches are to be interpreted within
conceptualizations which are meaningful to all members of that
discipline. It therefore seems to me that some shared, attempts
at theory construction and development are not only desirable but
necessary, if a certain degree of coherence and consistency is
to be achieved.
This brings me to the difference apparent in the few British
contributions to the topic. Apart from the articles which advocate
theory construction and examine how to set about it, two major
contributions to the endeavour to construct a conceptual basis for
nursing care and health visiting were made by working groups set
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up for the purpose.
That these collective efforts resulted in reasonably coherent
expositions may well be due to certain circumstances which seem
to have lessened the constraints identified by Stevens as being
detrimental to any successful outcome of such undertakings.
It must be noted that both groups worked without a time limit.
(CETHV 1977, SNNMCC 1981) Although the composition of the
membership of the groups changed from time to time, there was
remarkable continuity in membership which undoubtedly facilitated
a learning process for those involved in the deliberations.
Not least of all, both groups had the advantage of being able to
draw on a cohesiveness derived from external factors. In the
case of the health visiting group, the closeness of a numerically
small profession allowed an intensity of communication and
collaboration which would not be possible, if for example, all
general nurses attempted such an exercise. The Scottish group
undoubtedly benefited from the cohesiveness of a geographically
small country and from a distinct identity of a numerically small
professional group.
The results of their work so far, modest as these may be
compared with North American endeavours, promise a reasonable
coherence and consistency without appearing to 'shut out'
diverse and individual contributions to the further development
of a conceptual framework capable of fulfilling the organising
and ordering function without which the practitioner cannot utilize
the emerging results of empirical investigations which should
inform, direct and explain his practice. Perhaps true to the
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assumed British talent for compromise, the tendency seems to be
to develop neither the "grand theory" (such as Rogers') nor a
rather limited theory concerned with only a narrow range of
phenomena (such as Wiedenbach1s), but to construct "theories
of the middle range" (Merton 1968) to avoid the disadvantages
of both extremes.
I would like to close this discussion on the varying
contributions to a construction of nursing theory with a
speculation. I wonder, if the pioneering project, "The Study of
Nursing" which was set up in this country in 1966 and produced
twelve studies, "each exploring a particular aspect of ward
nursing care" (Inman 1975), would have presented the Research
Project Leader with the same difficulties in meeting her obligation
"to coordinate and write up the entire project at the end ...",
if a reasonably well articulated conceptual framework of nursing
had been available to the project leader and the researchers
before embarking on the work?
It is important to note that this approach to what the
introductory monograph to the series had called "the proper study
of the nurse" (McFarlane 1970), did provide an exemplary opportunity
for formulating nursing questions, investigating settings where
nursing actually happened, and attempting to measure nursing
effectiveness.
The argument set out by Inman is worth recounting, since it
illustrates some of the fundamental problems inherent in the
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endeavour to produce nursing knowledge.
All the studies set out to produce indices or criteria for
measuring the quality of nursing care in a wide variety of settings
and of a wide range of nursing activities.
Although "the main purpose of all was to describe and enlarge
our knowledge of patient care", conceptions of nursing contributions
to patient care which must have been held by the researchers
before selecting "theories such as the theory of personality,
theory of learning, skills and stress", and before "applying
established techniques", were never made explicit or shared, it
seems.
It is therefore quite possible that these conceptions differed
in material ways. This is not to say that theories and
investigative tools used in other disciplines could not have
been employed in answering the nursing questions, if it could
have been shown that they had relevant properties which could
establish a relation of modelling to the conceptualization of
nursing. As Wartofsky (1979) says, "anything may be taken as a
model of anything else", but "not everything has the relevant
properties which permit it to be taken as a model of something
else". But since the relevant properties of pertinent nursing
concepts, their potential relations and their potential explanatory
value and power for nursing practice (the effectiveness of which
was to be measured) had not been established, the scientific
theories "borrowed" from other disciplines may not have been
appropriate models. One point about representations (in which
for the purpose of this discussion I am including models and theories)
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that may have been especially pertinent is that a chosen model or
theory may fail as an intended factual representation because
it is richer in properties than the object, relationship,
event or situation it is meant to represent.
"We can hope that it is rich enough for us to continue
to use it fruitfully as an instrument of enquiry about its
object; but barring identity of model and object, it cannot
be as rich at the limit and yet remain a model. It must
therefore he less rich in relevant respects than its object,
which is precisely what we mean by characterizing it as
abstractive." (Wartofsky 1979 - the italics are mine)
Inman attempted to synthesize the results of these studies
in different ways. Keeping the nature of representation by models
and theories in mind, since the chosen theories were not
representative of anything conceptually germane to nursing, they
could not "provide a valid framework for all 12 studies."
(Inman 1975)
It becomes very clear that the search for a conceptual
framework which would allow some organisation of the studies was
a retrospective endeavour. In relation to one study, Inman asks,
"as the author uses Cattell's I.P.A.T. is the study purely
a psychological enquiry? Does it contribute to the theory
of personality as developed by Cattell? ... what kind of
study is this? ... if it is not a psychological study nor
an enquiry into basic nursing could we perhaps call it
a patient satisfaction study? ... Any attempt to label
the study ... leads to absurd distortion of its true aims
and focus."
Various attempts to analyze the studies by instruments or by
ascertaining their contribution to nursing care and research failed,
since, as Inman then says, "a list is no substitute for a conceptual
schema." (the italics are mine)
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The model that is finally adopted is based on the central
concept of "patient need". Its importance, says Inman, is that
"it is possible to focus research directly on nursing care,
instead of being forced to view it as, say, an intermediate
variable in patient care, or as an aspect of hospital
organization"
and
"if we wish to give a real meaning to the concept of nuvsi-ng
research we must find a way of researching into practical
nursing care which makes it the centre of attention instead
of an adjunct."
This is, I would argue, we must conceptualize from the practice
of nursing as it appears to be and produce a conceptual framework
of nursing practice from which the hypotheses and propositions
for empirical enquiries are derived.
This indeed was Inman's conclusion, and proposals for nursing
practice research based on a framework derived from "internally
validated items", that is based on axiomatic assumptions about the
nature of nursing care, were put forward.
This part of my argument has led me from the claim of nurse
writers to a philosophy of nursing in the form of ideological
statements which I hold to be a mistaken one, to look around for
philosophical concerns in nursing which might be emerging in other
contexts.
An obvious area to search in for an indication of the
appropriateness and usefulness of philosophical enquiries appeared
to be that of nursing ethics. Again I found it disturbing that
conclusions appear to have been confused with questions. The
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emerging notion of patients' rights offered another aspect of
potentially valid philosophical enquiries, and it seems that in
this context nurses have attempted to argue their case with
lucidity and reasoned conviction. Closely linked to the concerns
of the moral philosopher are those of the political and social
philosopher. I found the relevant material in the nursing
literature limited and by and large descriptive rather than
analytical. It occurred to me to question to what extent nursing
can function as an applied science, and what this might mean in
relation to two very important questions, namely what nurses must
do for themselves, and what they can apply for their own purposes
in the form of results obtained by other disciplines.
These still seem to me fundamental questions, particularly
in view of the extensive efforts of nurse theorists who are engaged
in theory construction and development in nursing.
I would admit the possibility that nursing can function
adequately without conceptualizations of its own, if it were possible
to order and organise whatever knowledge nurses may need within an
already existing theory so that this knowledge becomes readily
identifiable to the practising nurse and is meaningful in a nursing
context. The example which concludes my search for indications
of philosophical enquiries in nursing does not remove the doubt
from my mind that this is not possible and that the efforts of
theory construction as a basis for empirical investigations in
nursing is an essential one.
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Throughout this second part of my argument I have done what
I suggested nurses should not be doing in relation to their
investigations into nursing practice.
By asking what indications there may be of the use of
philosophical enquiries in nursing, and where these may be found,
I must have had some personal conception of what might characterize
such enquiries. I must have used some implicit criteria for
judging some claims to a philosophy in or for nursing to be
invalid. In other words, it is as impossible to talk about
philosophy without some personal conception of what philosophy
might be or is, as it is impossible to talk about nursing without
drawing on a personal ''feltb'LZd1 of nursing. But just as people's
ideas of what might characterize nursing are likely to be different,
so the nature of philosophical enquiries may be seen in various
ways by different people.
I must therefore examine how philosophers identify and explain
the nature of their discipline, its methods, contents, activities
and purposes, before I can suggest if or how philosophical
enquiries might become relevant to or meaningful in nursing.
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NOTES TO PART TWO
In a chronological sense, the division of philosophy into a
classical, medieval, and modern period simply indicates the
historical place of certain philosophers. For this purpose,
classical philosophers are practically synonymous with the
philosophers of classical Greece (including the presocratic
and neoplatonic schools) between circa 600BC and 500AC. In
classifying ethical theories in an attempt to draw attention to
certain distinct features, an apparently historical division
into 'classical' and 'modern' seems to suggest that classical
philosophers have propounded a classical moral theory, while
those who came later expanded on modern moral theories. But
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Benedikt Spinoza (1632-1677) are
in a chronological sense, modern philosophers. Moral theories
are considered to be 'classical', if they attempt to answer
one of two questions, or possibly both, namely 'What is the
good life for men?' and 'How should men act?' Most classical
theories do not distinguish carefully between these two
questions. But is is easy to see that, for example, Christian
ethics now as ever would be seen as classical moral theory
since their purpose must be to examine and elucidate the good
life for man which consists in the love of God, and by
demonstrating how this good life can be attained by acting
in accordance with God's laws. John Stuart Mill (1962)
expounds a classical moral theory in examining the principle
of utilitarianism, according to which "an existence exempt
as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in
enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality" is the
desirable state for people to attain, clearly answers the
question 'What is the good life for men?' It is therefore
right to say that classical philosophers were concerned with
classical moral theories, but also, that some modern philosophers
continue to examine moral principles in the context of classical
moral theory.
Nowell-Smith (1954) distinguishes the theoretical from the
practical sciences by ascribing to the former the task of
providing statements, descriptions, generalizations, explanations
and laws. He uses the same explanation for a theoretical
philosophical discourse which would, for example, appraise the
characteristics of goodness without any particular directive
whether an action bearing these characteristics may be desirable
or how a state of goodness might be achieved. Practical
discourse, on the other hand, Nowell-Smith claims, would provide
answers to such practical questions as 'What ought I to do?'
The answers derived from a practical discourse would be
decisions, resolutions, expressions of intention, or moral
principles leading to an order, an injunction, or a piece of
advice. Seemingly, Nowell-Smith assumes, as do others who
make this distinction (for example, Feibleman 1958), that
knowledge can clearly be separated from people's practical concerns.
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But if "Philosophy is the methodical and steadfast attempt to
bring reason into the world" (Horkheimer 1972), and if "the
ultimate source (of philosophy) is the will to authentic
communication" as Jaspers (1951) claims, then any philosophical
enquiry must have the potential to contribute eventually to
the "clarification and refinement of the conceptual world which
we meet in daily and scientific life", and must educate some
individuals for right thinking and acting. And if it does so,
is Horkheimer not justified in his claim that all philosophy
must have as its ultimate goal "the realization of the good,
and (this means) the rational organisation of human society"?
This is not a contradiction to seeing philosophy as "a disinterested
pursuit, to which questions of utility ... have no relevance."
(Jaspers 1951) It is disinterested in the sense that the
philosopher asks questions regardless of the convenience or
inconvenience that her questioning may cause to adherents
of established or accepted ideas. Philosophy may not attempt
to answer the questions which people with vested interests
may wish to have answered. In this sense, it may appear to be
of no immediate use. Philosophical enquiries like any other
form of human investigation, "may rise into the rarified atmosphere
of a hollow and bloodless idealism or sink into tiresome and
empty phrase-mongering, (but this) does not mean that these
are its true forms. As far as tedium and banality are
concerned, philosophy often finds its match in the so-called
investigation of facts." (Horkheimer 1972) Neither does the
close relationship of theoretical and practical philosophy
(if one needs to make this distinction) invalidate the often
made claim that philosophers may not find better or different
answers, or that there may not even be settled ways of arriving
at answers. Whatever answers a philosophical enquiry may
offer, if any, it would claim to have better reasons for them
than can be found for those which are arrived at in the absence
of a thorough rational examination and analysis.
The Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom published
two such documents in 1976 and 1977. Its Code of Professional
Conduct (1976) follows the International Council of Nurses'
code in making "explicit those moral standards which should
guide professional decisions in these matters". It is properly
called a code of professional conduct and presented as a
"discussion document". However, it is in this aspect that it
does not fulfil its promise. The items listed under
'discussion' do not provide alternate views for discussion nor
do they examine critically the reasons for adopting the principles
which are articulated in the 'text' of the document. The
'discussion' consists of an explanation and elaboration of the
aims which are expressed in this code in relation to the nurse's
responsibility to patients or clients, for professional
standards, and to colleagues and society at large. In the
second document, Ethics Related to Research in Nursing (1977),
the usual misrepresentation of ethics is even more obvious.
Again intended as "guidelines for nurses undertaking or
associated with research", the code claims as its rationale
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that "the ethics of nursing research must be consistent with
the ethics of nursing practice." This implies that 'ethics'
are statements, the virtue of which lies in their consistency.
In examining the nature of moral decisions in nursing research
or in nursing practice, which would be the proper task of
ethics, 'consistency' of this kind would be a somewhat
irrelevant concept. The publication contains no indication
of any critical analysis of its content, and refers the
reader only to similar codes of conduct which have been issued
by other professional bodies. These criticisms should not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that codes of professional
conduct must be elaborated into a moral discourse. This might
well defeat their purpose. But by implying that they ave the
ethics of the profession, they inadvertently give the impression
that this is all there is to ethics. It is not apparent that
such rules for conduct may be the outcome of a searching
analysis, nor is there any indication that they could and
should be reappraised. The exhortation to discuss, which
frequently accompanies these documents, is plainly geared
towards an application of the guidelines but not towards an
examination of their continued validity.
I am thinking here of the Declaration of Rights by the People
of Virginia in 1776, The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen
united States of America of 1776, and the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of Citizen prefixed to the French constitution
of 1789.
The conception of the perfectability of man as man stands
in contrast to the concept of man who can only find perfection
in God. The prerenaissance idea of man in a familial, social
and cosmic setting, transcended the individual and saw man as
part of a structured community based on a common religious
tradition, a hierarchy of power, and a network of mutual
obligations, all of which shaped men's lives rather than
served them. A vital influence, although not its exclusive
cause, on the development of individualism were the struggles
within the Christian church against papal absolutism and religious
hierarchy, that is, the rise of protestantism as the affirmation
of the individual conscience against church doctrine. But where
the controversies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had
been conducted largely in the language of religion, the social
contract theorists were doing something startingly new. They
proclaimed that the constitution of society was not divinely
ordained and serving some divine purpose. They claimed that
men by their actions organised society which existed not for
the benefit of God or King, but solely for that of the individual
in society.
In discussing the problems accompanying the giving of informed
consent especially in mental health care settings, Tancredi and
Slaby (1977) suggest the setting up of a "patient-advocate
committee of some variety"!
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I am grateful to Lisbeth Hockey for allowing me to use this
illustration which was devised by her, for my own ends. I
must emphasize that she also acknowledges the limitations
inherent in such a representation. Neither should any
particular significance be attached to the apparently
total inclusion of pathology and physiology into the field
or set of nursing. If I were to 'experiment' with this
conceptual model, I might imagine the various sciences and
disciplines to be similar to chemical compounds set into
a series of dishes which are wholly or partially covered
by a specially impregnated and absorbent disc. By some means,
like heat or motion, the disc will absorb certain elements
from all these compounds in different proportions. In this
way, only some elements would be absorbed even from those
dishes which are entirely covered by the disc. Since,
however, it is not my intention to justify this particular
model in any of its specific aspects, but rather to offer it as
a useful example of the 'k'ind of representation which
endeavours to show this mix of sciences', I must not now
divert myself with further conceptual experiments.
It may be pertinent to draw attention here to Stevens (1979)
who observes that every discipline has similar boundary
ambiguities but that the uniqueness of nursing does not lie in
the fact that such boundary overlap exists, "but in the number
of boundary overlaps with which it must contend. ... Nursing's
unique problem is to find a way to adapt these numerous,
unrelated, and potentially contradictory boundary theories
to its own milieu and its own image of man."
In addition to all other confusions that the term science is
liable to create, it also suffers from a process-product
ambiguity. (Rudner 1966) Science as a process is concerned
with the methods of developing and testing knowledge, while
science as a product refers to the body of accumulated knowledge
that claims to describe some aspect of our world. It is easy
to appreciate that those who define the process of science as
being synonymous with empirical enquiries, tend to accept only
knowledge gained in this way as being the legitimate product
which constitutes nursing science. But it should be clear from
the discussion that a body of knowledge (which is organised,
structured and meaningful) cannot be created by this version of
'science' alone.
As part of my contribution to an investigation into the
principles of health visiting which was conducted between 1975
and 1981 by a working group set up by the Council for the
Education and Training of Health Visitors for this purpose,
I wrote a discussion paper for the members of the working group
and officers of the Council. This paper was eventually
published in an edited version in the working group's first
report (CETHV 1977), and is reproduced in that version in
Appendix II. In a document subsequently published (CETHV 1980)
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which contained observations and opinions expressed in some
of the debates and conferences which followed the publication
of the report, Gregory offers an analysis of the situation
which led to the exercise of reappraising the principles of
health visiting. She points out, rightly, that the process
of reappraisal was initiated by teachers of health visiting
and not by its practitioners. However, the participants of the
1976 Nottingham Workshop did appraise the activity of health
visiting and not the activity of teaching, as Gregory claims.
Whether teachers of a professional activity who themselves
are qualified to practice, are justified in asking questions
about the practice of their profession, is another issue.
I would certainly concur with Gregory that "the tutor must
act as an educational leader ... by making the activity of
health visiting determine the knowledge required rather than
the other way round". How he or she can do this without
examining and analyzing this activity, I do not know. There
may indeed be "marked differences between questions raised by
tutors about the practice of health visiting and questions
raised by practising health visitors about the practice of
health visiting." They may not reflect questions asked by
practitioners but that does not make them 'wrong' questions
as Gregory implies. It might however, lead to unconstructive
situations, if no shared agreement between teachers and
practitioners is reached about their meaning and about what
might count as a relevant answer, as I have pointed out in a
paper concerned with a variety of philosophical issues, which
is reproduced in Appendix III. A most illuminating comment by
the Health Visitors' Association which regretted the effect
of the report in carrying "the risk of increasing rather than
alleviating ... insecurity" illustrates my point that to
solve the increasing uncertainty of a profession or a discipline,
one must create more, and perhaps deliberately, total uncertainty,
which is a frightening prospect for both the individual and the
group. To those involved in the experience, it signified their
first major achievement when they found themselves able to
tolerate the uncertainty which is a fundamental condition for
a genuine philosophical enquiry. While some respondents in
the debate recognized the value of a conceptual basis for the
practice of health visiting, a few questioned the wisdom of
trying to establish "a body of theory" similar in character to
the search for a theory of nursing, and considered it "an
equally mistaken enterprise". I would maintain nonetheless,
that the involvement of practitioners, teachers and managers
of health visiting in this endeavour to examine the conceptual
foundations of the practice of health visiting is unique in this
country and has not been achieved by any other group which
considers itself to be part of, or closely allied to the
nursing profession.
Other concepts which nurse theorists consider important to
relate in a conceptual framework of nursing care include,
for example, health, man, perception, interpersonal relation,
1 SI
action, process, social system, organisation, patiency, and
self-care.
Two helpful expositions on the nature of models are those by
Wartofsky (1979) and Jacox (1974) .
The view that nursing is a social exchange activity which
extends Henderson's need-response model by the notion of
reciprocity, is discussed in some detail by Chapman (1978) .
The principle of reciprocy refers to the constant, mutual
interaction and exchange between man and his environment;
that of synchrony indicates the space-time dimensions of this
interaction, while helicy incorporates the notion of
continuing innovative change that occurs unidirectionally out
of the mutual interaction between man and his environment.
The principle of resonancy is more difficult to elucidate in
a brief note since it is derived from a central notion of
Rogers' theory which identifies an energy field that is
electrical in nature and has a boundary continuous with the human
field boundary. In the model of interaction between man and
his environment, resonancy postulates that change in the
pattern and organisation of these human and environmental
fields is caused by waves which cannot be seen. Reading
Rogers' own exposition may be marginally less confusing than
my inadequate attempt at summarising these salient points.
However, since my purpose is not a detailed analysis of a
particular theory, but the attempt to exemplify various kinds
of contributions to theory construction in nursing, I feel
still justified in concluding that it is difficult to see
how these principles might be derived from a conceptualization
of nursing and how in turn, they might inform, guide and
predict nursing action.
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PART THREE THE SELLERS
How to find a manageable approach to
letting philosophers explain their
discipline; explanations offered by
philosophers of the purposes of philosophy,
of the nature of philosophical problems,
of methods used in philosophical enquiries,
of the contents of philosophy, and of the
relationship of philosophy with other
disciplines.
THE SELLERS
The proposal to examine how philosophers identify and explain
the nature of their discipline is a daunting one to make, but I
cannot think how else nurse researchers and nurse theorists might
decide whether or not all or some philosophical enquiries may have
any meaning or relevance in nursing.
Although I have for some time now thought about this question,
I am not sure that I could even tentatively suggest an answer
without a fairly methodical examination of how philosophers see
the contributions which they make to the understanding of our
world.
I have already acknowledged that it is impossible to talk
about philosophy without some personal conception of what
philosophy might be. Since I have talked at some length about
various ways in which nurses appear to be utilizing 'philosophy',
I could now propose to trace the development of my 'Wettb-iZd'
of philosophy in an attempt to demonstrate by what criteria I have
judged some claims to a philosophy in or for nursing to be valid,
and others to be invalid. However, this approach seems problematic
to me for a number of reasons.
Having been introduced to philosophical studies by the
historical approach1 still common at continental universities
(and one not particularly favoured by some British philosophers),
I must have followed quite unknowingly what seems to have been
G.E. Moore's advice on being asked what philosophy might be. The
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story is told that he would gesture towards his bookshelves in
answer to this question and declare, "It is what all these are
about." (Flew 1979)
Reading one's way through major philosophical works from
Plato to Wittgenstein could well be a useful approach if also
in certain circumstances an impossibly time consuming one.
However, to offer here a historical survey of the development
of philosophical "ideas and argument from Plato to Sartre" as
Flew (1971) does in an introduction to Western philosophy, is not
only beyond my ability, but might also be less useful for my
immediate purpose. Such a wide-ranging attempt might obscure
rather than illuminate fundamental ideas which might serve as a
starting point for me to consider their meaning and relevance to
nursing.
One might further argue that what is worthwhile in philosophical
enquiries has indeed survived a few millenia into our time, even
though there are those who think that some surviving concerns of
philosophy are invalid and should be excluded from the proper
scope of the discipline. (Peters 1966, Whiteley 1969)
Another consideration might be the likelihood that few nurse
theorists will start with a comprehensive historical survey of
philosophical ideas. I feel reasonably certain that most will
use what there is rather than question how it has come about.
This does, and indeed must not exclude a critical examination of
current philosophical concerns.
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I must also remind myself that my argument is not concerned
with a detailed critical review of specific philosophical
propositions. This is a task which appears to me to become
rather more pertinent after I can comprehend what sort of
philosophical enterprises might be relevant in nursing. There
is also a practical question which I feel must deflect me from
a historical approach to the development of philosophical notions
and arguments generally, or more particularly to the development
of my own ideas.
This is the question where a nurse theorist who is interested
in exploring this field might start.
There seem to me to be two possibilities (perhaps rather
naively and simply expressed here): either the nurse theorist
has a background of philosophical education, or she has not.
In the former case, there may be a high chance (unless the person,
over time, has had various mentors) that a particular 'school'
of philosophy might have dominated that education and will now
become the departure and mould for her work as a nurse theorist.
This possibility is not confined to nurses who have engaged
in formal philosophical studies. It is equally apparent, for
example, in the work of nurses who utilize their psychological or
sociological studies in nursing.
I believe this to be inevitable to some extent as long as
some nurses at least do not gather the courage to forego the
status of the 'specialist' or 'expert' and are willing to acquire
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a more general but undoubtedly less specific range of knowledge
about other disciplines which are seen to be relevant to nursing.
I am certain that this is a question where the distinction between
'Wi.38e.ll' and 'BLZ.d~J.ng' again is particularly pertinent.
A nurse who studies, for example, psychology to degree level,
will internalize the particular approach that prevails in the
institution where she receives her education in psychology.
Unlike the graduate in psychology who persues research in that
discipline and, although quite likely, propounds a particular
psychological theory, but is exposed to the criticisms of other
psychologists who operate from a different theoretical base,
the nurse who has accepted a particular theoretical base for her
graduate studies in psychology, but does not continue her work
in that discipline, is not exposed to such intradisciplinary
criticism.
In her possibly fairly uncritical application of a particular
psychological theory to the identification, analysis and solution
of nursing problems, any intradisciplinary criticism must come
from nursing colleagues rather than from psychologists. The
reluctance of nurse theorists to criticize each others theoretical
approaches and constructs has already been mentioned.
Since alternatives to the chosen approach are rarely indicated
by the author, and since hardly ever any reasons are given for the
preferred stance, an informed criticism becomes difficult to
achieve in any case.
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This general problem, as I see it, is fairly apparent in
the transatlantic literature concerned with philosophical
approaches in nursing. (For examples see Stevens 1979, McFarlane
1980)
Another explanation of what I perceive to be a problem may
well be that the writer has already reached a point of commitment
as a knowledgeable student of and as an experienced practitioner
in the discipline of philosophy. The problem for the nurse
theorist who has a less extensive and less committed background
in the study of philosophy, or none at all, is that she may find
it difficult, if not impossible, to enter into the discussion
at that level, or to even appreciate her colleague's work as
one possible approach to the matter in hand.
In this case it is very likely that whatever sources may
be available in the person's particular situation, may be used
in a perfectly legitimate attempt to learn something about
philosophical concerns.
Therefore her sources could include the work of highly
specialized and highly committed philosophers or more general
introductory texts written for specific groups of people.
Their authors may be alive or dead, well or little known,
representative of major approaches or not, lucid or obscure.
None of these and other possible differences would necessarily
make any source more or less useful than any other.
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What seems to be important, however, is that the nurse
researcher or the nurse theorist acquires a reasonably comprehensive
knowledge of what philosophers do and why they do it.
An in-depth study of only one area of the discipline (for
example, logic) or of only one approach (for example, linguistic
analysis) would not lead to an appreciation of what else is
possible, and of the appropriateness of the chosen source for
the purposes of the nurse theorist, as compared with other
possibilities.
It seems to me important (in philosophy as well as in nursing)
that a conceptualization of the purposes and problems of a
discipline should be derived from what its practitioners actually
do, and say they do.
Only after some framework has been established which allows
the identification and ordering of various items of knowledge about,
in this instance, philosophy, can more specific 'evidence' be
meaningfully utilized (such as a detailed study of the arguments
of a particular moral philosopher).
Therefore I shall examine various explanations by philosophers
of the





relattonshi-ps of philosophy with other disciplines
I am not suggesting that a discussion of these various
features of a particular discipline should aim at a clear
separation between them, since this would not only be impossible
to achieve, but it would also negate the essential interrelations
between them. For example, the kind of problems which philosophers
may claim as their own must influence the choice of method that
is held to be appropriate in advancing a solution.
Nonetheless, I shall find it necessary to try and concentrate
in the main on the particular aspect under discussion. Otherwise
I would find it impossible to follow my own argument, and I would
almost certainly get completely lost in many conflicting views.
In trying to elucidate the purposes of philosophy one discovers
that philosophers appear to be fairly unanimous; and that is in
respect to the claim that they are unique in the extent to which
they disagree with one another as to what their subject is.
(Whiteley 1969)
There are many writers who preface their thoughts about
philosophy with a sometimes brief and sometimes more expansive
comment on the generally prevailing uncertainty about the nature
of philosophical enquiries and their purposes. (Jaspers 1951,
Feibleman 1958, Hartnack 1962, Ryan 1970, Bird 1972)
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However, they invariably proceed to discuss what, in their
opinion, can be studied by philosophers, and is worth studying.
Although this lack of a 'concensus of experts' as to the
method and main conclusions of philosophy is regretted by some
as a severe defect which demonstrates that the study of philosophy
is still in a "rudimentary condition" as compared with the
sciences, and which defect should be remedied (Sidgwick 1902),
other writers consider this lack of concensus to be the special
strength of the discipline,
"... because the philosopher is operating in areas where
there are no settled procedures (in the sense that there
are no agreed necessary and sufficient conditions which
enable us to know what count (sic) as answers to the
questions we are asking), so he is likely to turn up new
ones. The apparent weakness of philosophising, that is,
in fact its strength." (Goddard 1962)
Goddard sees the purposes of philosophical enquiries arising
from "an unwillingness to take for granted what normally is taken
for granted", a view which is expressed even more strongly by
Horkheimer (1972) who describes "the real social function of
philosophy ... in its criticism of what is prevalent."
It is clear that the acceptance of prevailing ideas from
mere habit does not satisfy philosophers who are united in the
belief that "all novelty has to break through a cluster of habits."
(Nidditch 1970)
Goddard points to the likelihood that the philosopher will
turn up new ways of looking at questions simply because of the
uncertainty that surrounds any answer in the absence of immutable
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criteria for its validity.
Nelson (1949), a rather neglected early 20th century German
philosopher,2 makes an important observation when he shows how
the discovery of new truths in the sciences anticipated the
development of the methods necessary for their verification.
He says that
"The history of the empirical sciences and mathematics
is rich in instances of how the genius of great
scientists manifests itself precisely in their bringing
to light discoveries the truth of which they themselves
are unable to verify ... The scientist's genius is
guided by a feeling for truth which leads him further
and more surely than the traditional application of
methodic rules."
It is pertinent here to refer to Feyerabend's criticism of
Kuhn's argument (1970). Kuhn holds that scientists during
periods of 'normal science' work in a scientific tradition which
is guided by a single paradigm only (that is, standards of enquiry
as laid down by current authorities are accepted and dutifully
maintained).
But Feyerabend argues that when one looks at what actually
happens in scientific work, one finds that some scientists are
constantly engaged in what is basically the "philosophic argument",
while a great majority may well continue to attend to their
"tiny puzzles". But even following Kuhn's account, it is not
the latter activity that brings about "progress" but the activity
of the theory proliferating (rule-breaking) minority and of those
experimenters who attend to the problems of this minority and their
strange predictions. This speculative nature of philosophical
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concerns is compared by Feibleman (1958) to the work in
"a theoretical laboratory (where philosophers) explore
(and experiment with) the abstract possibilities, for
speculation is a sort of looking ahead at what practice
could be."
The purpose of this tendency of philosopher scientists as
well as of philosophers generally to 'break the rules' laid
down by authority as currently determining the standards of
enquiry in philosophising as elsewhere is the advancement of human
knowledge.
However, it is not only in 'breaking the rules' that
philosophers claim to be contributing to the advancement of
knowledge. By
"the clarification of ideas, the analysis of concepts,
the study of universals and even the search for
definitions",
Ryle (1945) would suggest, philosophers attempt to find out what
the rules are which govern our thinking, our perception of reality
and, so Winch (1958) would argue, our actions in this world as
we understand it.
There is considerable disagreement between philosophers as
to whether philosophy only contributes to an understanding of the
world by removing impediments to such an understanding "thrown up
in the course of non-philosophical investigations" (Winch 1958),
that is "the view that philosophy consists only in the elimination
of nonsense" (Smart 1963), or whether it has concerns of its own.
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(Feibleman 1958, Winch 1958, Korner 1969, Bird 1972)
But this disagreement does not invalidate the claim that
philosophy has at least this purpose, although it may have others,
to provide the tools for and to engage in activities aimed at a
clarification of meaning, the provision of the informal logic of
an enterprise and a "programme of rational reconstruction".
(Ryle 1945, Bird 1972)
This idea that "philosophy is concerned ... with the rational
reconstruction of our conceptual scheme" (Smart 1963) which Bird
expresses as a "programme of rational reconstruction" appears
to me to be a central one in elucidating the purposes of
philosophical enquiries.
If one conceives "philosophy ... as an enquiry into the nature
of man's knowledge of reality and into the difference which the
possibility of such knowledge makes to human life" (Winch 1958),
then "it is certain that the character of a civilization is greatly
influenced by its general view of life and reality." (Ewing 1951)
Furthermore, if it is the philosopher's task to find out what
the rules are by which we order our thoughts about reality, that
is by clarifying the meaning of the concepts we have of our world,
then
"in discussing language philosophically we are in fact
discussing what counts as belonging to the world. Our
idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for
us in the language that we use. ... The world is for us
what is presented through these concepts. That is not
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to say that our concepts may not change; but when they do,
that means that our concept of the world has changed too."
(Winch 1958)
As Ewing (1951) points out, the conceptual constructs arrived
at by philosophers
"have a very important indirect influence on the lives
even of those who have never heard of the subject. For
indirectly it filters down through sermons, literature,
newspapers and oral tradition and affects the whole general
outlook on the world." (the italics are mine)
In reminding us that the scientific outlook which governs
much of our current views of the world is in itself a particular
world-view which was brought into existence by philosophers
enquiring into the nature of man's knowledge, Ewing also argues
that we could make no use of scientific endeavours "without having
a more or less coherent world-view."
While Ewing pays particular attention to the fact that some
aspects of philosophy have a more obvious practical influence than
others, he also suggests that it is a mistake to assume that
apparently practically useless enquiries may not eventually have
far reaching effects on our world outlook.
Why this might be so may perhaps be explained by Feibleman
(1958) who points to an apparent paradox in that
"abstract studies often make their greatest advances in
those periods when they are supposed by their professional
advocates to be utterly useless."
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The reason for this may well be that
"the kind of intense and prolonged preoccupation that
progress in such fields requires is possible only on the
assumption that their applications do not exist."
This seems to me to arise out of the fact that enquiries
which are geared to the solution of quite obviously practical
problems or which were even inspired by the existence of such
problems, are under a certain degree of pressure to come up with
some relevant answers or solutions.
It may well be that the need to produce results (and this
might apply to philosophical enquiries as to any other form of
investigation) tempts the acceptance of a most likely solution
even if the foundations for it may not have been explored and
secured to the greatest possible extent. The investigator of an
abstract problem (that is one that appears to have little or no
practical applicability) can devote a great deal of time to the
rational-logical foundations which may underlie any possible
solution; in fact, the development of a coherent and consistent
theoretical construct may be his prime purpose and any 'problems'
may be incidental or illustrative rather than central to his
task.
Its very coherence and consistency may give such a construct
great persuasive power regardless of the possibility which Smart
(1963) and Ryle (1945) indicate, namely that the propositions on
which it is based may be invalid.
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This possibility that invalid, biased, or ill-conceived
assumptions may underlie philosophical speculation as well as
that it may be done badly, seems to lead Ewing (1951) to warn those
who engage in philosophical speculations and who claim that these
are not aimed at any practical consequences since the purposes
of philosophical enquiries lie in the disinterested pursuit of
truth, that
"bad philosophy can have a bad influence on politics,
good philosophy a good. We cannot in any case prevent
politics being influenced by some philosophical
conceptions, and therefore it is very desirable to devote
careful attention to philosophy in order to see that
the conceptions which do wield an influence are good
rather than bad."
While Ewing wants philosophers to keep in mind that
philosophy might influence people's view of the world, he does not
see it to be an explicit purpose of philosophy to engage in a
'programme of rational reconstruction' in order to create a rational
world view.
Although Nelson (1949) is the most explicit when he says
that the ultimate purpose of philosophy is to create "a scientifically
grounded conception of life", that is, a rational view of the world,3
he is not alone in this view among contemporary philosophers.
Flew (1979) appears to go along with a more moderate case,
such as made by Ewing, when he states clearly that
"we do need to notice that many of the issues of philosophy
as an intellectual discipline are in some ways relevant
to philosophy as world outlook. ... If, for instance,
either an analysis of the concept of knowledge or an
examination of the presuppositions and implications of
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scientific practice should reveal that authentic objective
knowledge is either generally or in some particular spheres
impossible, then it must become preposterous to strive
to subordinate private practice or public policy to what
is thereby proved to be unattainable. Again, if the
findings of the psychological and social sciences really
show that there is no room for choice and for responsibility,
then the rational man has somehow to jettison either these
ideas or those of the human sciences."
If one considers as one argument what has been presented here
in the words and thoughts of various philosophers who frequently
exclude each others' main interests and concerns from their own
way of doing philosophy, one would arrive at an not altogether
incoherent sequence of purposes for which people might engage in
philosophical enterprises.
What is taken for granted in the way in which we view our
world, is questioned, analyzed, clarified and then, at least
according to some philosophers, reconstructed into a more rational
view of the world than prevailed before.
That this 'taking apart' and 'putting together' is likely
to result in different conceptions of reality, of what we know and
can know, is surely apparent in the development of philosophical
ideas and arguments over time.
To accept Sidgwick's, and to some extent Jasper's views of
philosophy as not having "progressed" (as compared to the empirical
sciences) appears to me to beg the question. To compare the
lack of concensus amongst philosophers with the apparently greater
degree of concensus amongst empirical scientists is to compare
quite different kinds of activities about which agreement might or
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might not be reached.
To point to the apparent finality of answers arrived at in
empirical investigations as compared to the presumed unanswerability
of philosophical questions, again, is to compare quite different
purposes which need not share (and do not share) the common
characteristic that they include a striving for finality in
settling the matter in hand.
If, as I suggest, the fundamental task of philosophy is one of
ovdeving what we know about our world and of judging the claims to
any such knowledge, then this task must be neverending as long as
we believe that there are still new things to be known.
While the empirical sciences add to what we claim to know,
the philosopher must continue to appraise the question of how we
know and how we can know, and how we can order our knowledge in a
coherent and consistent way.
A passage from Wittgenstein (1958a) seems to express precisely
why the purposes of philosophy do not admit of either complete
concensus or finality.
"Imagine that we had to arrange the books of a library.
When we begin the books lie higgledy-piggledy on the floor.
Now there would be many ways of sorting them and putting them
in their places. One would be to take the books one by one
and put each on the shelf in its right place. On the other
hand we might take up several books from the floor and put
them in a row on a shelf, merely in order to indicate that
these books ought to go together in this order. In the
course of arranging the library this whole row of books will
have to change its place. But it would be wrong to say
that therefore putting them together on the shelf was no
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step towards the final result. In this case, in fact, it
is pretty obvious that having put together books which belong
together was a definite achievement, even though the whole
row of them had to be shifted. But some of the greatest
achievements in philosophy could only be compared with taking
up some books which seemed to belong together, and putting
them on different shelves; nothing more final about their
positions than that they no longer lie side by side. The
onlooker who doesn't know the difficulty of the task might
well think in such a case that nothing at all had been
achieved. - The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than
we know. E.g., to see that when we have put two books together
in their right order we have not thereby put them in their
final places."
Following this analogy (also cited by Flew 1971 in an argument
concerning the possible progress in philosophy) one might compare
the contributions of the empirical sciences with an addition of one,
or a number of new books to the library. The philosopher's task
is to judge whether they are worthwhile to be added to the collection
(that is, whether their authors' claim to have produced worthwhile
books is justified), and if she wishes to keep some order in
the place, she might on occasions just put them into a vacant
space, but on other occasions their addition might demand a new
category to be created which may well mean a rather thorough
reorganisation of the whole library.
In various ways, philosophers who see "philosophy as the
attempt to acquire a synoptic view4 of the world" by bringing
"all intellectual disciplines into a harmonious relationship
with one another" (Smart 1963) argue more or less on the lines
proposed by Whiteley (1969).
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Although philosophy contributes to our knowledge of the world
by analysis and clarification, this is essentially a negative
contribution since it simply removes impediments to our understanding.
No philosopher, however, is really convinced that philosophy's
contribution to understanding is entirely negative.
Whiteley cites James's account of philosophy "as an unusual
attempt to think consistently ...", and not only within the
context of a particular problem, but "over the whole range of
our thought ...".
This involves having "a set of interpretative principles"
which cover all the topics that we think about, and it involves
having "an outline plan of the universe" in which everything
can be assigned a place.
The quantative explanations of scientific fact cannot
comprehend everything that exists and happens. There are vast
problems of understanding and meaning which are not within the
preview of any special science.
"They are problems of synthesis, of how to combine the
different sorts of things we believe about the world
into a consistent pattern, how to heal the incipient
schizophrenia which menaces a scientifically orientated
civilisation."
Sidgwick (1902) and Jaspers (1951) are frequently criticized,
mistakenly I think, for seeing philosophy as a kind of superscience
in the terms of the empirical sciences.5 Sidgwick explains the
synoptic function of philosophy succinctly and elegantly -
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"The important distinction is that the Sciences concentrate
attention on particular aspects of the knowable world,
abstracting from the rest; while it is, in contrast, the
essential characteristic of Philosophy that it aims at
putting together the parts of knowledge thus attained
into a systematic whole; so that all methods of attaining
truth may be grasped as parts of one method, and all the
conclusions attained may be presented, so far as possible,
as harmonious and consistent."
It is not part of my argument to examine why at certain times
and in certain places philosophers tend to emphasize the
analytical function of philosophy over its synoptic purposes
and vice versa. Nor would I wish to convey the impression that
all philosophers take either one side or the other. For example,
Ryle, Smart, Feibleman, and Korner all acknowledge both purposes
as legitimate philosophical pursuits.
As a basis for the further discussion of the problems,
methods and contents of philosophy and of its relations with other






Although I have already acknowledged the interrelations
between the purposes, problems, methods, and contents of philosophy,
and its relationship with other disciplines, it still appears
reasonable to me to ask questions about philosophy which will
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elicit, for example, the purposes of philosophers rather than
their methods.
The purposes of philosophy emerge rather more clearly when
I ask the question, 'why do philosophers engage in philosophical
activities or investigations?' than when I wonder, 'how do
philosophers set about doing whatever they say that they do?' .
Possible answers to the latter question might tell me more about
their methods than about their purposes. Likewise, it appears
that asking 'what is it with which philosophers are concerned.',
might lead to some answers about the content of philosophy rather
than about its purposes or methods.
But the 'what' of philosophy could also be described as
the problems which philosophers try to solve.
I have evidently envisaged two sorts of answers to the
question of what philosophers do, namely the problems which they
try to solve and the content of their discipline. It appears to
me that one might illuminate what philosophers do in much the
same way in which one would endeavour to find out what, for example,
'scientists' do.
If I were to ask, 'what do scientists do?', it would not be
unreasonable to be directed to, let us say, different departments
in a university, where people called physicists, chemists or
biologists conducted their work.
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Similarly, philosophers describe their work in terms of
subjects or areas like logic and metaphysics, epistemology and
ethics, or even as we have seen, as theoretical and practical
philosophy. All these areas of work in philosophy (as in the
empirical sciences) undoubtedly convey something about the content
of the discipline. However, what is clearly a division of labour,
possibly based on diverse individual interests, among 'scientists'
as well as among philosophers, or what might be a 'division' in
terms of preferred theoretical approaches to the work in hand
(for example, the various 'schools' of philosophy), is still seen
to be part of a shared and common enterprise.
However, this shared and common enterprise is not easily
identified by just summarising the content of the discipline
as one might describe it in terms of its division of labour,
interest, or theoretical approaches.
I would argue that what is common and shared lies in the
commonality of the problems to be solved or of the questions
to be answered.
Or to put it another way, the problems of philosophers are
of a particular kind as are those of the 'scientists'.
The nature of the questions which interest a physicist is
of the same kind as of those which occupy a chemist, although the
former would show scant interest in proving or disproving the
existence of a specific catalyst in a chemical reaction, while
the latter might quite legitimately devote herself to this
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specific question.
Similarly, the nature of the questions asked by a moral
philosopher is the same as the nature of the questions that
interest a metaphysician, although clearly, they are not concerned
with the same questions.
I shall therefore distinguish the two kinds of answers
that might emerge which relate to what it is philosophers do,
by examining first the nature of the problems or questions which
appear to be characteristic of philosophical endeavours, and only
later will I attempt to show how philosophers organise their work
by a division of subject areas, interests or theoretical
approaches.
It is in the organisation of the content of philosophy that
philosophers' specific problems or questions will become apparent.
A philosophical problem starts with a person wondering about
what might seem to others a fairly obvious and settled state of
affairs.
Let us assume that I am watching a train leaving the station.
As it gets further away, it gets smaller and finally disappears.
It is plainly false to say, 'the train is getting smaller',
although this, and 'the train is gone', is just what we do say
in everyday conversations about seeing someone off at a railway
station.
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But we know that the train, whereever it may now be, has
certainly not changed in size nor has it ceased to exist.
Nevertheless, I have seen something change in size and then
disappear, and if it was not the train, then what was it? The
answer seems obvious. What has changed is my visual image, or
my perception. In saying chis, I am making a distinction
between two entities: the train and its visual image. These
two entities, however, cannot be the same or cannot be identical,
since one varied in size and even disappeared while the other
one did neither. Does this mean that there are no ways in which
we can say what this object, the train, is veatly like?
The size of an object is clearly independent of the
observer. If this were not so, then the object would have a
different size at one and the same time, if seen by two people
simultaneously from different distances. This surely would be
a contradiction and would negate our very concept of a thing
or an object.
Since the train is seen at one time or at different times
by someone whose perception is bound to differ from mine, how
many different perceptions do I need to know about, or to
experience myself, in order to be able to say what this object is
really like? Why should I even imagine that I can infer the
nature of an object by putting together various perceptions,
be they my own or other people's? Can I rely on the corroborative
evidence of others at all?
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In other words, what is the relation between sensory perception
and physical objects?
In pursuing this puzzle, one would undoubtedly get involved
in the philosophical problems of appearance and reality, matter
and mind, knowledge and belief, and countless others. (For
example, see Russell 1967)
This illustration might demonstrate some general features
common to all philosophical problems.
Firstly, that they arise from our experience of the world
which makes us wonder at what we see and hear, say and do.
"It is through wonder that men now begin and originally
began to philosophize; wondering in the first place
at obvious perplexities ..." (Aristotle 1956)
That philosophical problems are generated by perplexities
about what we experience, is suggested by Goddard (1962) when he
says,
"... philosophical perplexity arises out of a declared
ignorance; out of a willingness to admit that we do not
understand what is going on here; or why we should accept
this or that particular belief ...".
Even more explicit is Parker (1972) who sees the starting
point of all philosophical enquiries in the knowledge which
people pursue, claim and use in their everyday lives. The whole
point of thinking about and investigating a philosophical problem
is that the ideas it contains are related to what we are and what
we want to do.
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Secondlythat they aannot be solved by further observation
or by further progress within the empirical sciences.
Whether I ally myself with philosophers who deny the
independent existence of objects in the external world, or with
those who argue the opposite does not change or affect the
empirical data. In either care, I can only point to, touch,
weigh, measure or in other empirical ways describe the same
thing. Idealists and realists do not disagree about empirical
data, and it would be useless to try and settle their disagreements
by a closer inspection of the train, or by filming it in motion
to show what it really looked like after it had left the station.
Their arguments are not empirical arguments but attempts
to solve a conceptual problem.
It may, however, have become apparent that it is not merely
a question of what one might call conceptual analysis. Although
it might be useful on occasion, to identify and agree on the criteria
by which we call an object a 'train', or by which we define an
experience as 'perception', the object and the experience as such
were not really the difficulties arising from my example. The
possible answer does not lie in an agreement simply on what we
mean but in "exploring all that makes such questions puzzling."
(Russell 1967)
The problem at first may not appear to be a problem at all,
or may seem to admit to a rather simple explanation. However,
as Nelson (1949) points out,
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"The philosophical problem is wrapped in obscurity. To
be able to come to grips with it by finding clear-cut,
searching questions demands many trials and much effort."
It seems that each question leads to another more general
one until the specific problem has been submerged in a discussion
of very general and universal features of our experience in this
world. Any examination of philosophical writings will show the
generality of the concepts with which philosophers concern themselves.
Ewing (1951) among many others is representative in discussing
such notions as induction and intuition, knowledge and belief,
truth, matter and mind, space and time, cause, freedom, universals
and God, as fundamental questions of philosophy.
This trend to generality is an important characteristic of
a philosophical problem; therefore I will continue to characterize
such problems by saying,
Thirdly, that they lead to or are conceptual problems of
a particular generalized kind.
It may be important to note here that even those writers
who do not see philosophy as having a subject matter of its own,
point to its concern with general concepts common to the empirical
sciences, among which number, cause, induction and deduction,
probability, theory and proof are but a few. One might well
argue that the attempt to explain and interpret the empirical
sciences as one particular kind of enterprise in making the world
intelligible to us, is either one of the major philosophical
problems, or at least is a part of many philosophical problems.
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Fourthly, that they are logical problems.
If philosophical problems arise from what appear to be
absurdities and paradoxes, as the chosen illustration might
indicate (for example, it is paradoxical to say that the train
as an object can be of different sizes at the same time, or it
is absurd to think that the train has literally disappeared from the
face of the earth), then the problem is of a logical kind. That
is not to say that it is necessarily a logical problem in the formal
and classical sense of logic. It does not necessarily break the
rules of formal logic, thereby yielding a contradiction. It is
no contradiction to assert that the train does not exist independently
of being seen by me or some other cogniscant being, but it may
appear an absurd statement to make since we know that even when
being locked up in a railway shed at times, the train is still
there as an object which we know continues to exist.
It may well be that, what some people see as the progression
to greater perplexity in following philosophical arguments which
frequently increases one's sense of mystification, is in fact
a clear demonstration of a question or assertion which appeared
to be both meaningful and interesting at first, but on a close
examination turns out to have been quite absurd. Perhaps this
is what Wittgenstein (1958b) means when he says,
"My aim is to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised
nonsense to something that is patent nonsense."
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However, Korner's warning (1969) should be kept in mind that
"To philosophize is not to be perplexed by the unperplexing,
to cultivate perplexity for perplexity's sake or, even worse,
to adopt the pose of being eternally perplexed. Perplexity
is often not only the beginning but also the end of serious
thought. (But) It is not its aim."
Fifthly, that there is not one specific way of settling
the problem.
Goddard (1962) suggests that
"what makes a problem a philosophical question, is that
there is no settled way of answering it."
This seems to be supported by Wittgenstein (1958b) who holds
that "A philosophical problem has the form 'I don't know my
way about'."
When compared with the empirical sciences or with mathematics,
philosophy seems to lack a generally agreed method for deciding
the acceptability of its results.
The acceptability of any proposed solution to a problem
depends on its initial definition which indicates what sort of
answers could be expected as possible solutions, and on the
degree of precision of the requirements which the solution of a
problem must fulfil.
As Korner (1966) explains more fully,
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"In both these respects philosophical problems vary
greatly. At one extreme we find problems of logic
which are defined in terms of requirements which are
at least as widely accepted and at least as precisely
formulated as is the case with problems of mathematics.
At the other extreme we find philosophico-religious problems
defined by requirements which are accepted only by
comparatively small groups of thinkers and which admit of
very much less clear-cut formulation. This accusation
that philosophy is 'subjective' in the sense of lacking
a general agreed method for deciding the acceptability of
its results tends to lose force as we move from the problems
of Weltanschauung towards problems of logic."
However, it seems to me that a possible disagreement over
the way in which a problem ought to be settled is not entirely
unique to philosophical problems, especially if one compares
them, as is often done, with the problems of the empirical
sciences generally.
The precision of the requirements which an acceptable solution
must fulfil varies considerably between, for example, physics or
chemistry and anthropology or economics. Strictly speaking,
it is only one feature of acceptable solutions which applies
across the various empirical sciences, and that is that answers
must be based on or derived from empirical data. (This, of course,
does not apply to mathematics which is often quite unjustifiably
included under the heading of 'science'.)
If one would wish to argue that at least within one discipline
of the empirical sciences, for example, chemistry, there is quite
general concensus of the criteria by which an acceptable solution
may be recognized, then again, this does not distinguish
philosophical problems from other kinds. Taking logic as a
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comparative example within the wider field of philosophy, some
would argue that agreement as to what counts as an acceptable
answer is high and based on very precise criteria.
Similarly, if one looks at seme other discipline among the
empirical sciences, for example, sociology, then it seems not
so different really from the situation, let's say in epistemology,
where there is greater diversity about what should count as a
'solution'.
Furthermore, just as all empirical sciences share one
condition which prevails in relation to all potential solutions,
namely their empirical basis, so one could argue that all sorts
of philosophical problems share one condition, and that is that
their possible solutions are solely based on or derived from
thought. That which differentiates a philosophical problem from
all other kinds of problem is "that it becomes clear to us solely
through thinking." (Nelson 1949 - the italics are mine) It
therefore seems pertinent to emphasize this feature as common
to all philosophical problems, as
Sixthly3 that they are only answerable through thinking.
If, as I have argued, philosophical problems arise from our
experience of the world which makes us wonder at what we see and
hear, say and do, then it seems that philosophical thought needs
to be purposeful.
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What is fundamental to all philosophical problems is that
they raise questions regarding the nature and intelligibility of
reality. (Winch 1958)
The investigation of the nature, causes and effects of
particular real things and processes which can be observed in our
world, is the primary aim of the empirical scientist. But what
is 'real' involves more than what empirical research may show to
be the case. The question expresses the problem of man's relation
to the reality as represented by the results of empirical research.
Philosophical analysis of the problem reveals what it makes
sense to say about the world.
It is not at all clear at the outset whether the scientific
description of the vanishing train as a vast collection of
electric charges in violent motion is any more 'real' or meaningful
than Berkeley's assertion that matter is really nothing but a
collection of ideas. (Russell 1967)
"Many of the concepts underlying philosophical problems
are concepts by which we conceive of, describe and talk
about reality. The way we conceive of and understand
reality depends upon the way we conceive of an understand
relevant concepts. ...
To the extent that the concepts underlying our understanding,
our description and our talk about reality are misconceived
or deficiently understood, to that extent is our understanding,
our description and our talk about reality misconceived
and deficiently understood." (Hartnack 1962)
The widely held misconceptions that, for example, 'science'
starts with observation and that observation yields a secure basis
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from which knowledge can be derived, have been rejected by many
scientists (but perhaps mainly by philosophers of science like
Chalmers 1976 and Nagel 1979) . However, there continues an
adherence to these doctrines which is evident in the still
widespread endeavour to establish statistical laws based on
observations of what happens, and to insist when a proffered
interpretation is shown to be suspect in some way, that more or
different quantitative measures and manipulations would increase
the compatibility of an interpretation with the statistics. But
"The compatibility of an interpretation with the
statistics does not prove its validity." (Winch 1958)
The validity of an interpretation rests on
"what place in the whole scheme of things is held by the
realm of facts with which (science) deals or even how they
are related to the human minds which observe them. ...
The sciences presuppose certain concepts which are not
themselves susceptible of investigation by scientific
methods and therefore fall in the province of philosophy."
(Ewing 1951)
It seems that I have returned in a way to the beginning of
my attempt to elucidate some common features of philosophical
problems. It may serve as a final distinguishing characteristic
of philosophical problems to say,
Seventhly, that they are concerned with the nature of
reality and its intelligibility.
"The number of philosophical problems is legion", suggests
Hartnack (1962) and
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"If it is true that philosophical problems have their
roots in an insufficient understanding of the nature
(or, as it is also called, the logical structure)
of our concepts, then it is also true that we cannot
once and for all determine their nature."
It would seem foolish for me to think that the features
which I suggest characterize a philosophical problem are only
those which I identified or, indeed, that each one of them is
only applicable to philosophical problems.
I have already pointed out that the lack of a generally
agreed method for dealing with philosophical problems may not be
quite as unique to philosophy as is often assumed. Similarly,
one may object to the suggestion that the origin of philosophical
problems in our experience and their concern with reality are
unique features which readily distinguish philosophical from other
kinds of problems.
But all the suggested features together - and some, I would
maintain, are only applicable to philosophical problems -
should provide an outline of the commonality of philosophical
problems.
I shall therefore refer to the problems of philosophy
as
derived from and informed by experience
insoluble by empirical investigations
leading to particular generalized conceptions
revealing logical paradoxes and absurdities
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not being settled in one specific way-
only answerable through thinking
concerned with the nature and intelligibility of reality
Although philosophers emphasize frequently that philosophy
is distinguished from other human enterprises which aim at an
understanding of our world, by its method or methods, they are
extremely reluctant to identify, explain and discuss
methodological questions.
If I take 'method' as a planned way to set about some task,
then philosophy must have such methods to achieve its purposes
of criticism, analysis, experimentation, clarification, and
synthesis.
The entry in a dictionary of philosophy which reads,
"Methodology. See science." is illuminating. (Lacey 1976)
We learn (on looking up 'science') that "the study of how science
works, or should work ... is often called methodology ...".
It is clearly seen as the philosopher's task to undertake such
a study of the methods which are employed by scientists. The
author continues,
"When studying the nature of scientific reasoning we
naturally ask how it can be justified, and what are its
purposes. In what circumstances can a scientific
statement be properly accepted? ... the main purpose
of science is perhaps EXPLANATION, and an important
part of philosophy of science concerns what this is
and how it is achieved." (the italics are mine)
Why should it be 'natural' for philosophers to enquire into
the ways in which science works but not to discuss the ways (or methods)
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of philosophy?
It seems equally sensible to me to ask how philosophical
reasoning can be justified and what its purposes are. In what
circumstances can I properly accept a philosophical statement,
and what sorts of explanations do philosophers offer, and how
are they achieved?
The possible objection that philosophers are not in the
business of giving explanations, I would not only consider
to be invalid, but also irrelevant to the question why they are
generally reluctant to discuss their methods. I believe it to
be invalid in the sense that there are explanations of very
different sorts. The philosopher does not set out to offer a
scientific explanation (that is, to show why something had to
happen) nor necessarily one which simply makes clear what
something or some sequence of events is (although some 'what-is'
explanations can certainly be found in philosophical writings).
But he does endeavour to find what have been called 'reason-
giving explanations'. (Taylor 1970)
From much of what has been said about the purposes and
problems of philosophy, it must be clear that philosophers are
concerned with explanations of meaning.
Taking the most general definition of an explanation as
"The process of making something intelligible", (Lacey 1976)
leads me to believe that, by the declared purposes of philosophy,
philosophers are engaged in looking for explanations of some kind.
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The question whether or not this is so, however, is not
the same as asking whether or not they should endeavour to identify,
explain and discuss their methods of enquiry.
One often cited reason for not attempting such an explanation
is the essential need for participation in the philosophical
enquiry. Nelson (1949) argues, rightly, I believe, that
"Philosophical truth is rather of a special sort. It
is not a matter of knowledge but of insight. One
masters it not by erudition but by thinking it through
for oneself." (the italics are mine)
Brand Blanshard writes in the foreword to the selected
essays that Nelson believed that
"the business of philosophy was criticism, the bringing
to light of the fundamental presuppositions of our thinking,
the ultimate standards - logical, ethical, esthetic -
that are implicit in our ordinary judgments. Nobody
can tell us from the outside what these presuppositions
are, since nobody but ourselves can know what we really
think; we must see these things for ourselves; we
must arrive at them through a process of self-examination
and self-criticism."
However justified this demand for participation is (I have
emphasized its importance and have attempted to substantiate it
in the course of my argument), it is not a sufficient reason for
not explaining something about the methods which are appropriate
in a philosophical argument.
On the contrary, it may be even more important to explicate
the meaning and significance of various ways of setting about
thinking philosophically than it may be to offer an exposition of
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scientific methods of investigation to students of the empirical
sciences (without denying that they might benefit from such an
attempt).
"... method enjoys in these sciences a recognition so
unchallenged and matter of course that students following
its guidance are often hardly conscious of the assured
course of their researches.",
observes Nelson (1949). As long as the results are compatible
with the declared expectations in their respective disciplines,
students of the empirical sciences do not need to question closely
the methods by which these are obtained.
But as has been said often by now, the results, if any,
of a philosophical argument do not necessarily justify its
reasoning.
"... whatever the argument or explanation with which
we are presented, there are always two different kinds
of questions which we can sensibly ask about it; the
first concerns the logical structure of the argument
and relates to its internal validity, the second concerns
the factual truth ... and relates to its external relationship
with the facts." (Ryan 1970)
It would only appear reasonable to point out from time to
time, by what criteria a person could judge the validity of a
philosophical argument, and since by definition, she must engage
in it, what options may be open to her to pursue this kind of
argument.
What I am really saying is that I am not convinced that the
methods of philosophy are self-evident and would become clear
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just by participating in philosophical arguments. It may well
be that some 'bad' philosophy is offered by people who have not
discovered by 'doing it' that "without the guidance of method"
their speculations constitute nothing more than "merely a leap
in the dark" and will leave them where they were before, "prey
to the arbitrary." (Nelson 1949)
What might be a more legitimate reason for the reluctance
of philosophers to engage in discussions of method, is advanced
by Bernard Williams in an introduction to some philosophical
essays by Isaiah Berlin (1978).
The main medium of philosophy is conversation (a point which
I emphasized in the introduction to my argument).
"The translation from dialectic to document is ...
something that many philosophers of many schools have
found problematical."
There is little denying "that something essential to the
subject itself (is) lost in the transition to print." There is
also a second transition that has to be made, and that is from
the person engaged in a philosophical argument to the person
represented in print. Williams sees that transition as
resulting in losses "which are clear and determinate, even if
they are hard to describe." Each person conveys in a face-to-
face argument
"that no abstract or analytical point exists out of
all connection with historical, personal, thought:
that every thought belongs, not just somewhere, but to
someone, and is at home in a context of other thoughts,
a context which is not purely formally prescribed."
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However, there are limitations of opportunity and of time
which do necessitate a less than perfect concern with certain
issues. They must lead to compromises and a conscious setting
of limits of what one might achieve. In this sense I see as the
sole object of my attempt here, to identify some of the methods
which philosophers use in their enquiries, to elicit some of their
distinctive features, to direct attention to their variety, and
thereby to promote an appreciations of them rather than
offering them as 'recipes' (a particularly inimical thought to
any philosopher) on how to proceed.
The most common description of philosophical methods is one
of enumeration, such as Nidditch (1970) offers in a discussion
of intellectual virtues.
"The intellect and its virtues are relevant to all
affairs involving, especially, inference, criticism,
classification, the entertainment of alternative
possibilities, understanding, conceptual knowledge,
and coherent communication. ...
The history of thought is the successive adoption and
disclosure of error and the replacement of one set
of explanations by another."
Although Nidditch does not really explain what he means by
intellectual virtues, it is clear from the argument that
they assist us in the "effective organisation of thought".
In showing us what it is that needs to be organized, he
points to some of the things which we do when we are thinking
(for example, inferring, criticizing, classifying, entertaining
alternative possibilities) and to some of the possible and
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desirable outcomes of our thought (for example, conceptual
knowledge, coherent communication, understanding, explanations).
Even if we were to agree that what we are doing when we are
thinking in particular ways, may lead us to some of the methods
of philosophical enquiries, this kind of enumeration does not
tell us much about what exactly is involved when we infer,
classify or criticize.
Both Goddard (1962) and Smart (1963) refer to techniques
and procedures which philosophers use, or should develop and
apply, but like many other writers, they then proceed to
discuss certain theories or principles without elaborating
on the aforementioned techniques and procedures, although Smart
does equate clear thinking with "philosophy as linguistic or
conceptual analysis" and to think comprehensively with "philosophy
as the rational reconstruction of language."
In subtitling his book "An introduction to some aims and
methods in recent philosophy", Bird (1972) raises some
expectations about possible methodological explanations, but as
he soon asserts, "The aim here is rather to formulate satisfactorily
some of the background principles which govern philosophical
activity" than to examine more closely the ways in which
philosophers set about their tasks (with one exception, in the
discussion of scepticism).
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There are some exceptions to this general reluctance of
making methods of philosophical enquiry more explicit. However,
there is considerable difficulty in discussing, for example,
expositions of conceptual analysis (Wilson 1963, Emmet 1968,
Korner 1969, Whiteley 1969) which vary from a close examination
of the whole process to rather more specific considerations of
exhibition- and replacement analysis, and of reportive and
stipulative definitions, in the way in which they are presented
by their authors.
It is even more unlikely that one could relate systematically
and coherently the above mentioned methodological explanations
of conceptual analysis to those ranging from an exposition of
the Socratic method (Nelson 1949)
systematic ambiguity and abstractions (Ryle 1945)
analogies and other representations (Korner 1969, Wartofsky 1979)
to explanations of
doubting and describing (Korner 1966, 1969)
questioning and judging (Emmet 1968)
defining (Robinson 1968)
explaining (Taylor 1970)
and instructions in establishing
logical relations generally (Hamblin 1967)
logical structures of arguments in particular (Ryan 1970)
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It does not appear useful to me to report in a random
fashion what has been said by these various authors, quite apart
from the difficulty which arises from the different styles and
even lengths of the offered explanations. I can only endeavour
to examine various aspects of philosophical methods of enquiry
as they may become apparent in a much more general discussion.
If I take as my starting point the assertion that the
problems of philosophy are essentially logical problems which
are only answerable through thinking, then what might lead us
to specific forms of thinking must lie in the nature of the
philosophical argument.
The argument proper to philosophy should bring out the
logical powers of the ideas under investigation by showing the
precise forms of logical mishandling which would decrease their
workability, that is, their usefulness for whatever task they
were meant to fulfil in ordering our understanding of reality.
But we do not operate with single or solitary ideas. We
express them in statements which suggests that ideas might have
some logical power which can be diminished or increased by the
connections made between them.
Reasoning involves passing from premisses to conclusions
and so involves a relation and the things which it relates. It
seems a necessary first step to examine by what methods
philosophers might establish logical relationships generally,
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and logical structures of arguments in particular.
It is not my intention to paraphrase a complete introduction
to elementary logic, but to illustrate what a method of
establishing relations generally might entail.
An important logical feature of statements is that the truth
or falsity of one statement may depend on the truth or falsity
of another. In particular, one statement may imply another,
that is, knowing that the first is true may enable us to deduce
that the second is true also.
In ordinary speech we often indicate a relation of implication
between two statements by using words like 'therefore', 'so',
'consequently', or 'because'.
For one statement to imply another, it is not necessary
that either statement be actually true, but it seems important
to point out that if the first one is true (or can be shown in
due course to be true), then the second statement must necessarily
be true.
The statement, 'Jones is a male nurse' implies that 'Jones
is male' and that 'Jones is a nurse". It must therefore
necessarily imply that a nurse may be male, or that a male may
be a nurse (these last two statements are equivalent).
Establishing logical relations includes among others the
relations of contradiction or negation. The use of such words
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as 'all' or 'none' invite logical contradictions, that is, they
are often followed by statements which simply cannot be true at
the same time as the first one which introduced the relevant
idea.
'Nurse Smith is always punctual but today she is late' is
a simple example of a contradiction since only one of these
statements can be true.
How a logician may set about establishing logical relations
generally is usefully illustrated with what Hamblin (1967)
calls a "question-tree". In examining statements in an
argument, he may ask:
While a descent towards the full circle would establish
such logical relations as contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety,




or indifference, a descent towards the broken circle would
establish equivalence, superimplication, or subimplication.6
Another concern which must be met, if an argument is to
be accepted as satisfactory, is the distinction between matters
of logical validity and matters of factual truth. The central
idea here is that the weakness in an argument may rest in either
its logical structure or in the empirical data from which the
ideas which are related, were derived.
If I made the simple but implausible suggestion that 'All
nurses will get married', on the assumption that all nurses are
women and that all women get married, I have offered a deductive
and logically impeccable argument. A logician would set it
out in the following form:
all women get married (all A = B)
all nurses are women (all C = A)
all nurses will get married (all C = B)
The objection to my prediction is essentially factual, that
is, what is challenged is not the validity of the internal logic,
but the truth of the premisses. It appears clear that logical
coherence on its own cannot establish the validity of my argument.
I may therefore decide to rewrite my example in accordance
with the facts as we know them:
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some women get married (some A = B)
some nurses are women (some C = A)
some nurses will get married (some C = B)
It may well be that now all my statements in the argument
are factually true, but it is now not a valid argument at all,
since the conclusion, whether true or not, just does not
follow from the premisses. Without demonstrating formally
that this conclusion cannot logically yield a decisive
prediction, one can appreciate that the 'some nurses' who are
women, may not be identical with those 'some women' who
get married.
This weakness is a .matter of logic. I would have to set
out to discover what other characteristics separated those who
get married from those who do not, and how likely it might be
that nurses will behave like other relevant reference groups.
I may then be able to replace the logically inadequate premisses
of the invalid argument with new ones from which a valid conclusion
can be inferred.
Arguments, however, do not usually consist of such rather
simple statements as I have offered above.
An argument consists of a whole sequence of interrelated
claims and reasons. Although it may be useful to examine some
key statements in a more formal way, the analysis of a whole
argument seems to involve more than that.
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Toulmin et at. (1979) suggest that rational criticism of an
argument must involve questions about its starting point and
destination, about the procedures which it should follow, about
what stages it might pass through and how these may be related,
and about what questions must be asked, or what tests must be
employed in checking whether it is fully reasoned through or not.
Each element of an argument - its claims, grounds, warrants,
backing, modal qualifications, and possible rebuttals - must be
critically examined.
Criticism as a method (that is, as a planned methodical
activity to achieve one or more of the stated purposes of
philosophy) is clearly illustrated by Toulmin.
A diagrammatic representation which I have adapted without
materially altering it, not only shows the interdependence of
the various elements of an argument but it also indicates how




The authors show that a critical analysis, as a method of
enquiry, can be applied to any argument from a fairly concrete
case to a theoretical or mathematical proposition.
I shall offer two examples here, one theoretical and one




The criticism of this second argument might not centre so
much on one or the other of its elements as such, but on the
concepts contained in them.
Honesty, morality, and even distress are not indisputably
established in such a way that the assertor of the claim means
the same thing as those who refute it.
Even if not
"all philosophizing is a battle against linguistic
bewitchment, .... it is nevertheless inescapable that
language must be the medium of all philosophizing, or
at least of all ... that is communicated." (Emmet 1968)
Popper (1972) who is certainly pragmatic as far as method
goes, protests strongly that "logical analysis" or "language
analysis" should be thought to be the only method which a
philosopher may use. But he does agree
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"that something which may be called 'logical analysis'
can play a role in this process of clarifying and
scrutinizing our problems of our proposed solutions."
The techniques involved in analyzing concepts have been
identified, demonstrated, and discussed by Wilson (1963).
From isolating questions of concept (as opposed to questions
of fact and of value) to establishing a shared and acceptable
meaning, model cases, contrary cases, related cases, borderline
cases, and invented cases serve as models of the appropriate
use of the concept and allow its pertinent features to be
identified and to be clarified.
The aim of such an analysis is clearly
"to exhibit the meanings of expressions used by a group
of speakers and thinkers.",
and more precisely, to accomplish
"the exhibition of accepted rules by reference to which
the correct and incorrect uses of expressions are
determined." (Korner 1969)
This type of analysis Korner calls 'exhibition-analysis'
in which the rules governing a concept are made explicit, are
agreed upon, and one 'meaning' of the concept is accepted,
at least for the purpose in hand, as correct. The now better
understood concept is then used in the proceedings.
But, Korner argues, philosophers quite frequently do something
rather different. They do not just discern the meaning of a
concept and then use it with perhaps greater clarity (although they
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may do so on occasion), they veplaoe one notion with another which
does not suffer the apparent defects of the one it has replaced
(for example, it is less self-contradictory, less vague or
otherwise more suitable for the intended task).
Korner gives the example of Russell analyzing the notion of
existence in terms of the notion of truth. Russell's analysis
of existential propositions does not consist in discerning the
meaning of the concept of 'existence' but in replacing it with
the concept of 'truth'.
Korner explains that this is feasable as these two concepts
have a certain relation to each other which justifies the
replacement of one by the other when necessary.
The importance of making this distinction between exhibition-
and replacement-analysis is that the latter must allow more than
one possible answer and a whole range of criteria of 'defectiveness'.
Far from settling the uncertainty which gave rise to the attempt
at analysis in the first place, replacement-analysis formulates
new conceptual relationships and may at first introduce more,
rather than less complexity into the argument.
However, it should not be too difficult to appreciate that
a rather intractable exhibition-analysis may point to the need
for a replacement-analysis which might release the participants
from an irredeemably defective concept.
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Whiteley (1969) describes the outcome of a conceptual
analysis of the exhibition type as a 'stipulative definition'
which, he avers, "can only be done effectively in any given
field of discourse by those who are expert in that field."
He sees 'reportive definitions' as attempts to show how a
given word is used by a speech community, and declares this to
be the task of the lexicographer.
This distinction between 'stipulative' and 'reportive'
definitions which Whiteley indicates, appears, in his way of
explaining it, to be a slight one.
I do not agree with Whiteley's apparently minimal distinction
for two main reasons.
Although conceptual analysis occasionally examines by way
of illustration how a word is being used in a particular speech
community (for example, by native English speakers), it goes
far beyond simply reporting this fact in the form of a dictionary
definition (which in a rather invidious fashion often provides
the greatest obstacle to conceptual clarity). But furthermore,
Whiteley does ignore the fundamental importance that defining
plays in philosophical enquiries (but not in the narrow sense in
which it is presented by him).
One might argue that definitions are not only central to
the concerns of formal logic (not to mention that part of it
which deals with the theory of definition), but are also found
in a great variety of forms in almost all philosophical writings
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(notwithstanding the claim by some philosophers that a defined
term fails to grasp reality).
Part of a list of names for the sorts of definitions offered












To distinguish between the purposes and the methods of
definitions seems essential, if one wishes to avoid perhaps
elementary errors which may cause a great deal of unnecessary
confusion.
I often wonder whether teachers realize that students, in
fulfilment of the demand to 'define X', might do this by the
method of ostensive rather than by denotative definition (that is,
they may point to or otherwise physically indicate the object X,
rather than verbally describe its characteristic features).
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If this distinction were applied to nursing, one might
propose some argument in favour of demanding evidence that the
student is capable of ostensive definitions instead, or at least
as well, of as of denotative ones.
Similarly, persuasive definitions serve rather different
purposes than, for example, genetic or causal definitions.
However, the former are not always recognized as devices to serve
the adoption and recommendation of certain ideals, since they
frequently use words like 'true' or 'real'. 'A real man never
shows fear', is as persuasive a definition as 'Real butter is
made from milk' is a causal one. So far, scant attention has
been paid to the processes involved in defining objects, people,
places and actions, because it is such an everyday activity, it
seems. Nonetheless, there are important implications for those
purposes which philosophical enquiries are meant to achieve.
For anyone who engages in a philosophical argument, the
question whether definitions should come at the beginning or at
the end of their exposition is a crucial one (or whether, indeed,
they can conduct a 'definition-free' enquiry). The decision
to adopt one or the other course may influence how the whole
argument will be conducted.
One method of enquiry consists in the gradual approach toward
a possible definition (although it may not be achieved). The
implication of the whole procedure which is called the Socratic
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method seems to be that definitions cannot be dogmatically
asserted at the beginning but must be sought for in a laborious
procedure which takes a long time, and indeed, constitutes the
work as such.
Nelson (1949), like many philosophers believes that there
is a method of philosophizing that is something other than
just following the rules of logical thinking. "Obedience to
the laws of logic is an indispensable precondition of any
science", he maintains, but
"The function to be performed by the philosophical method
is nothing other than making secure the contemplated
regress to principles, for without the guidance of
method, such regress would be merely a leap in the
dark, and would leave us where we were before -
prey to the arbitrary."
The Socratic method, as a regressive method of abstraction,
aims at disclosing philosophical principles by utilizing reflection
to transform into clear concepts something which we already
possess and which makes itself obscurely heard in every individual
judgment.
A close scrutiny of any Platonic dialogue (at least in the
part where it most clearly retains the conversational dialectic)
reveals pertinent aspects of the Socratic method.
By paying a compliment and introducing a topic of interest
and immediate relevance to the other person, the philosopher
ensures not only the essential participation in the conversation,
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but, as we might say now, establishes a necessary rapport which
will allow her to take up a specific point from what the other
person says, and use it for her own purpose.
This immediate purpose is to lead the other person to admit
his ignorance so that the enquiry can be pursued. But to cut
through the roots of other people's dogmatism, as Nelson puts
it, creates anxieties and defences which could quickly bring the
enquiry to an end.
It becomes perfectly clear that the Socratic method is a
form of intellectual and emotional manipulation which can and
does incite passionate responses.
When Nelson talks of the "art of forcing minds to freedom"
as the first secret of the Socratic method, he clearly indicates
that this force may well be resisted.
However, having admitted to this "higher level of ignorance",
the other person may well be eager to proceed to a discussion of
complex abstractions. This is to be resisted by the philosopher
who in using the Socratic method must insist that first of all,
observable facts of everyday life, taken from the other person's
own experience, be examined.8 By formulating a principle
implied in the example offered by the other person and using
it as a question, one may be able to proceed from judgments of
which one is sure to those of which one is less sure. In this
process of separating the particulars of individual experience
from more general principles, the attention is directed to the
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generalized characteristics of concepts as we grasp them, and to
making them explicit by defining them.
It is usually said that the Socratic method utilises
inductive thinking to the exclusion of deductive reasoning.
This is only partly true as any closer examination of the
Platonic dialogues will show.
What is true is that the participants in the dialogue
frequently succumb to a danger that is inherent in the nature
of an exacting enterprise, and it is this: having become
involved in its mounting difficulties and unexpected distractions,
they will begin to think of ways of modifying the method to make
it easier. This tendency, springing as it does, from purely
subjective discomfort, is likely to distort and even completely
frustrate the enquiry.
In the course of the conversation, Socrates (as depicted by
Plato) proceeds by not only forcing judgments on the examples
offered by the other person, he also gives examples of his own
which serve as model cases, contrary cases, related cases,
borderline cases and invented cases in order to illuminate the
appropriate or inappropriate use of the concept under discussion.
He deals with specifically cited authorities (that is, with
the warrants and backing of the argument), and questions their
competence. He asks for elaboration to explore logical
inconsistencies in the argument.
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As a method of enquiry, the Socratic method merges into,
and utilises other ways of rational exposition. But it has
distinctive features which make it immediately recognisable in
whatever context it is employed.
Its distinctiveness lies in being dialectic and in being
grounded in the particulars of individual experience.
One aspect which may indeed dishearten the participants
in an enquiry, is the deliberate use of systematic ambiguity.
It quickly becomes apparent in any dialectical discourse that
one word can have two or more different meanings. One expression
can denote an infinite variety of ideas. In examining these
ambiguities, one may discover the commonality of these ideas
but one also finds that the existence of unnoticed systematic
ambiguities is a common source of confusion and problems leading
to what Ryle (1945) calls "logical disasters".
It would therefore appear somewhat perversato introduce
deliberate ambiguities into a discourse at points where none
seem to exist.
But there are at least two good reasons for operating with
such a double-edged tool.
One is the discovery of what Ryle calls "the absurdities"
which result from ignoring the different "logical powers" that
one and the same word may possess in different senses, and which
makes an impact upon us and shows that the differences should be
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determined by pressing the search for further absurdities.
Another good reason is the capacity of words or phrases
"to acquire new inflections of logical forces (which)
is one of the chief factors making original thought
possible. A new thought cannot find a new vehicle
ready made for it, nor can the discrimination of the
logical powers of new ideas precede the birth of the
knowledge (by wont) of how to think with them." (Ryle 1945)
Ryle would maintain that new concepts arise from existing
ones; are, for a time, expressed by words which denote the old
concepts; cause, in this "subversive role", contradictions and
ambiguities; cause the old concepts to be examined; and may
then be expressed in new words.
From asserting that problems of philosophy are essentially
logical problems and that any method of philosophical enquiry
should bring out the logical powers of current ideas under
investigation, I have now reached a point where I have contemplated
how we might discover the logical powers of new ideas.
It seems that in a sense I have come back to the beginning
of my attempt to identify some of the methods which philosophers
use in their enquiries, to elicit some of their distinctive
features and to direct attention to their variety.
Whether one considers philosophy to have one method including
various techniques or procedures or whether one considers these
various techniques and procedures to constitute different methods,
is not, I think, an issue which practically has any particular
224
import. I will therefore not argue with Popper (1972) who says,
"The method I have in mind is that of stating one's problem
clearly and examining its various proposed solutions
critically."
It seems justified to me to claim that the methods of
philosophy as illustrated by
examining the logical power of ideas
establishing logical relations
distinguishing between logical validity and matters of
factual truth
- criticizing an argument
- analysing concepts
- examining definitions
employing the Socratic method
utilising systematic ambiguity in the creation of new thought
must assist in stating philosophical problems clearly and in
critically judging their proposed solutions.
The kind of problems that philosophers make their own and
with which they deal in particular ways are common to all
branches of philosophy, or of what one might call the technical
divisions of philosophy as an academic discipline.
The content of these special areas of philosophical enquiries
is variously described, but the following outline would be
reasonably representative of such descriptions.
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It is customary to order philosophical content into the
more predominantly theoretical, practical and applied areas of
work, although these distinctions are by no means absolute.9
Logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and
theology10 could be said to be concerned with the most general
philosophical problems of our reasoning about, and understanding
of the world, and of our place in and relationship with it.
The central topic of log~ic is valid reasoning, its
systematization and the study of notions relevant to it. In
a broader sense, logic could be described as the study of the
structure and principles of reasoning, and of sound argument.
There are recognized subdivisions, such as the study of
formal logic, of logical theory, of the structure of arguments,
and of ordinary language.
Those aspects which lend weight to a strong argument, and
the consistency, coherence and accuracy of ordinary language are
sometimes referred to as informal logic. The main task of formal
logic is the study of the principles of deductive inference, or
of methods of proof or demonstration.
A topic related to formal logic is set theory, and this,
together with the study of proofs, leans heavily towards
mathematical logic, and towards a philosophy of mathematics.
Modern formal logic and mathematical logic are very close and
are often referred to as symbolic logic because of their intensive
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use of symbols in place of verbal expressions.
Logical theory examines the concepts involved in formal
logic, and asks questions about reasoning generally. For
example, is all reasoning deductive; are there different kinds
of reasoning; what relations exist between premisses and
conclusions; to what an extent can form and content of statements
be separated?
The study of the structure of arguments and of other important
areas such as definitions and explanations, brings logic close
to epistemology on one hand (for example, in examining the notion
of 'truth'), and to the philosophy of language on the other
hand.
The interest of philosophers in the study of ordinary,
that is, non-technical language is not as new as some authors
claim. (Bird 1972)
One could argue that the Platonic dialogues where they most
clearly demonstrate the Socratic method, evince a very searching
kind of concern with the language people use to express their
thoughts. Perhaps in some way, if not altogether, the "revolution"
in twentieth century philosophy which discovered an "interest in
ordinary language as a new topic for investigation" was at least
partly a rediscovery and only in some areas "a distinct change
from the traditional topics of philosophy."
Be that as it may, there is little doubt that there are many
assertions by which philosophers appear to deny common-sense
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beliefs. For example, they may claim that external objects which
we believe do exist, do not exist, or that space and time which
we seem to experience in a very real way, are not real at all.
An appeal to ordinary language in certain circumstances seems
justified and, indeed, rational, although its potential strength
as testimony for or against a particular claim ought to be
ascertained very carefully. (Quine & Ullian 1970)
An appeal to ordinary language may not provide the final
refutation of a philosophical position but it may help to clarify
the complex nature of the doubt that attends it.
"Of all the branches of philosophy, none sounds more
alarmingly abstract than metaphysics." (Popkin et at 1956)
One could add that it is also the branch of philosophy which has
been intermittently attacked as being a quite illegitimate field
of study for the philosopher, since the only effective way of
answering its questions about the nature of reality is by empirical
investigations. Starting with Hume and Kant in the eighteenth
century, the criticism that knowledge sought by the metaphysician
is not attainable, has continued to the present day. Some have
suggested that one ought to abandon its traditional investigations
and transform metaphysics into categorial analysis, that is, into
the study of the necessary conditions involved in knowing anything
(in which case metaphysics would become almost synonymous with
epistemology).
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Nonetheless, problems of permanence and change, and of
matter and form have not been entirely solved by either empirical
investigations or categorial analysis.
Questions about the fundamental nature of mind and body,
and how they may be related, have only been partially answered by
physiologists and psychologists (and some 'answers' accepted as
such are in fact not particularly well substantiated mind-body
theories).
The problem of free will and determinism has been argued
for centuries by a variety of disciplines, but does not seem to
be any nearer to a completely satisfactory solution for that.
As any other branch of philosophy, metaphysics is concerned
with general concepts, in this case with those by which we
describe and order our reality (for example, thing, entity,
object, individual, universal, particular, substance, event,
process, state).
For much of its history, metaphysics has examined the problem
of categories, that is, the seeking out of some fundamental
distinctions among the things in the world and among our ways
of thinking and talking about them.
A central element in metaphysics which has seen a fairly
consistent revival in the nineteenth and twentieth century
(especially in Western European philosophy outside the Anglo-
Saxon domain), is its attempt to characterize existence or
reality as a whole, instead of, as in the various empirical
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sciences, as particular parts or aspects thereof. Some authors
would call it in this sense, a metascience (as Sidgwick and
Jaspers do but, it must again be emphasized that this is not
the same as equalling philosophy with science).
There are obviously many areas where metaphysicians and
epistemologists pursue very similar questions.
Epistemology as the study concerned with the nature and
derivation of knowledge, its scope and the reliability of its
claims, is also a metascientific enterprise in the sense that
scientific knowledge is one of the possible forms of knowledge
under scrutiny by epistemologists. (The scrutiny of particular
sciences will be referred to later as, for example, the philosophy
of science, the philosophy of social science and so on) .
One of the most general questions raised in epistemology
concerns the reliability of sense data. If there is an objective
reality, how can we be certain of its features and characteristics?
One of the major reasons for doubting whether human beings can
possess 'certain' knowledge has been the question whether we ever
need to be absolutely certain, or whether we can manage, at least
for all practical purposes, with knowledge that has a high degree
of probability. But the criteria which may tell us to what
extent we might be able to rely on both our knowledge which is
derived from experience, and on that which is derived from
reasoning, need to be creditable and consistent. The general
concepts of particular interest to the epistemologist include
notions like belief, knowledge, understanding, reason, judgment,
sensation, imagination, and supposition.
Belief and judgment, imagination and supposition can be
expected to play a central part in what are sometimes called the
"value studies" in the context of philosophy; that is, ethics,
aesthetics, and theology. (Feibleman 1958)
Although the study of ethics in particular appears to have
a more direct bearing on people's lives than other philosophical
pursuits, it is like all philosophical endeavours an investigation
into the fundamental principles and basic concepts that are or
ought to be found in a given field of human thought and action.
"Being a branch of philosophy it is a theoretical study", declares
Flew (1979).
Among that which makes us human is the experience of moral
conflict and moral disagreements.
The examination of moral concepts and principles, of the
criteria by which we judge one action to be good and another
one to be bad, has always been the concern of the moral philosopher.
More recent interests have centred on the examination of the
language of morals by analyzing the meaning of terms like good,
bad, right, wrong, ought and so on, and by attempting to demonstrate
that moral statements are of a fundamentally different kind than, for
example, scientific statements, and that they may therefore have
a logic of their own.
A moral theory based on the analysis of the language in
which we express moral statements may hold such statements to
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be true or false, and possibly reducible to some concepts of an
empirical science (for example, psychology), or it might contend
that moral judgments are neither true nor false, but express
merely the feelings of those who make them.
It may be quite apparent that even the more recent developments
in the study of ethics lead us back to a classical question of
moral philosophy. Is there some absolute quality of goodness
or are all moral criteria relative?
One may assume that 'modern ethics' are not necessarily
regarded as an alternative to ethical arguments in the classical
tradition but as a preparation for the further study of classical
moral theories. If one becomes clearer about the meaning of
crucial terms and statements which occur in moral theories, it
may be possible that one is in a better position to argue their
strengths and weaknesses.
As moral philosophy is concerned with examining the meaning
of goodness, so aesthetics is concerned with the creation,
values and experience of the beautiful.
The primary topic of aesthetics is the appreciation of
art, and by what criteria we might decide that something is
a work of art.
Discussions of beauty have always figured in classical
philosophical arguments but were, in the past, more often linked
with epistemological and moral questions.
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Historians judge aesthetics to have become a more distinct
branch of philosophy since Kant, in whose view aesthetic
consciousness and judgment are unlike either cognitive or moral
consciousness or judgements. (Flew 1979) Aesthetic judgments
are made entirely subjectively, that is, only with reference to
the person who is making the judgment; although they may command
common assent by others, "in virtue of the common ground of our
subjectivity." An analysis of such concepts as meaning, intention,
representation, and illusion is predominant in the study of
aesthetics, as is an examination of the central notion of a
'work of art'.
Although I have found no reference in British dictionaries
of philosophy11 to theology as a branch of philosophy, I feel
justified to include the study of God, or of the holy as
Feibleman (1958) calls it, at this theoretical level in my
overview.
I know, of course, that in academic divisions theologians
do not normally see themselves as part of a department of
philosophy. The fact that most universities have separate
faculties of philosophy (or arts) and of theology (or divinity)
may suggest that their incumbents pursue rather different
enterprises.
However, this is not to argue about the rationale of the
organisation of institutions of learning, but to examine the
legitimate concerns of philosophers.
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Ewing (1951) introduces the last of the problems which he
considers to be fundamental in philosophy with the words,
"We have left to the last the philosophical quest-ion
of most extreme importance, both theoretically and
practically, namely that of the ex-istence of God.
By 'God' I shall understand ... a supreme mind
regarded either as omnipotent or at least more
powerful than anything else and supremely good and
wise." (the italics are mind)
Although some might hold that this question, if accepted as
part of the philosopher's concern, may be subsumed under the
study of metaphysics along with problems of space, time, eternity,
necessity, change and contingency (that is, with the study
generally referred to as cosmology), it seems to me to be of
a different kind.
Metaphysics pursues, whether successfully or not does not
matter here, questions relating to the reality of our world.
Where it borders on, or merges with, epistemology, it still
asks about what and how we can know about the world and about
our place in it.
The study of the origins of the universe, that is, cosmological
arguments, still retain the metaphysical perspective. The issues
contained in these questions centre around theories, doctrines and
common-sense beliefs which demonstrate the problems that we have
in making our world and our experiences in it intelligible; they
constitute the subject matter of philosophical reflection and
analysis as I have described it so far.
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Should I be justified in claiming, as I have done, that
philosophical problems arise from our experience of the world
which makes us wonder at what we see and hear, do and say,
then these experiences are all accessible to almost everybody.
We have either had some relevant experiences or we can bring
them about at will.
"Experiences at first hand of simple mathematical
operations marks the beginning of the systematic study
of mathematical theories which in turn leads to
philosophy of mathematics. Roads to the philosophy of
science, the philosophy of action and value, of social
life and of history also start from generally accessible
first hand experiences." (Korner 1969)
Although reason may transcend experience (as in Kant's
transcendentalism which asserts the dependence of the world
of experience on the activities of reason), we can generally
reason at will; that is, we can engage in an activity which,
although different from other forms of experience, is something
we can 'experience' directly by doing it.
The direct experience from which questions about the
existence of God or of some supreme mind or being may lead us
to philosophical reflection and analysis, is not generally
accessible, and it is not accessible by an act of will, that is
by deciding to have a religious experience. The formulation of
arguments for the existence of God can therefore not arise
necessarily out of perplexities caused by direct experience.
Furthermore, however we may define our time and space bounded
reality, reflections on the nature of a supreme, omnipotent,
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supremely wise and good mind must contemplate a different kind
of reality than that with which metaphysics and epistemology are
concerned. The nature of religious knowledge may include
elements of religious experience, but it must be based on a very
distinct process of thinking (and possibly feeling) which we
characterize by words like supernatural belief or faith. The
crucial concerns of theology (that is, of the study of God)
are both different to those of metaphysics generally, and of a
philosophy of religion.
Theology in the sense used here must be concerned with an
examination of the superrational in rational terms, by examining
knowledge claims of beliefs, faith and experiences which are not
shared at will among all human beings, and by asserting
rational standards in relation to which such claims can be
justified.
I have already commented that the distinction between
predominantly theoretical and practical areas of philosophical
investigations is not absolute, and in some areas of work it may
be more difficult to sustain than in others (for example in
ethics, aesthetics and theology).
Nonetheless, some areas of philosophical study are clearly
more theoretical than others (that is, they do not set out to
relate any understanding that they may gain directly or
necessarily to any consequent actions), although I would still
argue that all philosophical enquiries have the potential to
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affect 'practical' matters with which people are concerned.
Other enquiries are in a much more direct way 'action-
orientated'. Those concerned with the nature of the state and
its correlates of law, obedience, duty, liberty, justice,
freedom, authority, obligation and many others, not only serve
our general understanding of what one might call political
realities but in strengthening or weakening political theories,
they have a far more immediate 'action potential' than, for example,
a metaphysical discourse on the nature of reality.
Political philosophy is concerned with the kinds of questions
I have just indicated; and with social philosophy it has marked
out an area for itself as an academic discipline within
philosophy.
Flew's comment (1979) that it is difficult to distinguish
clearly between political and social philosophy, and indeed,
between these two areas and that of ethics generally, is
justified. For example, the examination of the notions of individual
rights and responsibilities is undoubtedly a proper concern for
the moral philosopher who must analyze and reflect on such
fundamental moral concepts as right, responsibility, duty,
obligation, freedom and so on. Also, modern moral philosophers
would claim that the language of morals is precisely that which
is employed in socio-political discourse. Therefore one might
assume that whatever we can learn about the way in which we use
moral contentions, prescriptions, commands and claims, would tell
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us also something about the way in which we talk about, for
example, human rights.
But perhaps the political and social philosopher do ask
questions more directly related to specific kinds of human action
(that is, their field is more practically orientated), such as,
"exactly who is responsible for war crimes?", or "must policies
of 'affirmative action' and 'positive discrimination' in favour
of members of formerly disadvantaged sexual or racial groups
violate the rights of members of other sexual or racial groups,
and be in themselves sexist or racist?" (Flew 1979)
I would find it invidious to prescribe at what point a
group of people should be considered to be sufficiently distinct
in their work, and therefore be nominally separated from others
within their discipline. For the purposes of my argument,
however, I find it more useful to think of political and social
philosophy as part of the study of ethics, since it not only
helps me to understand more clearly the often used distinction
between theoretical and practical concerns in philosophy, but also
because I can appreciate more easily that the nature of the
problems has not changed and therefore makes the enterprise of
political and social philosophers a philosophical one. An
example might show how the content of a special area of philosophical
enquiry corresponds to the possible distinction between theoretical
and practical philosophy, and how its questions might be formulated
in different types of discourse.
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As I do not consider the distinction between theoretical
and practical philosophy to be in any sense an absolute one,
I shall indicate it as a tendency towards one or the other end
of a range of types of discourse. Those tending towards the
theoretical end can be considered less immediately 'action-











Is 'justice ' a demand, a
claim, a proposition, an
axiomatic statement?
What is 'justice '?
substantive questions
What kind of moral actions
contribute to a state
of 'justice '?
applied questions
Is it justified to discriminate
deliberately in favour of a
particular ethnic or racial
group?
It should be noted that the questions in all types of moral
discourse partake of those characteristics which identify them
as indicators of philosophical problems; that is, they are
derived from and informed by experience, insoluble by empirical
investigations, particularly generalized in their conceptions,
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not necessarily settled in one specific way, and only answerable
through thinking. A closer examination would undoubtedly reveal
logical paradoxes and absurdities especially in our common-sense
thinking about them, and any possible solution would surely
increase the intelligibility of that part of our reality from
which the questions emerged in the first place.
It might be important to distinguish at the practical level
between philosophical problems and, for example, operational
problems.12 Although what I have called an applied question
(in, for example, political or social philosophy), refers to a
much more specific problem than a question at the theoretical
level, it is still concerned with establishing the criteria for
a general principle of justice, and not with the solution of a
specific operational dilemma (for example, should we discriminate
in all employment policies in favour of women and black people,
and if so, how?)
Far less, of course, are philosophical questions in whatever
type of discourse, designed to describe instances of, for example,
discrimination in employment or elsewhere. These are empirical
questions which can only be answered by appropriate sociological
or socio-political investigations. Any generalization derived
from such empirical investigations might in itself become the
object of further philosophical reflections but the empirical
facts as we by then know them, would in no way be altered by any
concerns of political or social philosophers.
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I cannot see the various specialist areas of philosophy as
entirely independent in any case, quite apart from any difficulty
in clearly distinguishing theoretical from practical concerns.
It seems to me that, for example, epistemological arguments
must inform, and must be informed by metaphysical, logical and
moral enquiries, although undoubtedly to varying degrees depending
on the focus of a particular argument.
The following attempt to summarize the overview of the
contents of philosophy in a diagrammatic rather than in a purely
verbal form should be considered as a representation of
the central place of logic in philosophical enquiries
the interrelatedness of logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and
and value studies
the tendency of various philosophical enterprises towards a
theoretical or practical type of discourse
the applied concerns of philosophy in relation to other





























social sciences history mathematics sciences art religion
linguistics
practical
By attempting to outline the content of special areas of
philosophical investigations, the relationship of philosophy with
other disciplines becomes apparent in some ways, as it has in
other ways during earlier discussions in this argument. A
particular relationship has already been indicated in the
discussion of the concerns of metaphysics. Philosophy as a
metascience endeavours to characterize existence or reality as
a whole. In a synoptic view of the world, "philosophy must
recognize the methods and results of the sciences" (Jaspers 1951),13
but must transcend them by a rational discourse "to gain insight
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into the essence of truth in its full scope under the present
conditions of scientific knowledge and historical experience."
Sidgwick (1902) goes further towards an integrating function
of philosophy by declaring an interest of philosophy in what ought
to be as well as in what has been demonstrated by the empirical
sciences to be the case.
He claims that
"the aim of philosophy, in its widest sense, is to
comprehend all rational human thought - whether it
relates to 'what is' or to 'what ought to be' -
as one coherent whole."
In relation to the empirical sciences, philosophy has developed
another special relationship which is directed less at coordinating
and integrating their separate results, but more at judging the
appropriateness of the methods and canons of proof employed by
them.
Sidgwick remarks with a great deal of justification which
still holds today that particularly in disciplines where knowledge
is growing fast in range or depth, there is continual conflict
and controversy
"as to the truth of new conclusions, which appear established
and demonstrated to the adventurous minds that have worked
them out; and as to the legitimacy of new hypotheses, or the
validity of new methods; and wherever we find such conflict
and controversy, there must be an error on one side or the
other, or possibly both."
243
Furthermore, there are not only the controversies within
particular sciences but also between different sciences. One
science criticizing the validity of the methods employed by another
and/or its particular conclusions is a phenomenon that has not
vanished with Sidgwick's generation.
"Such controversies force on anyone who aims at
systematising the methods and conclusions of the
sciences a searching inquiry into the fundamental
assumptions of those methods."
Scientists, Sidgwick observes, are not particularly disturbed
by the fact that certain scientific beliefs are found to be
erroneous and are replaced by new ones. The scientist "on the whole,
continues his usual processes of acquiring, evolving, systematising
beliefs with undiminished confidence."
But for the philosopher who examines the general concepts,
methods, criteria or proof, and processes of generalizations
employed in the empirical sciences, and who deals with rational
justifications for adopting criteria of acceptability of the
results offered by the empirical sciences, the "special concern
with the fundamental assumptions, as distinct from details, of
a branch of study" would not appear to fall into the province of
any other kind of investigation.
Consequently, these areas described as the philosophy of the
social sciences, history, mathematics, linguistics, sciences, art
and religion are concerned with questions about these disciplines
as contrasted with questions within them. The questions of interest
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to the philosopher, that is, those about a discipline, have been
described as second-order or conceptual questions as they require
"an account of the proper thing to say and think about
the facts, or, ... an account of how we should conceive of
them." (Ryan 1970)
A fairly representative approach to the philosophy of an
empirical science would include questions and arguments relating
to the nature of scientific theories, the logical character of
scientific methodology, the criteria of acceptable proof, the
problems of explanation, meaning and understanding inherent in
the given enterprise, and to its place in relation to other
empirical investigations.
The philosophy of non-experimental enquiries like mathematics,
linguistics, art, religion, and history may raise questions about
the nature of the sources from which the data for the practitioner
of the discipline are derived, their nature and criteria by
which their reliability and validity can be established, the nature
of theory and other forms of representation employed in the field,
the appropriateness of the methods chosen to advance knowledge
in the field, and the criteria for reaching a concensus between
the practitioners of the discipline.
It is not very surprising that the enquiries conducted by
philosophers of science or history, for example, are sometimes
seen to be less than useful by the practitioner of the respective
discipline. As Ryan (1970) points out in this context,
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"philosophical questioning is positively dangerous
in that it distracts us from following the tried practices
of the intellectual, or moral and political community
to which we belong."
Less threatening on occasion, although not necessarily so,
is the third kind of relationship that philosophy may establish
with other disciplines by emphasizing its contribution to the
clarification of fundamental concepts employed in the discipline,
and to the informal logic which governs its discourses and
arguments.
In a way, the relationship of philosophy with other
disciplines could be seen to be fulfilling a range of functions
from the analytical to the synoptic, and from the practical to the
theoretical.
There appears to be a certain correspondence between the
tendencies towards synoptic, theoretical concerns about the
discipline and analytical, practical contributions to its
endeavours.
A model of the relationship between these functions might have
to incorporate further details than the ones I am about to offer
here. But a model of this kind might suggest a possible starting
point in identifying some fundamental aspects of how philosophical









From a necessarily limited survey of what philosophers say
in describing their field, the purposes, problems, methods,
contents and relationships of philosophy indicate a wide range
of, and an almost infinite subject matter for, philosophical
enquiries.
My earlier assertions that the way in which nurse theorists
identify and handle 'philosophy' is not only particularly narrow
and somewhat arbitrary, but also often misleading, is, I feel,
substantiated by letting philosophers explain their discipline.
Not all philosophers would necessarily subscribe to the whole
range of concerns which I have outlined here, and some 'schools'
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of philosophy have adopted rather narrower aims. However, I
feel that it would be a mistake for the nurse theorist who wishes
to utilize philosophical methods of enquiry to adopt a singular
approach or to accept particular philosophical stances before
having examined critically alternate approaches and counterclaims
of other 'schools'. Philosophers like other people tend to
consolidate their respective stances and fall victim to habits,
personal and institutional histories and preferences, and not
least to intellectual 'fashions'.
Existentialism in Europe, dialectical materialism in the
Marxist parts of the world, positivism in Great Britain, and value
philosophy in the United States may all serve as examples of
fashionable 'schools' of philosophy.
Feibleman (1958) describes each of these 'schools' as always
having "all others as its opponents." He sees their adherents
as disciplines imbued with an almost religious fervour which
completely negates the tolerance, open-mindedness and self-
criticism characteristic of all genuine philosophical enquiries.
He may well be right that the most popular stances in philosophy
are those advocated by "the largest and most successful
institutions."
But philosophy as a "slave to other institutions" loses its
whole raison d'etre.
Philosophy ought to be an enterprise which leads
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"all those who suffer from philosophical opinion so
confirmed that they would impose it as the absolute truth
upon their neighbours, into the more passive channels
of unsettled speculation."
However, some speculations are more relevant and potentially
fruitful than others, and how one might determine the relevance
of philosophical enquiries in nursing shall be the concern of
the last part of this argument.
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NOTES TO PART THREE
Here a necessary distinction should be made. The attempt
to 'teach philosophy' by the description of chronological
events and biographical data, even when philosophical arguments,
set in their time and place, are part of this description,
is rightly suspect. Nelson (1949) observes with justification
that even "When expressed in words, these universal truths
will be heard; but it does not necessarily follow that they
will be comprehended." He continues, "It is accordingly
impossible to communicate philosophy, the sum total of these
philosophical principles, by instruction as we communicate
historical facts or even geometrical theorems. The facts
of history are not objects of insight; they can only be
noted. ... But to present philosophy in this manner is to
treat it as a science of facts that are to be accepted as
such. The result is at best a mere history of philosophy.
However, a descriptive, chronological history of philosophy
is not at all the same as a historical approach to the study
of philosophy. Recently, Alan Montefiore could say, "that
the tradition of philosophical study (in France) remains
very closely related to an intense study of the history of
the subject. ... Almost all French philosophers ... will
insist that the problems with which they are trying to deal
only emerge for them through their study of the work of those
who have preceded them, and through ... the development of
their thoughts ...". (Magee 1973)
There is a continuity in the development of philosophical thought
which corresponds to, and is illuminated by, the social, moral
and religious life of a people in a particular historical
context. "Any study of philosophy that is worthwhile will
lay strong emphasis on a knowledge of the historical development
of philosophical thought . . ." . (Butler 1908)
Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) taught at the University of
Gottingen for eighteen years from 1909-1927. His work
includes Lectures on the Foundation of Ethics, and Lectures
on the History of Metaphysics, as well as papers on general
epistemological questions and on the methodology of science.
He believed passionately that rational truth was not only
attainable but essential in refuting the dominant philosophical
schools in Germany during his lifetime (these started off as
almost pure scepticism at the turn of the century and then
merged with a strange brand of mysticism which rejected rational
philosophical discourse in favour of an invented irrational
'truth'.)
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When Nelson speaks of a 'scientifically' grounded
conception of life, he does not refer to a conceptualization
derived solely from empirical enquiries. On the contrary,
he sees a need for clearly deductive rationally grounded
propositions which are based on non-empirical enquiries. His
demand for philosophy to become a 'science' (Wissenschaft)
does not mean that he envisages philosophical investigations
to be conducted in a manner similar to empirical ones.
"Philosophical method ... is determined by the specific
character of philosophical knowledge", he claims. Philosophy
as a 'science' does mean that he wants philosophical methods
made explicit (a task to which he devotes two essays). It
also means that "Philosophical knowledge, like every sort of
knowledge, becomes science only when the diverse cognitions
that go to make up the particular knowledge are given the form
of systematic unity." In other words, he wants to systematize
philosophy so that the discovery and verification of its basic
principles becomes possible. In that he sees the essence
of a 'science'.
What the nature of such a synoptic view of the world might be,
is explained by Sidgwick (1902) in greater detail. "I
regard 'Philosophy' then ... as the study which 'takes all
knowledge for its province'. To such a study the human mind
would be palpably incompetent if it attempted to deal with all
the facts: it therefore selects the most important. Thus
if we conceive the sciences as sets of connected knowledge, and
imagine them as rising from the particular to the general,
we may consider these sets in their turn as connected by
Philosophy at the higher end. Philosophy, therefore,
deals not with the whole matter of any science, but with the
most important of its special notions, its fundamental principles,
its distinctive method, its main conclusions. Philosophy
examines these with the view of coordinating them with the
fundamental notions and principles, methods and conclusions
of other sciences. It may be called in this sense sctentia
scientarium."
Jaspers (1951) , £,ike Sidgwick, is frequently criticized for
claiming for philosophy the status of a superscience in the
terms of the empirical sciences. Neither of them does any
such thing. Jaspers feels that "Our sense of inadequacy of
each special branch of knowledge demands that each science be
connected with knowledge as a whole." Modern sciences need
to be integrated into a universal frame of reference. What
Jaspers finds missing in modem conceptions of science is a
quest for meaning behind the truth searched for by scientists.
He considers the preoccupation of the sciences with facts
alone to be erroneous, and he rejects the claim that we can
understand and explain everything in the terms of the empirical
sciences, or even in the terms of one science. He castigates
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the "intellectual tendencies, which uncritically hypostatize
a field of investigation that is meaningful within its limits
into a total science and infuse it with a religious attitude..."
This erroneous and dangerous endeavour leads to doctrinaire
and dogmatic attitudes and the "inability to explore in a
genuine sense, to listen, analyse, test, and reflect on
principles." Jaspers sees philosophy as inherent in the
actual sciences themselves providing direction and meaning
for the scientific enterprise. "If this guidance fails,
science falls into gratuitous convention, meaningless
correctness, aimless busy-ness, and spineless servitude."
Jaspers feels that with the increasing specialisation of the
sciences, the need for a discipline to tackle "the task of
unifying the whole" is urgent. He clearly sees philosophy







two statements which cannot both be
true or both be false
(A nurse is present - a nurse is not
present.)
two statements which cannot both be true
but can both be false
(Mary is a registered nurse - Mary is an
enrolled nurse. But she may be neither)
two statements which can both be true
but cannot both be false
(Wearing mufti on duty is not forbidden -
wearing mufti on duty is not compulsory.
If both statements were false, then wearing
mufti would be both forbidden and compulsory
which it cannot be.)
the truth or falsity of one statement
does not say anything at all about the
truth or falsity of the other statement
(At least one nurse here is not a man -
at least one man here is not a nurse.
Even if the first statement were true,
the second statement could still be either
true or false, and vice versa.)
the first statement implies the second
statement, and vice versa
(Some nurses are men - some men are nurses)
the first statement implies the second
statement but the second statement does
not imply the first one
(John is a male nurse - John is a man.)
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subimpUecction = the second statement implies the first
statement but the first statement does
not imply the second one
{Mary -is a nurse - Mary -is an efficient
nurse.)











naming things or objects
naming words, concepts, symbols
some lengthy explanation
pointing or physical introduction
naming characteristic features
indicating relations to other
things or objects
mathematical, symbolic means
a combination of analytic and
synthetic definitions
adopting one meaning for a particular
use or purpose
naming the cause of the thing or
object or whence it arises
As an illustration of the importance which Socrates was
seen to attach to examples taken from the daily life of his
conversation partners, a very short passage from Plato's
Republic yields references to medicine, cookery, sea voyages,
crops, shoemaking, playing chess, bricklaying, music, buying
and selling a horse or ship, banking money, boxing and fighting.
The distinction made between practical and theoretical philosophy
and its relation to classical and modern ethics has been
discussed in Part Two of this thesis.
The not very common inclusion of theology in this context
is discussed in more detail a little later on in this part.
Apel (1953) lists "theology" in a standard German dictionary
of philosophy as "the study of God; the science of religion",
but 'science' meaning here what the German word Wissensohaft
implies.
I have tried to think about Stevens' inclusion of the 'operational
method' as an example of a philosophical method of enquiry as
discussed in Part One, but I cannot really see it as part of
the philosopher's repertoire. It is so clearly goal-directed
that its predominant concern must be more the analysis of
factual data rather than the analysis of concepts, meanings
and logical relations; although the latter may be useful from
time to time, a philosophical enquiry is not the central concern.
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Whiteley (1969) also emphasizes the need for philosophers to
keep up to date with scientific developments since "Philosophy
needs constantly to be taking account of the fresh scientific
information to be accommodated in its total picture ... of
our place in the world ...".
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PART FOUR THE BUYERS
The potential development of nursing
knowledge by relevant philosophical
enquiries in nursing illustrated on hand
of four fundamental philosophical tasks
that need to be accomplished; that is,
limiting the search for knowledge, thinking
methodically and systematically about
nursing, identifying the philosophical
demands of the research process, and
constructing and developing theories.
THE BUYERS
There are a great many ways in which one might determine the
relevance of philosophical enquiries in nursing.1
Various nurse writers have explained, illustrated and
exemplified why philosophical enquiries are needed to gain knowledge
about nursing as a discipline and as a practice.2 (Bloch 1975,
Roy 1975, Donaldson & Crowley 1978, Griffin 1980, McFarlane 1980)
Having accepted that knowledge in whatever field of human
endeavour may be most usefully and effectively gathered in some
methodical way, nurse researchers have frequently pointed out
when and how philosophical approaches are not only useful but
essential to the research process. (Geitgey & Metz 1969, Hardy 1974,
Jacox 1974, Johnson 1974, Batey 1977, Silva 1977, Krueger et at
1978, Crawford et at 1979)
Teachers of nurses have been concerned with aspects of
curriculum development, and have utilized philosophical approaches
to examine and clarify their endeavours. (Abdel A1 1974, Treece
1974, Chater 1975)
Nursing values and the ideology of the profession have been
critically examined and occasionally redefined. (Partridge 1978,
Gamer 1979)
Although all these contributions are valid and, indeed,
important, I would like to consider the relevance of philosophical
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enquiries in a different way by asking what 'kind of ghiiosophicat
tasks have to be accomplished in nursing in order that the search
for nursing knowledge may become coherent and may finally lead
to the 'body of knowledge' which nurses claim they need for a
necessary improvement in the effectiveness of patient care.
The first task, it seems to me, is to limit the search for
knowledge to nursing knowledge;3 that is knowledge which is
identifiable by
its explicit nursing perspective
its structure and organisation based on a clearly articulated
concept of nursing
its demonstrable potential to improve patient care through
nursing action.
Setting limits to the enquiries in nursing is an essential
prerequisite for establishing the discipline of nursing. Disciplines
are characterized by their distinctive realms of enquiry and learning,
by a unique perspective and a distinct way of selecting and viewing
phenomena in a definable field of enquiry.
Part of the endeavour to define the discipline of nursing must
be to eradicate the confusion that generally appears to exist, in
which nursing as a discipline, nursing practice, the nursing
profession, and nursing 'science' are considered to be synonymous
or largely interchangeable.
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Nursing practice is not synonymous with the discipline of
nursing.
The discipline of nursing consists of all those endeavours
which are geared towards identifying, discovering, clarifying,
ordering, and methodically producing knowledge of a particular
kind.
Since one important characteristic of that knowledge is that
it should improve patient care through nursing action, it
seems reasonable to define nursing as a practice discipline
(along with, for example, medicine, social work, law, education
and the ministry).
Or to put it another way, the only rationale for the existence
of a discipline of nursing is that there is an area of activity
called nursing practice. But nursing practice (like other
professional activities) does not draw only for relevant knowledge
on the discipline of nursing. It needs knowledge from many
different disciplines, to varying degrees and in different forms.
But I would suggest that all such derived knowledge must be
integrated by and in the discipline of nursing before it becomes
wholly useful for the practice of nursing.
In establishing the proper relationship between nursing as
a discipline, nursing practice, and other disciplines, one might
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Although the discipline of nursing and the nursing profession
are inextricably linked by nursing practice which for both constitutes
their rationale for being, they must be distinguished from each
other. What might be considered progress or advancement in one,
need not necessarily lead to or be complemented by progress or
advancement in the other.
Many of the 'problems' of nursing practice, for example,
have been thought to be due to an insufficient recognition of the
professional status of the nurse, which may well have been true.
But obviously, not all problems in nursing practice appear to be
diminishing (and some may well be increasing) in the process of
professionalisation. One could even argue that the increasing
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discrepancy between the advancement made by nursing as a profession
and as a discipline may well be one of the main factors in what
appears to some a lowering of standards in nursing practice.
If the word 'science' were used in the more general meaning
of Wissenschaft, then the discipline of nursing would be synonymous
with nursing science, but in its narrower sense by only referring
to empirical methods of enquiry, it is not synonymous with the
discipline of nursing.
Particular care should therefore be taken in talking about
nursing science.
Similarly, all disciplines must be research-based, if research
refers to all methods of enquiry, but they are not all based on
'scientific' research, if we confine the term to the use of
empirical methods of investigation.
The main point which I am trying to make here is, that before
we begin to define the realm of nursing as a discipline, we must
have some clear conception of the nature of disciplines generally
and of practice disciplines in particular.
If the discipline of nursing is grounded in nursing practice,
as I have suggested, then its limits must be defined by a
conceptualization of that practice.
Again, before any such endeavour at clarification may prove
acceptable and successful, nursing practice itself must be
conceptualized in relation to its purposes, means and ends, and
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and its place in the society to which it belongs. What might
emerge as a specific nursing perspective will undoubtedly be
greatly influenced by the current beliefs and values of that
society.
I do not wish to imply that all professional values reflect
directly the values of the general society to which nurses belong
(quite apart from the fact that the members of a profession in
Western industrialized societies belong to very heterogenous
social groups with many diverse value systems), but it seems quite
urgent to me that nurses examine their professional systems of
belief and establish to what an extent these concur with or
diverge from the values of those members of society who are being
served by the profession.
Whether a realignment of values where they diverge is necessary
or desirable, should be a question of utmost importance in nursing.
What one may well call an ideological analysis and revision must
also include an honest appraisal of the extent to which values that
are professed, are in fact internalized by the members of the
profession. Sociologists have supplied some empirical evidence
which points to a great diversity of people who belong to 'the
profession'. This still leaves out the question by what values
practice is to be informed which is carried out almost predominantly
by workers who are not, or are not yet, members of the nursing
profession.
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In other words, the 'nursing perspective' may well turn out
to be an illusion as far as its manifestation in practice is
concerned.
A major point of my argument is that any endeavour, however
diligently and skilfully executed, to create, find or produce
nursing knowledge is doomed to failure until such a time when an
identifiable nursing perspective emerges in nursing practice.
Otherwise nursing as a discipline would become quite truly an
'academic discipline' (which is no pejorative for an essentially
academic profession, for example, for philosophers, but which
negates the whole rationale of a practice discipline).
A clearly articulated concept of nursing and an identification
of key concepts in nursing practice appear to be other, and
consequent devices by which the limits of the discipline (and
indeed, the practice) of nursing can be established. If this
conceptualization of nursing were derived from practice, I would
envisage a major reformulation of many theoretical frameworks for
nursing practice and research. One 'conceptual shift' that might
occur is the return to a central concept of 'illness' which may
replace the present concept of 'health' as a central concern of
nurses.
It seems to me that here nursing has followed a conceptual
'fashion' without clarifying the rationale and relationships
embodied in the concepts of 'nurse' and 'patient'.
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One might well argue, and with more congruence with the
rationale of nursing as a service, that 'health' may well be
one of the possible outcomes of successful nursing, but that
'illness' is really the central business of nurses.11
It is only when the discipline of nursing has been defined
by a nursing perspective and has acquired a workable conceptualization
of nursing that empirical investigations might demonstrate how
certain kinds of knowledge within that perspective and based on
those concepts may improve patient care through nursing action.
In this first task of limiting the search for knowledge to
a search for nursing knowledge which should eventually lead to a
true discipline of nursing, the two crucial aspects which determine
the limits of nursing are only open to philosophical enquiries.
I shall denote these in the following illustration by the letter
'P' .
The second task is to think methodically and systematically
about nursing. This may have already been accomplished by some
nurses but because of its essentially philosophical character,
the result achieved by some cannot be 'handed on' to others as a
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discrete item of knowledge. The conceptualization of a methodical
and planned approach to the tasks which nurses perform with and
for patients in the course of providing nursing care, has become
known as the process of nursing.
In its sequential phases of identification of patient needs,
assessment of those needs which can be fulfilled by nursing
intervention and of the personal and organisational resources
available, intervention by carrying out certain nursing actions,
and evaluation to ascertain the effectiveness of these actions,
the process of nursing is clearly a programme of rational thinking
and problem solving (closely akin to the solving of intellectual
problems in an argument).
The forms of inductive and deductive thinking, establishing
logical relations and pursuing a tenable argument are all based
on philosophical methods of enquiry. Therefore these modes of
thought must be practised by each nurse in order to be utilised in
the planning of nursing care. It may well be that professional
nursing practice will come to be identified by this ability to
think clearly, analyse and synthesize various conceptual components
and generally bring order into the whole picture of the patient's
needs.
It is also through a process of methodical thinking that the
necessary contribution from other disciplines to the solving of the
presenting nursing problems can be identified.
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A further aspect of this second task would be the categorisation
or classification of nursing problems, so that relevant and valid
means of solving them can be hypothesized, tested, and if found
established, generalized in the form of principles of care.
It is quite obvious that the 'nursing process1 parallels any
other kind of methodical thinking in a problem- (or question-)
orientated situation. It is therefore identical in its phases
with the sequence in which knowledge may be obtained methodically








Whichever purpose this mode of thinking serves, it involves
philosophical enquiries of one kind or another.
One specific point needs to be made here, if the research
process is to provide the evidence that certain nursing actions
have a demonstrable potential to improve patient care. The questions
asked by the researcher must be formulated in the same, or in
legitimately and easily exchangeable, terms in which the nurse
practitioner formulates nursing problems.
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In other words, there must be a 'fit' between the concepts
and their relations employed by both pratitioner and researcher.
Many examples of nursing research can be found where the concepts
employed by the researcher are far wider or much narrower than
those utilized in nursing practice. The problem for the researcher
may well be that she needs to conform to customary formulations in
other disciplines. But unless she can either 'transform' these
concepts in such a way that they 'fit' into current conceptual
schemes of nursing, or she can persuade workers in other disciplines
to accept workable and valid nursing concepts (if their approval
is needed), the results of her work will often be almost meaningless
in nursing practice. But not only will they be practically useless,
it will not be possible to enrich the thinking of nurses by
incorporating the research into some ordered scheme of nursing
knowledge.
It is also possible (and it has been done) that researchers
influence the conceptualizations in specific areas of nursing
practice. In 'action research' a continuing exchange takes place
between the researcher and the practitioner. It may well be
that this, and similar forms of mutual involvement in the search
for nursing knowledge, will in time produce some methods of
investigation particularly suited to the concerns of a practice
discipline. Meanwhile, a reasonable test whether a researcher
actually realizes the importance of this conceptual 'fit' may be
that the choice of concepts and their relations are not only
explained in terms of, say, psychological theory, but that they
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are explored in terms of their current 'fit' with prevailing
nursing concepts.
It is customary in empirical research to 'test' the proposed
method of data collect]on by 'piloting' the chosen instrument.
It would be equally feasable to 'test' and 'pilot' the proposed
conceptual formulations which frequently could be amended and
brought closer to the nursing perspective without losing their
inherent validity in the context of another discipline. It
seems to me that all these endeavours to establish methodical and
systematic thinking about nursing must be accomplished with the
help of philosophical methods of enquiry.
The third task is to identify clearly the philosophical
demands of the research process. This should involve both the
individual nurse researcher who needs to examine much more
critically the theoretical foundations of her work, and the nurse
theorist who needs to develop more detailed criticisms of current
theoretical approaches, and who should be engaged in the construction
and development of nursing theory.
Generally speaking, all scientific endeavours (in the widest
sense) exhibit characteristics which are established by rational
methods of enquiry as opposed to empirical ones. They must be
coherent, definite, generalisable, true, logically ordered and
reasonably argued.
Or to put it in a negative form, nursing science cannot be
established by an explication of unrelated data, no matter how
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valuable or interesting these may be in any one instance.5 It
has already been said frequently, that enquiries outwith a definite
and definable field cannot be ordered into a coherent and conceptually
sound entity.
The regression or reduction to generalisable statements,
observations or formulated principles may vary considerably between
different investigations, but it is the task of the researcher to
reach the highest possible level of abstraction that the material
allows.
The identification of conceptual relations which might emerge
from the data is essential, if knowledge is to be gained and
advanced. The researcher who 'plays safe' with an immaculate
but totally unrelated and pedestrian presentation of her data
does not challenge anyone to further the search for knowledge in
that area.
The definition of truth is certainly a complex epistemological
question but even if the 'whole' or 'absolute' truth (if one
could define it) is not attainable, the researcher must at least
abide by her own truth-conditions which the honest person will
have established before, not after, the event.
Hypothesizing involves attention to the logical ordering of
statements and to their particular relationship with each other.
Again, a 'tidying up' operation after the investigation has been
completed is not only somewhat dishonest, it also invariably
shows in the logical disasters that almost always ensue. The
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strengths and weaknesses of the proposed argument ought always
to be made explicit to prevent unnecessary repetition or even
compounding of error and to show, perhaps more importantly, how
such strengths can be exploited and such weaknesses overcome.
A reasonable grasp of, at least, informal logic seems to be a
necessary prerequisite for any research endeavour. Epistemological
questions and problems should be familiar to the researcher, at
least in relation to her own field.
In any experimental form of research, metaphysical questions
about 'cause' and 'effect' should perhaps be more generally
considered before establishing criteria for measurements of whatever
kind.
Causality may not be a necessary condition to establish in
any case, and it is questionable whether it can in fact be
demonstrated empirically.
The notion of inference should be handled carefully and with
due regard for its inherent weaknesses which are rarely acknowledged
in empirical work.
A particularly vexing question may well be to decide the meaning
(Bedeutung) of the proposed research.
Trivialisation can hinder the advancement of knowledge rather
than encourage it. To what an extent established criteria for
rigorous definitions, complex but unwieldy tools of investigation,
and minutely observable outcomes really contribute to knowing
something worth knowing at the end, may demand difficult decisions.
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But meaningless (bedeutungslos) research in a practice
discipline is difficult to defend. The only 'defence' I can
imagine might be that the investigation served a learning and
training purpose. But even this defence (a moral argument should
perhaps be developed from this point) is suspect if one asks for
which kind of work the learning and training was meant to prepare
the student.
Apart from these rather general considerations of any kind
of research, it is in the process of research that the non-
empirical aspects are often made less explicit than the empirical
input.
Even a simplified outline will show that the non-empirical
(that is, philosophically based) phases far outweigh the empirical
phase (usually both in length of time the researcher needs to
devote to them and in their importance for the coherence and
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In other words, the conceptual and interpretative phases
seem to be far longer and more decisive in relation to the possible
outcome than the empirical phase.
One question of interest in this argument must surely arise.
How sound, especially conceptually and interpretatively, is nursing
research as it is being conducted?
Batey (1977) examined twenty-five volumes of Nursing Research
to assess the conceptual, empirical and interpretative limitations
"> 7 q
apparent in the published material.
Of the limiting features identified, fewer were found in the
empirical phase than in the two non-empirical phases. Furthermore,
a large proportion of the seemingly empirical limitations could
be related to somewhat suspect underlying reasoning in the conceptual
phase of the research process. Very frequently, the selection of
the investigative tool was incongruent with the meaning specified
for the variable to be represented by the data produced with it.
Batey claims that
"This was found to have occurred with greatest frequency
when the meaning of the governing concept remained
blurred in the conceptual phase." (the italics are mine)
Limitations in the interpretative phase were mainly due to the
attribution of meanings to the findings that were beyond the scope
of the findings presented, to ignoring findings and holding to an
initial value judgment despite the evidence, and to an absence of
concept reexamination or reformulation on the basis of information.
"As those comments imply, limiting features of the
interpretative phase were traceable to a major extent
again to the functions served by the conceptual design.
By far the largest proportion of limiting features
of published research reports was attributable to the
conceptual phase of the research process. " (the italics
are mine)
It may be instructive to list the limitations which apparently
beset so many of the studies at their inception:
?7q
fallacies of reasoning
failure to specify meaning
lack of substantive knowledge in conveying the problem6
vagueness of conceptual framework
lack of explicit statements regarding the purpose of the conceptual
phase
ambiguity in stating the problem
uncertainty of what concepts had guided the choice of literature
and its discussion
ambiguity as to the meanings of the concepts used
lack of explicit presentation of the investigator's conceptual
image of the problem
lack of relating important background knowledge about the
problem to the study
vagueness of the objective and rationale of the study, or its
aims and purposes.
With the exception of the lack of relevant and important
background knowledge (derived from other disciplines), all other
limitations are clearly due to a fundamental inability to
conceptualize nursing and to articulate conceptualizations clearly.
Batey suggests that this may be due to the fact that many of
the studies served as learning exercises in research training.
She comments
"The majority of the texts that serve research instruction
in nursing make at best only passing reference to the
conceptual phase of the research design. Research instruction
courses in nursing are limited for the most part to the
technical components of research design as evidenced through
procedures of data production and analysis."
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Her observation that most research students receive no
instruction in theory construction, or in logic and the philosophy
of science, would probably be equally relevant to nursing research
in the United Kingdom.
Yet these are the areas of philosophical concerns which
provide the fundamental ingredients for research conceptualizations.
There still appears to be a very simplified notion of 'empirical
truth' abroad in nursing. This needs to be balanced by the very
important concept of 'logical truth'.
The concepts and their meanings as they concern the phenomena
of the study, require that relations be established between them.
Such relations may be referred to as propositions, that is,
proposed relations.
The investigator may propose certain associations or causal
connections, but in either case, she has made explicit the fundamental
rationale for the study, that is, she has stated its 'logical
truth'.
The 'logical truth' as derived from the conceptualizations
based on past knowledge and current perceptions can be 'disproven'
in two ways: by someone pointing to its lack of conceptual
completeness in representing the phenomenon's components and their
relationships, or to its suspect logical inferences, and by
available empirical evidence.
Knowledge which is valid, reliable and true emerges from
an interaction between 'empirical' and 'logical' truths , each
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informing and modifying the other.
It should by now be almost unnecessary to emphasize that
'empirical' evidence is highly selected, subjectively ordered and
utilized according to some very definite preconceptions on the
part of the selector, observer or investigator. Its 'truth-value'
can only ever be measured against the 'truth-value' of the logical
system which determined its selection, ordering and utilization.
Both need to be subjected £o constant scrutiny to allow congruence
and cohesion between the two 'truths' to emerge. Either one
is useless without the other.
The fourth task of theory construction and development is
inherent in the already discussed research process, but I believe
needs to be examined in more detail in its own right, since a long
and often heated debate has accompanied the question whether there
are or might be 'theories of nursing', 'theories for nursing'
or 'theories in nursing', or whether perhaps there should be
'a nursing theory'.
Neither have the opponents who wish to distinguish between
basic and applied sciences buried their differences. It seems
to me that theories of whatever kind are a long way off in and
for nursing.
I basically would see a logical division between 'theories
for nursing' and 'theories in (or of) nursing'. Both seem to be
needed by the practitioner of nursing.
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Theories for nursing would include in my view, all kinds of
theories offered by other disciplines which might contribute to
an understanding of a particular facet of the patient's experience,
the nurse's role, the institutional setting in which both nurse
and patient interact, communicate and function, and the community
which supports the institution with certain expectations, often
quite divorced from its declared purposes. Examples of such
'applied' theories may include psychological theories about stress
and anxiety, sociological theories about roles, status and function,
socio-political theories about the power structure in institutions,
and moral theories about the liberty of the individual or about the
necessity to strive for a common good.
All of them would assist nurses to focus on, test and understand
more fully certain aspects of their experience. However, it seems
that nurses generally do not apply such theories to their practice
although they have been taught about a good many of them.7 My
explanation why this should be so concurs with Crawford et at (1979)
who suggest that
"knowledge from another science or discipline cannot be
adequately understood, if it is removed from the context
that generated it. For this reason, when one uses
borrowed concepts and theories, one must redefine and
synthesize them according to the perspective of the
borrowing discipline."
If this synthesis is a condition of employing theoretical
constructs offered by other disciplines, then the primary task
must be to create and define the perspective which will allow for
a particular use of borrowed or applied theories. Therefore it
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seems to be patting the cart before the horse to raise a great
deal of concern about the proper classification of theories for
nursing, before we can actually use them effectively in guiding and
testing our observations in patient care, and in creating suitable
experimental conditions for ascertaining the factual relationships
postulated in those theories.
Theories in (or of) nursing cannot emerge either, until the
first three tasks which I have described, are at least partially
accomplished.
It seems to me that theory construction and development that
is being conducted in the absence of a shared perspective with
the practitioner of nursing, and which strives for a completeness
of its own, is a mistaken exercise.
The function of a theory is primarily to guide observation and
experiment by interrelated postulates or hypotheses which are
subject to reformation and refinement.
In other words, observations and experiments are carried out
in order to shed light on some theory.
In nursing, however, theories need to be further developed
to be capable of guiding nursing actions towards desirable outcomes.
Practice theory must go beyond the theories utilized in the empirical
sciences which serve to define, explain and predict the behaviour
of the inanimate or animate objects of the investigation.
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Dickhoff and James (1968) describe such practice theories
as "situation-producing", that is, as theories which guide action
to produce a certain (generally agreed, desirable) situation.
"Situation-producing theories ... attempt conceptualization
of desired situations as well as conceptualizing the
prescription under which an agent or practitioner must
act in order to bring about situations of the kind
conceived as desirable in the conception of the goal. "
(the italics are mine)
In other words, practice or situation-producing theories
presuppose an agreement on what are desirable objectives for
nursing care.
It may appear to some that the desirable goals of nursing are
perhaps quite easily identified and that it would not be too
difficult to reach agreement on, for example, that a patient should
emerge less anxious from an encounter with a nurse than he may
have been before it.
Experiences of, and available evidence in my own field of
nursing make me hesitant to expect such agreement to be either
already existing or to be easily procured.
In order to meet the requirements of a practice theory as
stipulated by Glaser and Strauss (1967), namely that
it must closely fit the area in which it is to be used
- it must be understandable to practitioners using it
it must be general enough to cover many diverse practice situations
it must allow the practitioner control over the everyday situations
as they change,
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the first and second tasks as I have stipulated them here must be
accomplished to some extent and on a wide basis by a great many
members of the profession before practice theory can be constructed
and developed.
However, if and when nurses engage in theory construction and
development, they need to utilize philosophical methods and
approaches in this task.
Concepts as the basic elements of theories need to be analyzed,
clarified and meaningfully employed.
Theory consists of concepts, formulations about their
relationships and postulates of a particular kind.
The nurse theorist must be able to determine the precise
logical structure of the relations between the concepts employed
in the theory (that is, its syntax) and their meaning in this
context (that is, its semantics).
The syntax of the theory governs the propositions, expressions
of the axioms, postulates, principles and hypotheses of a theory
and their relationship to the concepts employed in it. The
semantic structure of the theory (that is, how concepts are defined
and understood) develops and changes as the theory develops and
changes. Conceptual reappraisal therefore becomes a continuous
and current task to be accomplished in any theory development.
The relationship between the elements of a theory (that is,
its concepts) may be expressed in terms of analog, iconic or
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symbolic (figurative) models. An understanding of the nature
and function of such representations appears essential in theory
construction and development.
Useful theories need to employ valid concepts (that is,
concepts defined in a manner similar to that used by other
theorists in the field), if they are to be successful in gaining
empirical knowledge relevant to the field of enquiry generally.
The operational and empirical adequacy of a theory rests on
such notions as falsification, confirmation, verification, support,
and corroboration. They all imply rather complex epistemological
processes which need to be understood before operational or empirical
adequacy can be demonstrated.
Finally, although the logical as well as the empirical adequacy
of a theory may well be established, and all the criteria of a
practice theory fulfilled, the users of any theory must be conscious
of its continuing tentative nature.
More damage has been done in practice disciplines by the
acceptance of a theory as if it represented established, immutable
facts than by what one might call theoretical pragmatism.
In concentrating on what I see to be essential tasks to be
accomplished in the search for nursing knowledge, that is
to limit the search for knowledge
to think methodically and systematically about nursing
to identify clearly the philosophical demands of the research process
to construct and develop nursing theories,
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I have left out many philosophical concerns in nursing. Perhaps
I should say more accurately that I have not made some of them
as explicit as they deserve to be made when I concerned myself
with the above tasks.
I will therefore at least indicate what I consider to be
important and relevant philosophical problems that will emerge
in the process of searching for nursing knowledge.
One of the major problems accompanying practically all the
tasks which I have mentioned is that of belief and 1<nowledge.
Are there unjustified beliefs and others which can be justified
by reasoning? In what particular way are justified beliefs
transformed into certain knowledge?
Here a second fundamental problem emerges which centers around
the notions of probability and certainty.
There is an inherent dilemma which afflicts all scientific
enterprises. On the one hand the aim of scientific enquiries
is to provide us with knowledge which we can trust and about which
we can be sure enough in order to act confidently and to predict
future outcomes. On the other hand it is essential feature
of scientific investigations that we should never believe anything
dogmatically8 and that we must be ready to change our beliefs in
accordance with what we observe and what we reason.
Therefore we should not be confident about any scientific
theory which we should abandon if it proves contrary to observation
or argument.
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So how are we to understand certainty and probability? Are
they incompatible with each other or does one lead to the other?
Can I be certain of some aspects of a situation and remain dubious
about others, and if I do, how does this affect my overall
perception and conceptualization of that part of my experience?
Here another problem emerges that will become apparent in
almost all the tasks which I have identified.
How do perception and conception relate to each other?
Knowing about the unreliability of human perceptions, how would
this unreliability affect the conceptions which are based on our
perceptual experiences?9 To answer this question, we would again
have to examine in what circumstances and by what criteria our
perceptual interpretations (beliefs) can be reasonably justified.
We would have to examine the process of justification which
we use to establish the reliability of our perceptions.
Another difficult problem of particular relevance to nursing
may be the question whether unexpressed conceptions inform our
thinking (and consequently our actions) in a different way to
expressed conceptions.
Here I am thinking of the possibility that a nurse may be
apparently unable to express verbally what she means by, for example,
'comfort' and how she utilizes this concept in caring for a patient.
Although she may not be able to identify the criteria by which we
might distinguish states of 'comfort' and 'discomfort', is it
possible that she consistently and selectively engages in appropriate
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actions which actually make people more comfortable than they
were?
What I think to be pertinent here is whether expressed and
unexpressed conceptions have the same logical power, or perhaps
one might say, are equally rational.
Another important aspect of all epistemological enquiries is
what kind of explanation might be required. We may need to
distinguish between 'how' and 'why' explanations, or between
descriptive and analytical ones. We might also need to distinguish
between explanations and solutions. We should also examine
(in the view that nursing is a practice discipline and therefore
best served by practice or situation-producing theories) whether
or how explanations become directives for action.
This examination appears to me especially important in view
of the fact that in many situations in health care particular
importance is attributed to the need to explain. But often, it
seems, an explanation is offered with the intention that the
recipient of it consequently acts in a particular way.
I would argue that an explanation per se does not necessarily
imply any particular way in which action should follow, or indeed,
whether any action should or need follow at all.
To take a very common example, nurses have known the
explanation how bedsores may develop, for a long time but this
knowledge derived from often given explanations has not led to
nurses acting in a particular way in their endeavours to prevent the
occurrence of such bedsores in patients.
We certainly need to distinguish between trivial and important,
implausible and plausible, partial and full explanations. Finally,
we must establish the relationship between explanations and
meaning.
In almost all endeavours which aim at gathering knowledge
about people as contrasted with knowledge about things, moval
judgments (whether made explicit or not), are part of our beliefs,
certainty, perception and conception, justification, and explanation
about the matter in hand.
Whether we judge what is 'right' in nursing or 'good' or
'desirable', we are making judgments about values which may
be implicit or explicit.
It may depend much on the subject of the investigation to
what an extent the investigator makes the moral components of the
situation explicit. An enquiry into how and why nurses communicate
potentially distressing information to patients (or on what grounds
they decide to withhold such information) may demand more obviously
an explication of moral concepts and an examination of moral
judgments. But I would suggest that these should be made explicit
in all nursing enquiries, to the same extent to which researchers
explain and justify their factual evidence and the ways in which
it was gathered.
291
My attempt to examine the reletano& of some philosophical
enquiries to nursing may appear limited, since I have largely
concentrated on conceptual and epistemological questions. I
was certainly tempted to look, for example, much more closely at
the kind of moral questions which I feel nurses ought to be asking.
On reflection, however, I think that these would have to emerge
as the tasks which I have described, are being gradually accomplished.
By emphasizing the contributions which philosophical methods
of enquiry might make in limiting the search for knowledge, in
thinking methodically and systematically about nursing, in
identifying the philosophical demands of the research process,
and in theory construction and development, I have offered a
possible answer to the initial question which led me to engage
in this argument.
A new phenomenon in nursing is the search for a particular
kind of knowledge. Some nurse writers claim that in addition to
various empirical methods of investigation, philosophical methods
of enquiry are needed to accomplish the set task. By concentrating
predominantly on the process by which knowledge is gained (that is,
the research process), and by discussing the fundamental necessity
for philosophical enquiries of a particular kind in almost all its
phases, the primary philosophical tasks have been much more clearly
identified, I would claim, than by ranging wide over all that
philosophy might have to offer.
My aim has been to show the starting points for philosophical
enquiries in nursing rather than define their ends.
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Rather than pretend to a certainty which I do not possess,
I have suggested possibilities which might make us more certain
in the end, if we are courageous and adventurous enough to
explore them.
"Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty
what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises,
is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge
our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom.
Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to
what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to
what they might be; it removes the somewhat arrogant
dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region
of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder
by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect."
(Russell 1967)
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NOTES TO PART FOUR
I would like to make a clear distinction here between the
relevance of philosophical enquiries in nursing and to
nursing. The purposes of philosophical enquiries in
nursing should directly relate to the processes by which
nursing knowledge is gained. Criticism, analysis, conceptual
experimentation, clarification and synthesis should be
seen as tasks to be accomplished in the discipline of
nursing. There still remain other philosophical enquiries,
both 'theoretical' and 'practical' which might be relevant
to nursing. They may be concerned with very general
philosophical enquiries and may contribute indirectly to the
advancement of nursing knowledge by making some aspect of our
general reality more intelligible or by making us more sensitive
to important issues. Or there may be philosophical enquiries
related to other disciplines, for example, to science, social
science and history, which may not only make us more aware
of the nature of knowledge derived from these disciplines, but
which may also serve as examples how similar epistemological
problems may be examined in nursing.
The writers mentioned here explain philosophical enquiries
in what I consider to be a legitimate way to talk about
philosophy. They do not commit the errors which I have
exemplified in Part Two of my argument.
I need to point out here that my argument for limiting the
search for knowledge to nursing knowledge is not synonymous
with arguing that nurse researchers should not be engaged
in other kinds of enquiries. There may well be a moral or
socio-political argument for circumscribing the activities
of practice-orientated researchers generally, or even in
nursing particularly, but this is not one I am pursuing at
the moment. There may be equally sound arguments for encouraging
nurses to research in other disciplines. Donaldson (1978),
for example, observes that "some members of the profession
must engage in enquiry that is not immediately applicable to
current clinical practice", and "Appropriately prepared
nurses may elect to conduct research within other disciplines
because of the critical importance of this non-nursing research
to professional practice or the growth of the discipline (of
nursing)." All I am saying here is that nurse researchers who
wish to produce nursing knowledge directly must limit their
search for this knowledge in a particular way.
There are many reasons why I believe the central emphasis on
'health' to be a mistaken one in nursing. In particular,
'health' is a long term goal which might inform our choices
in many areas of our lives, and which undoubtedly will influence
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such choices in very specific ways when we are ill. But
it is also a particularly global concept which tends to be
employed in an idealistic and all encompassing sense, thereby
often obscuring the more immediate short term goals of a sick
person. If one believes as I do, that nursing is an activity
through which a sick person is assisted in living through a
short or long term episode of illness with a minimum of distress
and pain as can be achieved, then nursing is essentially a
'here-and-now' concern orientated towards the current illness
experience of the patient. In what one might call the
experientially (perhaps even existentially) orientated endeavour
of nursing, more can be accomplished by concentrating on a
succession of short term goals (which may well be informed
by the long term goal of 'health' but not necessarily so).
The identification of these short term goals may be more
readily achieved by conceptualizations of facets of an illness
experience like distress, pain, discomfort, and desolation.
This criticism of the explication of unrelated data is not
meant to disparage small-scale investigations concentrating
on very specific problems or questions which may well not
be immediately generalisable to any extent. I am here
thinking of in-practice investigations by practising nurses
or nurse teachers to solve fairly concrete nursing problems
in a specific and perhaps very circumscribed field of nursing.
These are not only valuable for the immediate purpose which
they are meant to serve, they must also be a valuable source
of nursing conceptualizations derived from practice, and they
may well be the most effective way to develop methods of
investigation especially suited to the needs of a practice
discipline. Not only should such small-scale attempts at
gaining knowledge be encouraged, but we should also look for
ways by which such investigations can be utilized more
widely.
I do not think that Batey is using the notion of 'substantive
knowledge' here in the sense earlier referred to by me as
indicating the conceptualizations that fit a discipline's
perspective and that may be represented in its models and
theories. In the context of her argument, it appears that
she is indicating a lack of using available, current,
considerable, important and valuable knowledge relevant
to the problem to be investigated, that is, substantial
knowledge.
My perplexity why nurses do not appear to utilize relevant
theories from other disciplines is caused by various aspects
of this phenomenon. One major difficulty, I believe, is
created at the very outset when nurses are taught about such
theories. Not only are the theories of other disciplines
often removed from the context in which they were generated,
simplified to the point of distortion, and often not related
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to any kind of nursing experience, they are also frequently
presented as if they were facts. This removes any possibility
that even an intellectually curious nursing student may
apply them to certain aspects of the nursing experience in
order to test their utility, reasonableness, and explanatory
and predictive powers.
A much more simplicistic conception of science appears to
prevail among many non-scientists (and even perhaps among
a few scientists) which nurses generally tend to share.
There is often almost an element of unshakable faith in
scientific findings which are accepted as certain and
immutable knowledge.
I am not sure whether my formulation seems to imply that
there are conceptions which are based on something other
than perceptual experiences. If this should be so then I
would need to emphasize that all conceptualizations are
based or derived from experience. I would further argue that
all experience involves perceptual processes, so consequently
all conceptualizations must be derived in some way from
perceptual experiences. I am beginning to wonder whether
there is not a tautology hidden somewhere in talking about
perceptual experiences.
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EPILOGUE
In developing my argument concerning the meaning and relevance
of philosophical enquiries in nursing, I had a picture in my
mind in which I saw nurses on a journey, searching for knowledge.
In the market place of knowledge, some nurses are offering
wares which do not seem to be very genuine, while other scholars
tempt us with potentially useful kinds of knowledge. But these
we need to refashion in some way to make them actually usable
for our own purposes.
Amongst the sellers are philosophers who really ask something
quite different of their customers who wish to purchase the
commodity called philosophical knowledge. Philosophers show
us what kind of things they produce but then they refuse to sell
us their products. Instead, they tell the buyers of knowledge
to go away and produce their own.
So where do we go from here?
Who should produce the knowledge that can be gained by learning
and emulating the skills of philosophers, and which appears so
essential in allowing us to proceed on our journey in search of
nursing knowledge?
I have talked a great deal of the necessity for many nurses
to participate in philosophical enquiries, and especially of the
need for the nurse practitioner to do so. It also seems necessary
that those whose main task it is to produce knowledge, acquire the
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philosophical skills to accomplish this task.
So does this mean that all nurses, practitioners and researchers
alike, need to become proficient nurse philosophers? I would
hardly think so, quite apart from the fact that it does not appear
to be a very practicable proposal to make. I do think, however,
that all nurses need to participate at some level and to some
extent in accomplishing the essential philosophical tasks which
I have outlined earlier on.
Perhaps the most general requirement that needs to be met
by all nurses is to think methodically and systematically about
nursing, and to develop the ability to make explicit fundamental
conceptualizations in nursing practice.
To achieve this, I would not suggest that nursing students
should study 'philosophy' or any of its branches in a formal
manner. What I would expect to be necessary is that they are
given the opportunity to learn about nursing in a methodical and
systematic manner, to acquire habits of thought that develop
their logical and critical powers, to learn to structure their
arguments, to develop a critical approach to apparently 'certain
knowledge, to look for and find relevant knowledge rather than to
accept passively preselected information, and not least of all,
to become consciously involved in using appropriate and relevant
results of nursing research. To put it all much more simply,
the task to be accomplished by all nursing students is to think
clearly, logically, consistently and coherently about nursing.
300
Only if and when we achieve this goal, will nurse practitioners
emerge in sufficient numbers who can conceptualize their practice
and who can make the perspective of their work explicit.
Nurse researchers need to participate at a different level
and to a greater extent in accomplishing other and additional
philosophical tasks. They need to be able to identify clearly,
and fulfil competently, the philosophical demands of the research
process, and to construct and develop nursing theories.
I am reasonably convinced that part of any learning which the
research student has to do must include recognizable and distinct
efforts to become competent in some aspects of logic, in identifying
and working through epistemological problems, and in utilizing
philosophical methods of enquiry with the same deliberation and
conscious choice that characterizes the use of empirical methods
of investigation in any sound research.
There is also a need for some nurse researchers not to allow
themselves to be diverted from non-empirical enquiries in nursing
by narrow definitions of what constitutes a scientific endeavour.
Finally, there may well be a need for nursing research
establishments to change the focus of their work from nurses who
do research to nursing research.
I would envisage greater success in creating the discipline
of nursing with its substantive and syntactical structures, if
nursing research establishments (including academic departments
of nursing as part of their research commitment) would see it as
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their primary concern to accomplish the essential tasks which I
have indicated.
This would create the basis for stable investigative endeavours
by nurse researchers whose primary interest lies in nursing
research and the discovery of nursing knowledge, and who should
find a place among their number for the nurse historian and the
nurse philosopher.
The purpose of having nurse philosophers and historians is
not to duplicate the efforts of other disciplines, but to ensure
the development of the discipline of nursing.
It is only through the integrated efforts of the philosopher,
the historian, the empirical scientist and the professional,
practitioner that nursing knowledge can be gained, developed and
advanced, and the discipline of nursing be created. Only when
there is a discipline of nursing, can we find out whether the
patient does or does not benefit from nursing care that is based
on identifiable nursing knowledge.
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A question of honesty in nursing practice
This paper examines the perception of moral issues in nursing as presented in the literature and
in themes of meetings, discussions and study days devoted to the subject. It oilers an account
of moral issues perceived by nursing students and qualified nurses as being relevant to discussions
of moral aspects in nursing. The second part of this paper presents a closer examination of the
problems related to professional truth telling and deception as an illustration of an 'everyday'
moral issue in nursing and in health care generally.
VALUE JUDGEMENTS
Health care workers make numerous valucjudgemcnts in the course ofa single day.
Occasionally they may be conscious of doing so, more often than not decisions
are arrived at by the individual without conscious awareness of the process
involved in them. It has been claimed that all decision making processes involve
value judgements (Steele & Harmon 1979) and it is widely agreed that health care
priority choices inevitably entail moral judgements (Campbell 1978). Making
any decision, however weighty or relatively trivial, implies that the person who
needs to decide has recognized the possibility of at least two potential courses of
action. If one does not respond almost immediately in a particular way to an
event or to a situation, but pauses for thought to contemplate even briefly what one
should do or say, it is more than likely that one has become aware of a conflict of
interests. The not inconsiderable literature 011 value and moral questions related to
nursing clearly illustrates the various interests that may emerge when nurses
become (or are made) aware of having to decide on one course of action in pref¬
erence to another. Value or moral judgements must be made in answer to
questions of what is right or wrong in any given situation, where any degree of
uncertainty exists as to the course of the 'right' action. (The earlier premise that
all decision making involves value judgements, is extended in this paper to the
contention that all value judgements arc moral judgements.) When one keeps in
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mind these two attributes that largely characterize a moral dilemma, namely
uncertainty and conflict of interests, it should not be at all difficult to think
of many events in a nurse's daily professional life that might serve as illustrations.
It should therefore be a matter of some interest that most of the writings, meetings,
discussions, study days and slots in the nursing student's timetable which are de¬
voted at least occasionally to 'moral dilemmas in nursing', by and large use
examples of experiences and events which cannot in any sense be described as
everyday happenings. Few nurses have to face with any frequency actual conflicts
and decisions concerning abortion, human experimentation, organ transplantation,
euthanasia, psycho-surgery or even resuscitation in their daily work. Yet almost
invariably these arc the predominant topics when the concept of moral dilemmas is
applied to the professional activities of the nurse, or of the doctor (Campbell 1975).
There may be many and complex reasons why much more common moral
problems are largely ignored by writers and those who initiate discussions in this
area. Honesty, keeping promises, respecting physical and emotional privacy,
safeguarding adult entitlements, doing justice to people, examining the limits
of obedience, using and not abusing professional power and preventing in¬
competent practices may not be dramatic enough at first glance to sell books or
to attract people to a meeting or study day. It may also influence the choice of
topics that it is usually easier for all concerned to talk about events and situations
which are largely hypothetical for most of the participants and therefore can be
dealt with on an 'as if' basis without any personal commitment or action likely
to affect next day's work. Neither is it inconceivable that nurses might recognize
more immediate moral problems and issues and would prefer to be concerned
with them, if they were given the opportunity to do so.
SOME NURSES' PERCEPTIONS OF MORAL ISSUES
IN NURSING
In an attempt to elucidate and examine nurses' perceptions of moral problems
which they have encountered or feel that they might do so in their daily pro¬
fessional activities, groups of nursing students and qualified nurses in postbasic
programmes were asked during a 9 month period between September 1978 and
June 1979, at the beginning of a scries of timetabled discussions concerned with
moral aspects of nursing, 'to list three topics or issues you think might be relevant
to the forthcoming scries of discussions' which varied in number between five and
eight sessions. Table 1 provides a summary of the answers received by 83 under¬
graduate nursing students and 48 postbasic students who were participating in
health visiting, clinical teaching and nursing administration courses.
Although the respondents were all, at the time, attending nursing courses in
an institution of higher education, there is little reason to believe that they were
entirely unrepresentative of nurses generally, in offering over 90% of topics for
discussion which are usually presented as illustrations of moral concerns in nursing
by the professional literature as well as by the mass media.
tableiMoralissuesperceivedbyn rsingstudentsandqualifi dn rs sabei grelev nttodiscuss onsfm r la pectinnursi
Numberoft picsrelatedt :
NumberofNumberOrgan












































































I3<S R. A. Sclirock
The category of topics that was of particular interest in the context of the pre¬
sented argument is that of 'others' containing topics not related to the often cited
examples of moral conflict in nursing. In spite of the small number of topics in
that category (well under 10%), Table 2 shows an interesting difference between
nursing students and qualified nurses in their choice of examples.






























































The comparatively high proportion of topics relating to patients' relatives and
patient care, is somewhat misleading as an overall indication of concern amongst
nurses with moral issues in these areas, since 76% of these topics were offered by
nursing students, 12% by health visiting students and 12% by nursing administra¬
tion students, while clinical teaching students did not contribute at all to these
areas.
Topics related to 'medical authority' included giving a drug without a doctor's
prescription, criticizing a doctor for not answering a call, not telling a doctor
something that a patient had said, and giving the patient information which the
doctor had withheld deliberately.
Conflicts arising out of caring for the 'patient's property' were described as
losing an item of personal clothing in the ward, allowing the patient to keep a
large sum of money in the bedside locker, not checking all the patient's property
011 admission, and handing patient's property to visitors without his or her
knowledge.
'Fellow nurses' were seen as part of a moral dilemma when they did not carry
out nursing care as instructed by the ward sister, were abrupt or unkind to a
particular patient, made mistakes but did not admit to them or attempted to blame
others tor errors or omissions.
Nursing administration students contributed one item which related to
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'patient care' giving the example of not telling the patient when lie or she might
go home. All nursing students who offered items in this category mentioned
insufficient or ineffective care due to too much work, poor organization, ignor¬
ance, tiredness, home commitments of nurses, and frequent transfers of staff
between wards. Similar problems were indicated in relation to 'patient's relatives'
whom nursing students felt they had failed due to ignorance, direct prohibitions
by the senior ward staff to pass on information, not being able to conceal when
relatives were felt to be in the way; and not knowing what the patient feels about
his or her relatives. Both responses by health visiting students in this category
questioned the general notion that relatives are always good for patients.
Perceptions
If one examines the perceptions implied in those topics offered which did not fall
into the more common categories of moral dilemmas, one experiences difficulties
in judging whether the respondents perceived a situation in moral terms rather
than in what might be more appropriately called social-organizational contexts.
However, even a closer look at the 'in any case' small numbers of responses in this
category reveals the almost total absence of what may be called more justifiably
'everyday moral issues'. There are many glaring omissions; telling the truth,
keeping promises, respecting privileged information, defining the limits of
obedience owed to a formal professional authority, and balancing justifiable
self-interest against that of the patient. All these activities arc not only part of
everybody's daily existence, they also appear to be much more central to the
patient's concern about the 'right' and 'wrong' decisions that arc made by others
and over which he or she appears to have little control.
The second part of this paper offers a closer examination of some of the
problems related to professional truth telling and deception as an illustration of an
'everyday' moral issue in nursing and in health care generally, to which nurses
might address themselves rather more frequently than they seem to be doing at
present.
The cavalier approach of the health care professional to being truthful
Whether to lie, be silent, hedge around or tell the truth is often a difficult decision
to make. Almost everyone who remains conscious of the various shades of truth
that pervade our everyday existence must have faced the personal dilemma
whether to be truthful or not 011 many occasions. Few nurses would claim that
they never had to modify the truth as they knew it, in what they genuinely
believed to be the patient's best interest. Doctors and nurses may not feel able to
concur with the fourth century Augustine who concluded a treatise 'Against
Lying' by saying 'what is not true we should never try to persuade anyone to
believe' (Deferrari 1952). Socrates, some 700 years before Augustine, illustrated
the dilemmas of being truthful in a way that nurses may appreciate: ' ... If one
borrowed a weapon from a friend who subsequently went out of his mind and
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then asked for it back, surely it would be generally agreed that one ought not to
return it, and that it would not be right to do so, or to consent to tell the strict
truth to a madman?' (Plato 1955 edition). From Socrates to Kant and Simone de
Bcauvoir (1969), who all cited examples from the work of physicians and nurses,
philosophers have examined the principles which appear to or perhaps ought to
govern man's decisions to lie or tell the truth.
This was never an easy undertaking and many are the examples in which 'The
common good requires that even falsehoods should be upheld' (Grotius quoting
Quintilian 1925).
'Where deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, common sense seems to concede that
it may sometimes be right: tor example, most persons would not hesitate to speak talsely to an
invalid, if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock . . .',
argued Sidgwick (1907). ' felling the truth, therefore, is not solely a matter of moral character, it
is also a matter of correct appreciation ot real situations and serious reflection upon them. I he more
complex the actual situation of a man's life, the more responsible and the more difficult will be his
task ot telling the truth' (BonfocfFer in Bcthgc 1965).
Nurses might argue with justification that they find themselves in very com¬
plex situations where many quite legitimate interests may conflict with one
another. But it seems that the appreciation of the potential complexity of the
nursing task has not been accompanied by the 'serious reflection' which
Bonhocfler demands.
'Many physicians talk about such deception in a cavalier, often condescending and joking way,
whereas patients often have an acute sense of injury and loss of trust at learning that they have
been duped' (liok 197X).
This casual approach to the problems of professional truth and deception
is common to all professions causing the recipients of professional services the
greatest distress. For patients among others, to be given false information about
important events in their lives is to be rendered powerless and to be deprived
of their autonomy.
'Honesty from health professionals matters more to patients than almost everything else that they
may experience when ill' (Bok 1978).
Yet the requirement to be honest with patients is not referred to either in the
nursing or in the medical code of ethics! It is generally ignored, if not actually
disparaged in the teaching of nursing and medicine and finds only an occasional
reference in writings 011 professional ethics.
THE FUNDAMENTAL EXPECTATION OF TRUTHFULNESS
IN SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL INTERACTIONS
Some level ot truthfulness has always been seen as essential to human society.
A society whose members were generally unable to distinguish truthful messages
from deception would collapse. There must be a minimal degree of trust in
essential truthfulness of communications with one's fellow men. Daily life as most
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people know it would come to a standstill, if they could not rely at least in principle
on the truthfulness of others. The procuring of food and shelter could not be
accomplished by simply asking where they might be found, warnings of dangers
or pleas lor help would have to be ignored until or unless independent continuation
could be found.
Doctors and nurses can only practise on the general understanding that patients
will tell the truth about their complaints and problems. A nurse could not accom¬
plish the most basic care, if she could not expect that patients indicating hunger,
thirst, need for elimination, discomfort and pain arc normally telling the truth.
It is the necessary expectation that people will be truthful, which also confers
upon the lie or half-truth the power to hurt and to destroy the trust that is essential
in the professional relationship. Not only does lying or deception rob the patient
of his or her autonomous power, it decreases in the long run the power of the
nurse or the doctor to act effectively for the benefit of this and other patients.
Few nurses may deliberately lie to patients but the common uses of half-truths
and denials (often as a result of the nurse's inability to cope with a potentially
stressful situation) must be truly anti-therapeutic over time.
Excuses and justification
The perpetrator of the lie or half-truth usually incorporates in the decision to act
in this way some explanation to assuage his own conscience, or he may offer
some explanation to others who may require that he explains his conduct. It
might help to clarify the issues involved by making distinctions between the kinds
of explanations usually given by a professional person who has lied to a client.
An excuse seeks to extenuate the person who told a lie from any blame. The
nurse who told a patient on little or no evidence that a particular treatment would
cure him, while others who feel that this is not really an honest presentation of the
situation might claim as an excuse that so little is known about the treatment to
make it impossible to say that what she had told the patient may not be true, in
other words, the nurse is not really offering an excuse for having lied but is dis¬
puting that her action should be classified as a lie.
A second type of excuse might emerge, if she claimed that she knew well that
what she had told the patients was not entirely true, but that she had been ordered
by the doctor to give the patient the information in this particular form. A third
type of excuse may be that she admits to having deceived the patient and therefore
accepts responsibility for it, but offers reasons to show that there was some
justification in her decision to lie to the patient.
It may be apparent that an examination of the justification of the nurse's
action would have to proceed along different lines, depending 011 what type of
excuse had been put forward by her.
Not knowing the whole truth should not prevent anyone from being told
what is actually known and what can reasonably be conveyed to the person by the
informant.
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Doctors frequently justify their reluctance to give a patient information about
his illness by claiming that to tell the 'whole truth' would not be possible. All that
is known about the disease may not be known by the individual doctor. Even all
that he does know about could possibly not be conveyed to the patient in less
than weeks or even months. Probably what can be said about the disease generally
needs so many qualifications and elaborations in each individual case that the
task of 'telling the truth' appears quite impossible. Clearly, 'the whole truth' is
out ot reach for the doctor, for the patient, and for the nurse in the above example.
However, the issues to be judged arc not concerned with the 'whole truth'
but with the truthfulness of the nurse who, her colleagues might argue, should
have told the patient truthfully that little was known about the treatment in
question.
The first type of excuse would therefore entail an examination of whether the
nurse was justified in claiming that no more certain knowledge about the treat¬
ment was available to anyone and whether she was justified in concealing the
uncertainty of the treatment from the patient. The second excuse would pose
quite different questions related to the moral issues of the limits of obedience to a
formal professional authority and of acting 011 moral decisions made by another
person (assuming that the doctor felt morally justified to withhold the truth from
the patient). The third type of excuse would lead to an examination of the validity
ofthe moral reasons for deliberately telling a lie to the patient. The nurse may have
decided not to be truthful in an endeavour to avoid harm and produce a benefit
to the patient which she felt could not have been achieved by telling the truth.
One might argue that the first and second type of excuses do not provide
any justification for telling a lie to this patient, one being a matter of possible
ignorance or unjustifiable bias in relation to facts, the other being a question of
self-interest rather than of the interest ot the patient. If any justification can be
found for the action of the nurse, it would most likely have to emerge from the
third type of excuse. To put it another way: ignorance and coercion arc not
acceptable justifications for lying to patients, if the perpetrator of the lie claims to
have acted in a professional capacity which is characterized by the demand for a
reasonable standard of knowledge and by a reasonable degree of autonomy of
action. Nurses cannot claim professional status and at the same time excuse their
actions by ignorance and coercion.
The deliberate lie indicated in the third type of excuse in which the nurse
admits the lie, accepts the responsibility for it but offers moral reasons why she
should not be blamed for the decision to deceive the patient rather than tell the
truth, appears to be the only possible departure from truthfulness by a professional
person that might be justified.
THE PROCESS OF JUSTIFICATION
If accountability is accepted as a characteristic of a professional performance,
then all departures from generally expected and established principles of practice
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should be justified. It was pointed out earlier that the principle of telling the
truth is essential to maintaining an effective professional relationship. Any deliber¬
ate deviation from this principle should be justified and not be accepted without
questioning the rationale employed by the professional who decided 011 a specific
occasion not to tell the truth.
In examining the offered justification when presented with a fellow nurse's
excuse for a particular lie, her professional colleagues should first of all look
carefully whether any alternatives of a non-deceptive nature had been available.
Secondly, they would weigh the moral reasons for and against the lie taking care
to consider both the nurse's and the patient's perspective. Thirdly, they would
look beyond the individuals involved and assess the effect this and quite possibly
consequent instances of deception ensuing from the first one might have on other
persons outside the specific situation under discussion.
'Reasonable persons might be especially eager to circumscribe the lies told by all those whose power
renders their impact 011 human lives greater than usual. And they would wish to set up the clearest
possible standards and safeguards in order to prevent these and other liars from drifting into more
and more damaging practices—through misunderstanding, carelessness, or abuse.
The concern to counteract spreading practices ot deception would lead these reasonable persons
to opt tor accountability wherever individuals now exert inHuence over others in ways for which
they cannot be held to task. At all times they have to look at the individual lie from the point of
view that it might give rise to others' (Bok 197s).
An examination of some possible justifications of deliberate deception
in a professional relationship
Nurses claiming justification for having deceived a patient or a relative appear to
frequently offer reasons which, following the argument here, do not seem accept¬
able in principle. From a series of written questions to be answered anonymously
by qualified nurses who were at the time participating in various postbasic courses,
two examples presented in Tables 3 and 4 might illustrate this point.
Sixty per cent of the offered reasons for withholding the truth in response
to a patient asking the name and/or purpose of a drug he was given would fall
under the second type of excuse, to have acted under coercion (of the doctor's
orders, of ward policy instructions). However, 27-5% appeared to evidence lack
ofconfidence by the nurse to be able to handle the situation, if the patient had been
told the truth (Table 3 Reasons 3, 6, 8, 9, 10). An excuse of ignorance or lack of
skill 011 the part of the qualified professional worker would not seem to be a
valid justification for lying or evading the truthful answer. Another 7-5% of the
reasons appeared to have taken the interest of another professional into greater
account than the interest of the patient (Table 3 Reasons 4, 5). Only 5% might,
after discussion, have emerged as valid reasons for withholding information in
two specific instances (Table 3 Reason 7). The percentage of reasons attributed to
coercive influences of ward policy in withholding information from a relative
who had asked what was wrong with the related patient matches the result in
the first question almost exactly with 58-6%. Reason 3 in Table 4 (10-3%) and
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table 3 Qualified nurses' justifications for instances oj deliberate deception
Question: It you have ever told a patient that you did not know the name or purpose
of a drug that he/she was given (although you did know), why did you tell
a lie or give an evasive answer?
Student Croup
Clinical
Health Clinical Nursing postbasic
visiting teaching administration course
students students students students
OJ]ered reason (16) (9) (to) (5) Total
1 1 loctor's orders 5 3 3 1 12
2 Ward policy 3 3 4 2 12
3 Expected patient
to refuse drug 2 0 i 1 4
4 Patient had been
told drug was changed
but it was not 0 0 o i 1
5 Patient believed
another drug to
be more effective I 1 0 0 2
6 Patient would have
known he had an
illness he dreaded i 0 i 0 2
7 Patient was addicted
to certain drugs 0 1 i 0 2
8 Other patients might
have started asking 0 r 0 0 1
9 Patient had told doctor
that he would not take
this drug as it made him
feel bad I 0 0 0 1
10 It would have taken
too long to explain in
detail 3 0 0 0 3
Reason 4 (6-8%) indicate an unacceptable lack of skill or knowledge while
Reason 2 (24%) might after discussion of each individual case have revealed an
acceptable justification for deliberate deception. With 95% of excuses in the first,
and 76% in the second example being unlikely to be acceptable as justification
for deception, the question what kind of reason might in principle be acceptable
as a justification for not telling the truth must be raised.
The acute crisis
For those confronted with a crisis in which a patient may suffer serious physical
or emotional injury, or even death, there is little time to reflect. It should be noted,
however, that in the 69 instances of deceptions illustrated in Tables 3 and 4, not
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table 4 Qualified nurses' justifications jor instances of deliberate deception
Question: If you have ever given an evasive answer to a relative of a patient who
asked what was wrong with the patient, why did yoti do this?
Student Group
Clinical
Health Clinical Nursing posthasic
visiting teaching administration course
students students students students
Offered reason (») (7) (9) (>) Total
1 Ward policy not to
give diagnosis 5 5 4 3 17
2 Patient Bad a malignant
disease 2 2 3 0 7
3 Relative would not
have understood 1 0 •> 0 3
4 I did not know for
certain 0 0 0 2 2
one was attributed to a crisis decision. None the less, they undoubtedly do occur
and do not leave the nurse with any time to work out non-deceptive alternatives.
The avoidance of certain harm befalling the person about to be deceived would
outweigh the general principle of truthfulness that should operate in professional
relationships. There would be no dilhculty in defending the decision to tell the
person poised to commit suicide a lie that can be expected to stop the person front
committing an irrevocable act of self-destruction. While rushing to resuscitate
a patient who collapsed in the presence of visitors, truthful and detailed answers
to their anxious questions might clearly be not possible. 'Someone who advocated
the policy of total honesty would be a dangerous individual in times where life
and death crises arise, there arc professional groups whose members can expect
frequent crises in their work' (Bok 1978).
Prolonged threats to survival
In extreme and prolonged threats to survival as in epidemics affecting large
numbers of people, human choice is intolerably restricted. One lie after another
may barely prevent disaster and threats may reoccur which each time pose the
issue of deception under the same conditions as may prevail in an acute crisis, i.e.
110 time for searching out non-deceptive alternatives and the necessity of prevent¬
ing greater harm coming to people. In many discussions with nurses, few instances
could be found that might create such prolonged threats to survival in the health
care system in this country. Perhaps a just possible example may be a group of
seriously disturbed mentally ill patients, who lace an outbreak of an epidemic and
can only be coerced into following a strict regime designed to halt the spread of
infection by a deliberate series of lies or half-truths.
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Defining a crisis
Many less urgent predicaments may still be perceived as a crisis or even as a series
of crises by those who practise deception 011 their patients. They may want to
be relieved ofan unpleasant obligation and offer the excuse that there is no time to
consider carefully any alternatives to the deceitful practices. Examples of almost
standardized evasions of the truth abound in relation to dying patients. The
excuses forwarded for an adherence to what arc deliberate lies, contain a mixture
of alleged coercion, lack of knowledge or certainty, and lack of time for the
contemplating of a particular individual's needs and interests.
Prolonged threats to professional survival arc also put forward by nurses in
justification of going along with deceptive practices e.g. in a mental hospital.
Here the conflict between self-interest to merely survive in a job and the violated
interest of patients becomes very apparent. It would be naive to suggest that self-
interest should always be deferred to the interest of the patient. A nurse might feel
obliged to assist a patient detained in a hospital to contact a legitimate authority in
order to have his situation reviewed. If the patient has been prevented from doing
so by the deceptions practised upon him by other members of staff, the nurse
may only be able to help him by telling a lie. For example, she may post a letter
for the patient addressed to his Member of Parliament although the charge nurse
has forbidden this (wrongfully).
'These situations differ with respect to the proportion of persons who actually participate in the
deceptive practices. They differ with respect to the degree of voluntariness of participation,
depending upon the consequences of noncompliance. In all these cases, the claims to justification
vary; liars will tend to overestimate the forces pushing them to lie' (Bok 1978).
PROTECTING CLIENTS AND COLLEAGUES
Difficult choices may arise for nurses and doctors whose professional conduct
endeavours to safeguard the confidences that they may have received from a
patient. Nurse managers will have to decide whether there is any non-deceptive
alternative to answer the inquiry about the psychiatric record of a member of
staff. Often silence is the strongest indication that something is amiss which the
doctor or the nurse manager have endeavoured to keep confidential on behalf of
the patient, or the member of staff, to whom the right of confidentiality of privi¬
leged information belongs.
There arc three claims which might justify a deliberate evasion or even a
deception 011 the part of the person who holds the privileged information. He has
a right to protect himself and his client from any harm which disclosure may
bring; fairness requires a respect for privacy and added strength is given by
the implied or explicit promise to keep confidential any privileged information.
The first claim appeals to the principle of avoiding harm. The lie to protect a
patient or a colleague may prevent injuries to their lives. The second claim involves
the right to privacy. Into this category fall all the potentially illegitimate inquiries
regarding political beliefs, sexual orientations or religious faiths. Honest answers
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to such inquiries may well rob clients or colleagues of their employment or of the
respect accorded to them by others. Refusing to give information that could
blacklist a patient or colleague may be fully justified and lying in such instances
may fall into the category of responses to a crisis. The third claim in defence of
deception in order to maintain confidentiality rests 011 the expectations in pro¬
fessional relationships that hold the promise of secrecy, unless it has been made
explicit by the professional that he will not be held to this promise in a specific
situation. It is, however, in this area ofpotential conflict that the perspective within
a profession can be limiting. 'The bond of confidentiality can dim the perception
of the suffering imposed 011 outsiders' (Bok 1978). The appeal to the sanctity of
promises adds no justification to an undertaking that in itself is wrong or that
protects anyone who places others at risk. Professional loyalty is clearly out¬
weighed by the duty to prevent grievious harm. 'It is time for health professionals
to look closely at the threat which incompetence poses, and at the conflicts between
loyalty and responsibility' (Bok 1978).
The patient's perspective
Withholding from or distorting information given to patients has been tradition¬
ally justified by nurses and doctors in a rather simplistic way. Claims that truth¬
fulness is impossible, that patients do not want bad news, and that truthful
information might harm them rest largely on the paternalistic assumptions of
professional superiority. An attempt to deal with the first claim was made earlier.
The second claim has been refuted by one study after another which show that
the large majority of patients say that they want to be told the truth. A rather
dubious response to this evidence is to make the counterclaim that although
patients say that they want to be told the truth, they do not really want to know!
Even doctors and nurses who admit to the patient's right for honest informa¬
tion may still not provide it and may invoke the third claim that it might harm
them.
'The tactual basis for this argument has been challenged trom two points of view. The damages
associated witli the disclosure of sad news or risks are rarer than physicians believe, and the benefits
which result from being informed are more substantial, even measurably so' (Bok 1978).
Even the fear that patients will be driven to suicide by being told the truth,
has been put forward as a justification for deception, and has in turn been found
to be largely groundless (Oken i96i,Weisman 1972, Veatch 1976).
Nonetheless, concealment, evasion or deception may at times be necessary,
if a health care professional decides to lie to a patient or to conceal the truth,
the burden ot proof must rest, as with all deception, on those who advocate
it in any one instance. A decision to deceive must be seen as the exception and
reasons must be offered and discussed with those who contribute to the care of
the patient. 'Trust and integrity arc precious resources. They can thrive only
011 a foundation of respect for veracity' (Bok 1978).
R. A. Schrock
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"APPENDIX II
Miss R. Schrock, a Lecturer in the Department of Nursing Studies, Univer¬
sity of Edinburgh, was invited to join the Working Group at their first working
week-end session. She subsequently joined the two workshops at Nottingham
and Loughborough.
The members of the Working Group are grateful to Miss Schrock for her in¬
terest and involvement in the task of re-appraising the principles and practice
of health visiting.
Miss Schrock's leadership and clarity of thought were of great benefit to
members of the workshops when she led the plenary sessions. Through her
analysis of the work of the small groups, she enabled the participants to
perceive relationships in the material which were not previously obvious.
The Ongoing Process of Reappraisal
An edited version of the paper by Miss Schrock
The beginning of the process is very important. It illustrates the start of all
those activities which, although called by various names, have a common
denominator in the endeavour to reappraise, eg., research, conceptual revision,
theory construction, examination of principles or even ideological reassess¬
ment.
The first two steps in this process are:
1 Established practices and explanations are being questioned by the
practitioner.
2 Questioning arises out of the realisation that the established practices no
longer seem to:
(a) fulfil the demands made on the practitioner by the client or con¬
sumer (or by the material)
(b) provide the practitioner with a measure that he/she is operating
satisfactorily or efficiently and that current explanations for these
practices no longer help to:
(i) order and predict events with any certainty
(ii) provide an acceptable rationale for practice.
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This state of affairs is often experienced as a scientific or professional crisis.
Suddenly, it seems, the old concepts and modes of thinking which appeared to
have provided a perfectly satisfactory basis for a particular scientific or
professional activity, are not only inadequate but also strangely uncertain. The
dilemma experienced by people in such situations is almost bizarre.
No one would doubt that there is a group of people called health visitors.
They exist, they carry out observable activities which can be described and
categorised and compared with the activities of other people. These are matters
of fact, open to verification. But, at the same time, the strange question arises
whether in fact there is such a thing as health visiting. What has happened?
To emphasise the point: no one would deny that there are people who call
themselves health visitors. We can count them, classify them by age or sex,
describe their work and their clinets and so on. But this does not answer the
question whether there is such a cognitive, conceptual entity which we can call
health visiting as distinct from similar but other entities. So what we are en
countering here is a conceptual problem.
To find the answer we would waste time, if we tried to learn more about
health visitors, or about their work as it can be seen to be done, or about the
things which they learn in the course of their training and education. We must
focus our attention on the criteria in virtue of which wc say that all these
factual phenomena can be conceptualised under the term "health visiting". We
must find out the rules in terms of which expressions are correctly or incorrect
ly used and we must particularly attend to the reasons which these criteria and
rules embody, i.e. why we should draw one distinction rather than another,
why we should characterise actions in one way and not in some different way.
That the participants at the 1974 Wansfell Conference were not in need of
more factual information about health visiting or about health visitors was
poignantly indicated by the statement:
It was not easy to clarify the principles of health visiting except that they
appeared to be expressed in ethical terms and shared with other caring
professions. The conference ended with tutors questioning whether there
were principles more specific to health visiting.
At this point the third step and the fourth in the process of reappraisal had
been reached:
3 Uncertainty is experienced by the practitioner not only about various
concrete aspects of his/her activity, but about its whole purpose or
meaning.
4 Formerly specific aspects or variables have lost their specifity and have
become diffuse by escaping precise definition.
It is at this stage that one must realise that the only solution lies in abandon-
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ing, ai leasi lor the time being, any attempt to add to, to refine or to rearrange
the specifies, both the factual and conceptual content.
Whether this realisation and the resoluteness required to translate it into
action is always allowed to become fully conscious, is a fascinating but also a
crucial question. Particularly in all those human activities where time seems to
be pressing in one way or another or where the demands on the practitioner are
uninterrupted or even increasing, the above demand seems impossible. To
abandon, even temporarily, the conceptual structures which so far have given a
modicum of security during a process which by itself generates uncertainly,
demands a great deal of courage. Or, to put it another way, to solve the in¬
creasing uncertainty, one must first create even more, and perhaps deliberately,
total uncertainty! This is, as one may appreciate, a rather frightening prospect
both for the individual and the group.
But this is the fifth step in the process of reappraisal:
5 By questioning the fundamental assumptions underlying the practice of
the explanations, an even greater degree of uncertainty is created.
This, however, is what occurred during the early meetings of the Working
Group which had been set up in 1975.
It may have been a fortunate coincidence and indeed, may not have been
seen at the time to be a positive factor, that in asking me to contribute to the
deliberations, a further source of creating more uncertainty was introduced
into the process. The uninhibited questioning of some fundamental assump¬
tions underlying the practice of health visiting was necessary, since these were
meaningless unless the criteria for using them were spelt out in minute detail. It
soon became apparent that what had once been a fairly effective framework
for all these activities which we call health visiting had become insufficiently
wide or llexible to accommodate all the developments which had taken place
over the last twenty years. The next steps in the process are:
6 Reconstruction which starts with the identification and analysis of key
concepts relevant to the practice under scrutiny.
7 Before these key concepts can be reorganised into a new, more effective
conceptual framework, the field of conceptual enquiry must be extended
in two ways:
(a) the use and meaning of these very same concepts must be examined
in any other area where they appear to be of significance and their
meaning and relationship in these other areas must be analysed.
(b) related "questions' or "problems' must be identified and reduced to
the concept which is being 'questioned' or which proves
'problematical' so that these concepts can be incorporated into the
continuing process of reappraisal.
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This laltcr activity occupied much of the participants' time and effort during
the days of the Nottingham Workshop. It alternated and was inter-related with
what one must call the stage of'experimenting with parts of a usable model'.
8 Conceptual and paradigmatic experimentation involves trying out and
usually partly accepting and partly discarding various elements. This
stage of experimentation must attempt to test any suggested so.lutions
(or parts of a solution) for
(a) inherent consistency (informal logic)
(b) its explanatory value and power of the practice under scrutiny.
I here is a danger that this phase can be prolonged and extended to such a
degree that it becomes more and more difficult to correlate what is happening.
Therefore the next step must be attempted, even tentatively, to keep control
over the process:
9 Definitions and paradigms must be formulated and must be used to in
corporate any new elements and any new part solutions.
There is a possibility that a point is reached where the attempted definition
and the provisional paradigm or the set of principles prove unworkable. This,
however, does not mean that a start from the very beginning has to be made. If
a careful record of the criteria and rules expressed in these conceptual struc¬
tures has been kept, it can fairly easily be seen in what way the solution so far
attempted is still valid and in what specific way it has to be modified.
The next stages can be summarised in the last three steps:
10 Conclusive conceptual and paradigmatic statements must be made.
11 The specific question/problem which started off the process of
reappraisal must be answered/solved.
12 The 'new' concept/model/set of principles/theory must be shared with
all practitioners and must be tested in its application to the practical
endeavour under scrutiny.
However, the twelfth step should not literally come'at the end' but the whole
development of the process of reappraisal should be shared to the greatest
possible extent with the practitioner.
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1 Ruth A. Schrock
Philosophical issues
The search for knowledge
Observers of nursing in the United Kingdom during the past seventy
years should have recognised a major change in the development of
the profession since its 'coming of age' in 1919 when responsibility for
the training, education and registration of nurses was taken over by
the General Nursing Councils. The steady flow of reports on nursing
from the 1930s onwards indicated clearly that all was not well in the
provision of the quantity and quality of nursing care (Baly, 1973). The
suggested solutions to the problems which apparendy beset the
profession in the first half of this century concentrated largely on the
need for recruiting and retaining more nurses. This implied that more
nurses would provide more and better nursing care.
From the 1950s onwards the demand for more nurses was frequendy
accompanied, if not entirely substituted by an ever more strongly
expressed desire for a new knowledge in nursing. To have and to hold
more nurses as such appeared no longer to be the only solution. If
more nurses were needed, they also needed to be different.
In A Reform ofNursing Education (1964) the hope that the 'study of
nursing would become a suitable subject for study at university level'
was expressed for the first time in a published report. The Report ofthe
Committee on Nursing (1972) reaffirmed on a broader basis this new
look at nursing and demanded that efforts should be directed towards
making nursing a more research-based profession. It was no longer
felt to be sufficient for the education of the professional nurse of the
future to 'remain at the level ofa training in procedures'. Such skills as
nurses may acquire have 'to be supported by a rationale, a scientific
basis for action'. A theoretical basis for nursing action, well founded in
scientific principles, many writers agree, is essential to the provision
of effective nursing care. Although nurses are as yet in the early stages
of theory construction and are still engaged predominantly in the
endeavour to describe methodically and systematically what actually
happens in nursing, the search for a new knowledge in nursing and the
efforts to 'see nursing in a new light' have produced a 'useful literature
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exploring the basic conceptual framework ofnursing..(McFarlane,
1976).
Conceptual revision
One kind of philosophical activity is a process known as 'conceptual
analysis' (Wilson, 1963) by which philosophers attempt to clarify and
define the concepts, notions and ideas which are the foundations for a
particular scientific or professional inquiry but which the scientist or
professional uses pragmatically and empirically. Always (Kuhn,
1962), or at least very often (Ryan, 1970), it is in times of crisis,
scientific or professional, that suddenly the old concepts which had
seemed to provide a perfectly satisfactory basis for a particular
scientific or professional activity, no longer suffice in the ordering and
predicting of events. It is at this point that an attempt is made to
restructure or to recreate the major concepts in a particular field of
human endeavour. The kind of crisis that shakes the epistemological
foundations of a discipline or profession appears to be affecting
nursing at present. Traditional nursing 'knowledge' is no longer
accepted generally or totally as either adequate, valid or relevant to
those activities which are called nursing (Scott Wright, 1973).
It requires a lengthy and complex historical and philosophical
argument to examine in depth the causal relationships between the
increasing uncertainty of what might constitute 'real nursing
knowledge' and the apparent conceptual confusion of what kind of
caring activities should properly be called 'nursing'. The traditional
concept of 'care' along with the knowledge and skills generally
acquired by nurses no longer seem to fit either the experiences or the
ambitions of nurses who wish, and are often asked, to demonstrate
that they are engaged in an effective caring activity that is sufficiently
distinct from that of other health care workers to be conceptualised as
a separate entity, i.e. as 'nursing'.
The growing literature concerned with the 'process of nursing'
(Kratz, 1979) illustrates the fundamental re-thinking that is
attempted in nursing today. Although this kind ofconceptual revision
is a relatively recent phenomenon in British nursing, making its first
appearance in the mid 1970s, it has aroused already distinct
apprehensions in those who engage in these revisionist activities and
in those who fear to become the unwilling recipients of a great deal of
useless 'theorising'. While the former group is anxious to see its new
models of caring applied in the actual activities of nurses, and is
therefore justifiably apprehensive ofany expression of rejection by the
nurse practitioner, the latter frequently anticipates little benefit and
an additional burden to an already heavy workload. That this gulf
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should be generated in the first place and by its existence propound
the problems which were to be solved at least partially by a conceptual
revision of the whole enterprise called 'nursing', illustrates the
difficulties in producing a shared understanding of the process of
conceptual reappraisal.
Questions and answers
Philosophical analysis, of which the process of conceptual reappraisal
in only one example, is an essential preliminary to any sort of answer
to a question. One must first analyse the question in order to discover
what it means and how one would set about answering it. One cannot
sensibly answer any question without first discovering what sort of
answer would be relevant and indeed, useful to the purposes of the
questioner (Popkin et al, 1969). If the questions that are asked by
nurse practitioners and nurse theorists are not analysed, and no
shared agreement is reached about their meaning and about what
might count as a relevant answer, a variety of largely unconstructive
situations may arise.
Answers to unasked questions
The nurse practitioner is not asking any questions and is therefore not
expecting any answers. If one assumes that the question to which
nurse theorists have supplied the answer in the nursing process
literature is about the best means towards effective nursing care, one
can see clearly where the gulf between nurse practitioner and nurse
theorist may have originated. The nurse practitioner is not asking
questions about effective nursing care and therefore the answer of the
nurse theorist (to an unasked question) is not only seen as meaningless
but may be perceived as threatening in the sense that the nurse
practitioner is made to feel guilty for not having asked the question to
which the answer is now offered.
Answers to different questions than those asked
The nurse practitioner expects answers to different questions than
those which the nurse theorist has chosen to examine and to answer.
The nurse practitioner may be asking questions about how to cope with
new managerial responsibilities and cannot share the priorities nurse
theorists perceive. Again the offered answers embodied in the concep¬
tualisation of the process of nursing appear irrelevant and burdensome,
since they seem to be answering a different kind of question.
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Unacceptable answers to the question asked
The nurse practitioner and the nurse theorist are asking the same kind
of question but differ in their expectations of what is to count as a
relevant answer. Both may be asking questions about means towards
effective nursing care but the nurse practitioner is expecting an
answer in terms of manpower development and does not accept the
offered answer in nursing process terms as a valid and relevant
solution.
Acceptable answers arrived at by chance
By chance, the nurse theorist may select and examine a question that
is being asked by nurse practitioners, and may provide an answer that
is found to be valid and relevant within the practitioner's current
conceptual frame. Here one may find the comparatively rare occasion
when almost against all expectations an idea takes root and becomes
incorporated into the ideational fabric of the profession. However,
one not uncommon danger may lurk in this situation. The answer that
is so unexpectedly and speedily taken up into an essentially
unexamined conceptual framework may be somewhat transformed
into practice activities which were not desired by the nurse theorist.
A perfectly acceptable philosophical approach to avoiding the
unconstructive cross purposes and conflicting expectations
surrounding questions and answers is open to the nurse theorist who
wishes to preserve an individual starting point in the search for
knowledge. To arrive at specific conclusions and then to determine
what kind of practice questions these may answer, by whatever
method of inquiry that offers itself for the 'attempt to increase
available knowledge by the discovery of new facts through systematic
scientific enquiry' (Clark & Hockey, 1979), is a legitimate scientific
endeavour. It entails the analysis of questions that nurse practitioners
may be asking with a view to identifying those that may be answered
by the theoretical conclusion already arrived at. Much research that
sets out to duplicate previous studies utilises this theorem. This does
not contradict the earlier assertion that question analysis is an
essential preliminary to any sort of answer. Here it becomes the
identical preliminary to fitting an already formulated answer to a
possible question. What remains a frequently unsolved philosophical
issue in nursing is the lack of, or deficiency in, the analysis of nursing
questions either before or after a theoretical answer has been
formulated. However, more usually the search for a new knowledge
via the process of conceptual reappraisal finds an effective expression
in changed practices when it becomes a shared endeavour between the
nurse theorist and the nurse practitioner.
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The process of a shared conceptual reappraisal
Following Kuhn's argument (1962) one would expect successful
conceptual revision to be generated by the practitioner who will remain
actively involved in its various stages. The following outline of the
process of reappraisal (Schrock, 1977) illustrates the essential inter¬
action between the conceptual revision and its application to the practice
whose knowledge base it is endeavouring to clarify and to define.
The beginning of the process is very important. It illustrates the
start of all those activities which, although called by various names,
have a common denominator in their attempt to reappraise, e.g.
research, conceptual revision, theory construction, examination of
principles, or even ideological reassessment.
The first two steps in this process are:
1. Established practices and explanations are being questioned by
the practitioner.
2. This questioning arises from the realisation that the established
practices no longer seem to:
a. fulfil the demands made on the practitioner by the client or
consumer, or by the material
b. provide the practitioner with the confidence of operating
satisfactorily or efficiently and with explanations that help to:
(i) order and predict events with any certainty
(ii) provide an acceptable rationale for practice.
This phase is experienced as a scientific or professional crisis when
the current knowledge base appears not only inadequate but also
dubious in principle. Ryan (1970) describes this experience as 'a crisis
of scientific confidence' in which 'currendy accepted techniques yield
results which seem not just unsatisfactory, but unsatisfactory in
principle...'. The practitioner, who is dissatisfied with the knowledge
and explanations that are available, may well continue to expect
solutions to this uncertainty to be provided by more knowledge of the
kind that so far has been accepted as relevant to the practice. Nurses in
this situation may similarly demand more detailed and more complex
procedural instructions or an extension of the familiar medical
knowledge based curriculum.
As an accession to these demands fails to restore confidence in the
practice of nursing, the third and fourth step in the process of
reappraisal have been reached:
3. Uncertainty is experienced by the practitioner not only about
various concrete aspects of the professional activity, but also about its
whole purpose and meaning.
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4. Formerly specific aspects or variables have lost their specificity
and have become diffuse by escaping precise definition.
It is at this stage that the only solution lies in abandoning, at least for
the time being, any attempt to add to, to refine or to rearrange the
specifics of both the factual and the conceptual content of the current
knowledge base. Whether the resoluteness that is required to translate
this realisation into action is always allowed to enter into full
consciousness is a fascinating and crucial question. Particularly in all
those human activities where time seems to be pressing or where the
demands of clients on the practitioner are uninterrupted or even
increasing, a deliberate and total abandoning of current conceptual¬
isations may seem impossible. To give up, even temporarily, the
conceptual structures which so far have provided a modicum ot
security during a process which by itself generates even greater
uncertainty, demands a great deal of courage. But unless the
practitioner is content to forego any control over the development of
the discipline or profession that has reached a critical stage of
uncertainty and dissolution, the lit Ih step in the process ol reappraisal
is inevitable:
5. By questioning the fundamental assumptions underlying the
practice, its rationale, its knowledge and its values, an even greater
degree of uncertainty must be created.
Since a crisis of confidence is not caused by trivial inconsistencies in
the practice of a discipline or of a profession but by its inability to
accommodate and utilise developments which threaten to change its
central character, a superficial rearrangement of concrete practices
will contribute nothing towards its solution. British nursing at the end
of the 20th century must assimilate ideas such as need, individuality,
participation, self-determination, right, accountability, power, and
many more which have been instrumental in the recent general
development of that society to which nursing belongs and in which it
has to function. Without a questioning of the assumptions that
created a model of nursing care which now appears to be increasingly
inadequate, a conceptual reconstruction in the next three steps of the
process of reappraisal is not possible:
6. Reconstruction starts with the identification and analysis of key
concepts that are relevant to the practice under scrutiny.
7. Attempts at clarification and definition must take into account
the significance of these concepts in any other area of professional
practice where they appear to be as significant as in nursing, and
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related 'questions' or 'problems' must be reduced to the concept
which is being 'questioned' so that they can be incorporated into the
continuing process of conceptual reconstruction.
8. Conceptual and paradigmatic experimentation involves trying
out and usually partly accepting and partly discarding various
elements of a usable model which must be tested for its inherent
consistency and for its explanatory value and power in relation to the
practice under examination.
There is a danger that this phase of conceptual clarification and
paradigmatic experimentation can be prolonged and extended to such
a degree that it becomes almost impossible to monitor and to correlate
what is happening. In the absence of any correlation during a
proliferation of conceptual models of nursing, the nurse theorist can
become almost compulsive in the search for an irrefutable nursing
paradigm, while the nurse practitioner fails increasingly to see the
purpose of what may not be described too inaccurately as intellectual
acrobatics which are fun to perform but often frightening to watch
(Rickelmann, 1971). This is not to advocate the imposition of one
conceptual model in arbitrary preference over one or many others.
Scientists frequently make use of a 'model' to describe more clearly
the relationships between concepts. A model is an analogy that is used
to help visualise and understand something that cannot easily be
observed dins My or about which little is known. It is often argued
wnli soi ne j ir.l 11 a a lion that a good model is one wlui li holds loge tliei
long enough to allow the development ol a better one. In many
instances, however, it seems that the development of ever more-
complex theoretical constructs in nursing proceeds without the
necessary testing of their explanatory usefulness for the nurse
practitioner. Jacox (1974) sums up the discussion of a highly abstract
kind of mathematical model that is used to express the
interrelationships among persons, actions and events in numerical
form, by saying: 'As long as no one is fooled into prematurely
believing that the model accurately and simply describes and explains
(nursing), little harm may be done and new insights may be
produced.'
Nevertheless, to keep control over the process of reappraisal which
after all should serve a practical end by helping to re-establish a
well-founded confidence in the practices and explanations of the
discipline or of the profession, one must attempt the next step:
9. Definitions and paradigms must be formulated and having
incorporated any new elements and any new part solutions, they must
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be tested against the specific questions and problems which started off
the whole process of reappraisal.
If one now recalls that these specific questions and problems had
been raised by the practitioner in the first place, it becomes
abundantly clear that the last step in this description of the process of
reappraisal should not literally come 'at the end' but should
accompany each step as it occurs:
10. The 'new' concept, model, set of principles or theory that has
been developed must be shared with all practitioners and must be
tested by them in its application to their practices.
It is part of Kuhn's (1962) and Ryan's (1970) arguments that the
practitioner of a discipline is unlikely to inquire into its logical and
epistemological foundations at times when current problems are
soluble in currently acceptable ways. But practising scientists do
engage 'in philosophical scrutiny of their own practices once they are
beset by doubts of a particularly striking sort' (Ryan 1970). One need
not be committed to the view that the nurse will become a better
practitioner by being diverted to a consideration of philosophical
issues in nursing in those times which might correspond to Kuhn's
(1962) periods of 'normal science' when established concepts can be
used pragmatically and empirically to good effect. But when there is a
crisis of confidence, 'the line between science and its philosophy
becomes much harder to delineate exacdy' (Ryan, 1970). It then
seems not only desirable but necessary that the practitioner should
understand and participate in the philosophical method of inquiry
which 'uses the tools of logic and reason in an attempt to extend
knowledge' (Clark & Hockey, 1979).
While a conceptual revision in times ofcrises may lead to successful
theoretical innovations and to a new kind of knowledge, there is no
reason to believe that philosophical inquiry in nursing only flourishes
in such times.
Philosophy and ideology
At all times people have a tendency to cling to a variety of myths about
man and the world, about the past, present and future. Nursing like
almost any other human activity is surrounded by myths which rest on
'numerous cliches, platitudes and strange contradictions which
point. . . directly or indirectly to a set of unsubstantiated beliefs held
by nurses. . . who (have) been imbued with the lore of nursing'
(Reinkemeyer, 1969).
Many such beliefs centre on the apparent impossibility to define
nursing. At the same time, they are accompanied by a ceaseless quest
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for such a definition. Few attempts have been made by nurses to
examine closely 1) the functions that definitions generally serve, 2)
what kind of definitions one might construe and 3) what specific
purpose any one definition of an object, a person, a group of people,
an activity or a situation might fulfil. An understanding of the nature
of definitions would lead to constructive attempts at defining nursing
and would also expose the belief 'that the glorious thing about nursing
is that it cannot be defined' (Storlie, 1970) as false.
Other cliches and platitudes seem to have been equally resistant to
objective examination: British nursing is the best in the world;
nursing standards have deteriorated (since the introduction of a
revised senior nursing management structure, since the
reorganisation of the health service, since the joining of the European
Economic Community, since the teaching of nursing in universities
and colleges, since the individual's own training days); nurses may not
make mistakes since almost everything they do is a matter of life or
death; nursing is an art based on common sense; nurses know
intuitively when what they do is 'good', but it eludes description;
nurses are born, not made; nurses cannot be educated and dedicated
at the same time; good nursing students are poor nurse practitioners
(and vice versa); nursing can only be learned at the bedside.
The issue here is not whether any or all of these beliefs are true or
false, but that they are accepted uncritically by and large by a
professional group of people and are incorporated into a persuasive
ideological structure which has significant consequences for the tasks
and relationships of the nurse (Williams, 1974). In the course of time,
many unexamined and unproven assumptions and beliefs which are
held with a certain degree of fervour and conviction by a definable
body of people are incorporated into 'an integrated and consistent
personal attitude toward life and reality' which 'underlies' a nurse's
central and shared purposes (Wiedenbach, 1969).
It is certain that such an ideological structure serves'to increase. . .
loyalty to the community and to each other' (Plato, 1955) and that it is
fundamentally necessary in 'the selection ofmodes, means and ends of
action' (Godfrey, 1971). However, it is also important to note that it
does not do justice to the contribution which philosophical methods of
investigation can make to the study of nursing, if one confuses an
'ideology' with a 'philosophy' of nursing.
Whether the prevailing ideology of nursing 'constitutes worthy
means and ends for a given practical endeavour' (Walker, 1971) is not
for the philosopher to decide in spite of the spreading transatlantic
custom to talk in the above sense about a 'philosophy of nursing'.
Philosophical issues in nursing are not exemplified by a collection of
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assumptions and beliefs, even though a philosopher might be
intrigued by the lack of internal logic demonstrated in ideological
systems in nursing as elsewhere.
The philosophical perspective
The philosopher shares with the historian and the scientist the
common goal of increasing man's knowledge about himself and about
the world in which he lives (Silva, 1977). The discovery of new facts
through systematic scientific enquiry is the scientist's task. However,
before and after the scientist employs an experimental research design
with its rightful emphasis on causality (asking e.g. whether certain
explanations given by nurses to a preoperative patient affect his pain
experience postoperatively), the use of the philosophical perspective
facilitates the identification of the research problem, the construction
of an appropriate theoretical framework, the establishment of
conceptual relationships, the formulation of meaningful hypotheses,
the selection of criteria of proof, the processes of valid generalisations,
and the synthesis of any newly discovered or substantiated 'facts' with
already existing (nursing) knowledge.
Regardless of any philosophical analysis of the nature of 'facts',
scientists do not usually set out to 'discover' unrelated facts. They
look for specific facts, order, relate, interpret and generalise from
them. All these are conceptual activities which acknowledge: 'Facts
(to) be sets of objects in the world related in certain ways' and which
view facts as 'things in the world corresponding to parts of thought
and language' (Lacey, 1976). In day to day scientific work, these
operations are normally performed by the scientist who draws on the
discipline's philosophical foundations. These foundations are
examined, clarified and consolidated by the philosopher of science,
social sciences, history, education, mathematics, or nursing, who does
not ask questions in these sciences but who poses questions about
them (Ryan, 1970).
First- and second-order inquiries
It is helpful in distinguishing between scientific and philosophical
questions (and answers) to consider the different kind of questions
that one may ask about any phenomenon or experience. One may ask
factual questions to which the answer can be found by observing,
counting, measuring and testing. Anyone who uses the same tools of
measurement should be able to repeat the investigation and to arrive
at the same results. Ifone stated the fact that x-number of patients in a
given place were recovering from a surgical operation, the observable
evidence of recent operation wounds would make it possible for any
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trained observer to verify this fact. In other words, the answers
purport to be accurate reports of what the facts are like and must be
defensible in terms of-the known methods for getting at these facts.
These kinds of first-order or factual questions are the concern of the
scientist.
What makes second-order or philosophical questions different is
that they cannot be decided by an appeal to any of the known methods
of observing, counting, measuring and testing, i.e. they cannot be
answered by scientific invesugation. If one were to ask how many
nurses there were caring for the mentally disturbed patients in a given
locality, one would quickly discover that the scientist could not even
begin to observe, count or measure until some agreement had been
reached on who were to be counted as a 'nurse' and by what criteria
one would identify the 'mentally disturbed patient'. What has here to
be questioned and answered first are not any potentially observable
facts, but how certain phenomena are to be characterised so that they
become observable, countable and ultimately comparable.
It might be argued that such verbal definitions of conceptual
entities are purely conventions and apply only because of an
agreement that they should apply. Those who consider a close
conceptual examination to be a superfluous exercise might call it
'simply semantics'. But it can cause a fundamental weakness in
nursing research (as in other social science research that is concerned
with the complexities of people in social relationships), if there is no
reasonable concensus on what verbal agreements exist and on the
necessity to maintain such an agreement from one occasion to the
next, to provide the consistency that is essential to all scientific
investigations (Ryan, 1970). Without such concensus, scientific
investigation may become trivial and almost certainly so narrow that it
has little or no meaning for nursing practice. The pursuit of
experimentation for its own sake in a professional context needs
questioning. Cook & La Fleur (1975) maintain that scientific investiga¬
tion that is not supported by a thorough and competent philosophical
analysis and synthesis is becoming a dead end, as meaningful nursing
action cannot be understood by the method of experimental research
alone.
There is general agreement among philosophers that, at the very
least, philosophical inquiry aids the understanding of that knowledge
which has been obtained by appropriate methods related to the matter
in hand. Apart from its contribution by conceptual analysis to the
consistency of scientific inquiry, the methods of philosophy provide
the 'informal logic' and the means for a consistent argument in any
discipline or enterprise to which they are applied.
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Although this is not the only contribution that philosophy has to
make to the understanding of nursing, it must still be argued that
removing contradictions and confusion from the realms of nursing
discourse and eliminating linguistic uncertainties are by themselves
important services.
The demythologisation of nursing ideology
It has been submitted that a nursing ideology serves a unifying
function in helping the practitioners to select modes, means and ends
of nursing actions, and that it allows the emergence of central and
shared purposes. Any ideology, however, that is largely based on
unsubstantiated myths runs the risk to be found wanting in the face of
reality as soon as it becomes feasible to account for the facts which
constitute that reality in a systematic and coherent fashion. If the
beliefs and values which make up the ideological framework of
nursing no longer guide the practitioner effectively and safely but
cause uncertainty and frustration when confronted with factual
evidence that does not support them, an ideological revision becomes
an urgent task. From the beliefs and values which were based on
myths (i.e. unsubstantiated assumptions which served the same
purpose as man's belief in a flat earth at the centre of the universe
when no factual evidence was available to help order man's thinking
about his world in any other way), nurses must progress to beliefs and
values based on the observable facts of reality.
Again it is a question of creating an internal logic by identifying
those aspects of nursing ideology which are clearly contradictory and
therefore by definition cannot be true at the same time. One such
contradiction is e.g. expressed in the firmly held but unsubstantiated
belief that more nurses means better nursing care given to patients,
alongside the fact that there are more nurses now than ever before and
the contradictory belief that nursing care standards are falling
everywhere. Only one of these beliefs can be true. Only one of them
can be potentially supported by facts if there is any causal relationship
between the number of nurses and the standard of nursing care at all.
One of these beliefs must be eradicated, if nursing ideology is to
acquire a sounder logical, conceptual and factual basis and serve its
proper function. The nature of philosophy as an uncommitted inquiry
and the prevailing view among philosophers that it is not their
business to advocate any ideology (or 'Weltanschauung') should
single out the philosophical perspective as the valid approach to any
attempt at an ideological revision.
Dickhoff & James (1970) suggest that nurses might cultivate
profitably certain philosophical practices, e.g. to entertain systematic
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ambiguities and even promote them actively in order to prevent a
quick substitution of one (exposed) unexamined belief for another
(not yet exposed).myth; to suggest and work with new terms and new
structures when the old and familiar are deemed inadequate; to render
overt and explicit, and to exploit constructively errors, difficulties and
embarrassments; to seek simplicity of action through principles
rather than through further selection of more closely and more rigidly
defined detail; to use examples of personal, subjective experiences as
mere heuristics (i.e. as a means to find methods of discovery) and not
as 'proofs' which will add to rather than subtract from the mythical
qualities of nursing ideology; and to risk purposeful disorientation as
a step toward a richer reorientation (i.e. to have the courage to
dismantle the crumbling ideological edifice of prevailing nursing
myths in order to facilitate the growth and development of reality
based beliefs and attitudes).
Moral issues
Everyone who is troubled by certain situations in life might be
reflecting on the Tightness and wrongness of possible and potential
behaviours. Moral questions engage almost every human being who is
trying to solve a particular personal value problem, and who is
attempting to do this by deciding consciously and conscientiously on a
specific course of action in the given circumstances (Popkin et al,
1969). Morality concerns that behaviour which involves judgments,
actions and attitudes based on rationally conceived and effectively
established norms. The behaviour can be judged right or wrong. It
can also be judged good or bad depending on the values of society
(Jonsen & Hellegers, 1974). It has been suggested that it is not the task
of the nurse philosopher to determine which values nursing as a
profession should adopt and pursue. The formulation and adoption of
a professional code of ethics which embodies values that are held to be
fundamentally important, is an ideological undertaking and not a
philosophical one. Although 'descriptive ethics' are sometimes seen to
be the philosopher's concern (Lacey, 1976), the examination of what
moral views are held by nurses or by other groups of people or
societies, and whether any of these are held universally, is strictly
speaking a scientific rather than a philosophical enterprise. There is
little doubt that values are 'facts' that can be ascertained by methodical
and systematic inquiry using such tools of scientific investigation as
observation and appropriate measurements of behaviour.
Most concerns in nursing that are related to moral questions appear
to centre on two approaches: to establish — often preceptually —
what values nurses should hold, and to find solutions to moral
16 RECENT ADVANCES IN NURSING
dilemmas that nurses perceive to be important. Whereas the first of
these approaches is not only a decidedly non-philosophical concern
and could be held to be actually an immoral undertaking, the second
endeavour may well be assisted by the contribution that a moral
philosopher could make.
Ethics or moral philosophy is that area of philosophical theory
which is concerned with understanding the nature of moral
judgements. It is not concerned with providing moral guidance but
with an objective analysis of universal principles and concepts
(Campbell, 1975). Such an analysis might be applied to the concept
of honesty or truth-telling, consider the nature of excuses or
justifications and the processes by which people arrive at them, and
establish criteria of lucidi ty, coherence and comprehension in relation
to moral questions in nursing where solutions are required in matters
of honesty.
It has been argued elsewhere that nurses generally do not seem to be
greatly concerned with those moral concepts that have engaged the
interest of many moral philosophers, e.g. truth, honesty, promise,
loyalty, conscience, right, duty, obedience, power, reponsibility,
accountability, and justice (Schrock, 1980). More precisely perhaps,
nurses do not appear to exemplify, examine or discuss these concepts
in relation to everyday nursing situations and thereby discover the
practical implications of a formulated moral principle for their daily
professional behaviour. There may be a connection between one of the
prevailing myths (that all nursing actions are a matter of life and
death) and the tendency of nurses to discuss such moral issues as
euthanasia, abortion, resuscitation, organ transplantation, human
experimentation and psycho-surgery (Campbell, 1975) in preference
to more mundane but more common moral problems in health care.
Telling patients the truth, respecting physical and emotional privacy,
safeguarding adult rights, examining the limits of obedience in
hierarchical structures, using but not abusing professional power, and
preventing incompetent practices could all be examined very profit¬
ably from a philosophical perspective which cannot produce the instant
solution to people's moral uncertainties, but which will provide the
intellectual and emotional discipline that such an activity demands
from the individual who is faced with difficult moral choices:
The analytical attitude which it teaches prevents reliance on
unquestioned assumptions, or on uncritical reactions to particular
situations, as escape routes from thinking through the complexities of
adequate medical care. (Campbell, 1975.)
In this area of concern as well as in those discussed earlier, the
narrow and uncritical colloquial use of the term 'philosophy' by nurse
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writers and speakers has seriously limited the potentially valid
contributions which a 'philosophy of nursing' might make to nursing
theory and practice.
Conclusion
Philosophy is aptly described as the endeavour to evaluate the
information and beliefs of man about the universe and the world of
human affairs and to see if they are rationally defensible (Popkin et al,
1969). Therefore its scope is practically limitless. One of its important
concerns is the study of formal logic. The place of formal logic in
theory construction in nursing would require a complex exposition.
Nothing has been said here about the important fundamental issues of
social and political philosophy, nor has their scope and applicability to
nursing theory been examined (Campbell, 1978).
All moral codes, all religions, all ideologies make some . . . claim about the
world ... All social theories are thus vulnerable to the ravages of the facts
which may push them beyond the stage of merely having puzzles to solve to
that presenting anomalies, and at this point, the revolutions which occur
are not scientific ones, but political and social revolutions. (Ryan, 1970.)
It may appear to many that nurse theorists and nurse philosophers
are engaged in a possibly stimulating pastime by attempting to solve
intellectual puzzles. A rational defence of nursing knowledge and
beliefs, however, is an urgent necessity in the face of its fundamental
and often jealously guarded irrationality that sooner rather than later
might lead it beyond the current crisis of confidence into social and
political upheavals in which it would be unable to survive as a
recognisable entity.
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